Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
ETD Archive
2017

A Post-Critical Science of Administration: Toward a Society of
Explorers
Craig M. Wickstrom
Cleveland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive
Part of the Epistemology Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Wickstrom, Craig M., "A Post-Critical Science of Administration: Toward a Society of Explorers" (2017).
ETD Archive. 1022.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/etdarchive/1022

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted
for inclusion in ETD Archive by an authorized administrator of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information,
please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

A POST-CRITICAL SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION:
TOWARD A SOCIETY OF EXPLORERS

CRAIG M. WICKSTROM

Bachelor of Arts in Natural Science

North Park College

May 1979

Master of Science in Urban Studies
Cleveland State University

May 2003

submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN URBAN STUDIES AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

at the
CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY

DECEMBER, 2017

© COPYRIGHT BYCRAIGM. WICKSTROM2017

We hereby approve this dissertation for
Craig M. Wickstrom

Candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies and Public Affairs degree
for the
Maxine Goodman Levin College of Urban Affairs

and the CLEVELAND STATE UNIVERSITY
College of Graduate Studies

Dissertation Chairperson, Michael W. Spicer

Department & Date

Dissertation Committee Member, Helen Liggett

Department & Date

Dissertation Committee Member, Walter B. Gulick

Department & Date

Student's Date of Defense: November 30, 2017

DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my families:

•

To my wife, Cheryl, who patiently and sometimes not-so-patiently endured my
long effort.

•

To my birth mother and father who always remained interested and willing to

listen to my discoveries.
•

To my mother-in-law and especially my late father-in-law who understood little

of my purpose or thinking, but supported me unconditionally, as a son.
•

To my children who sometimes wondered why I continued such a long pursuit
with little promise of reward.

•

To my grandchildren (and all children) who always bring me so much joy.

•

To my local church family which sought to give me space while suffering from
the neglect of my full presence.

•

To my siblings and siblings-in-law who probably understand me better than I do

myself - and yet have continued to support me nonetheless.
•

To my missionary family which always assumes more of me than I deserve.

•

To my global church family which always accepts me as a brother.

Even if I had never completed this work, my families would have accepted me,
encouraged me, supported me, and brought me joy. I am blessed to belong and to be

called by so great a throng of witnesses.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was made possible by expressions of confidence in my ability that

called me to keep pushing forward when I sincerely doubted myself.

That

encouragement came in many forms - from my wife, Cheryl, refusing to let me give up

and my family members taking time to listen and discuss ideas with me, to the

recognition of indeterminate possibilities evident in me from the time I was an infant. I
am particularly fond of the story Dorothy Blakeway and Helen Berquist tell of baby
sitting me as a one-year old and teaching me to say "sphinx" as my first word.

Academically, I owe much of my success for completion of this dissertation to Michael
Spicer who gave me confidence by inviting me to write a dissertation under his tutelage

and who, as my committee chair, then pushed me to complete it, spending many, many

hours correcting and critiquing and editing my work in a process of apprenticeship that
made real many of the concepts I was attempting to bring to light.

Of course others also had a part in encouraging my academic efforts. Norman Krumholz
first stimulated my interest in public and urban affairs by his hands-on teaching style.
Lawrence Keller sparked my interest in leadership and organizations and chaired my first

major writing effort. Helen Liggett taught me to explore ideas that pushed my thinking
beyond what was comfortable and served as a member of my committee. Walter Gulick
showed an early interest in my understanding of Polanyi's ideas and, as the Polanyi

scholar on my committee, encouraged me to restrict my elaboration of Polanyi's
philosophy to that which was relevant to my central topic.

Many other professors at Cleveland State University contributed to my development as a
scholar, among them Camilla Stivers, Sylvester Murray, Jennifer Alexander, Robert

Simons, Joel Elvery, William Bowen, and Robert Gleeson, and I received further
encouragement from the associations, particularly the Public Administration Theory

Network and the Polanyi Society, of which I have become a part.

Special

acknowledgement must be made to The Institute of Applied Phenomenology in Science

and Technology for financial support provided through a Ralph P. Hummel Scholarship
in 2013. Without the expressions of confidence from all of these and many more, I

would not have been able to bring this work to completion.

A POST-CRITICAL SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION:
TOWARD A SOCIETY OF EXPLORERS
CRAIG M. WICKSTROM

ABSTRACT

What is meant by "science" and whether it is an appropriate model for public

administration has been a subject of debate since Woodrow Wilson called for a science of
administration in 1887. This dissertation introduces another voice into that debate, the
voice of a world-renowned physical chemist named Michael Polanyi.
Polanyi's sharp criticism of positivism reinforces the arguments of those questioning the

legitimacy of an administrative science, but instead of rejecting it, he constructed an
alternative definition of science that recognizes the indeterminacy of reality, the personal

nature of knowledge, and the centrality of "the logic of tacit knowing." Because all
knowledge is tacit or rooted in tacit knowing, we can know more than we can tell, and
tacit knowing becomes evident in the dynamic order of polycentric entities and in their

reliance on tradition and the person, constrained by community, and morally responsible

for discovery and practice.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

But apart from this contemporary mood, the ideas of economists and
political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are
more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little
else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some
academic scribbler of a few years back. (Keynes, 2008, p. 383)

He taught me, among other things, that science begins when a body of phenomena
is available which shows some coherence and regularities, that science consists in
assimilating these regularities and in creating concepts which permit expressing
these regularities in a natural way. He also taught me that it is this method of
science rather than the concepts themselves (such as energy) which should
be applied to other fields of learning. (Wigner, 1963)

“Science” has been an important theme in American public administration since
the latter first began to define itself at the end of the 19th Century. As early as 1887,

Woodrow Wilson wrote that,
Seeing every day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is
to see clearly how it ought to do them. This is why there should be a
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science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of
government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and
purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. (Wilson,
1887, p. 201, italics added)
Wilson and his immediate successors advocated a “science of administration” that was

rational, objective, and universal. Esteeming it themselves, they recognized that the
growing public appreciation for science at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th

centuries made a scientific orientation imperative for the adoption of administrative

reform. Wilson's seminal article reflected an attitude about government that began to be
evident after the Civil War, that gained legitimacy in the Progressive Movement at the

turn of the century, and that was expressed in civil service reform, in the growth of city
planning and bureaus of municipal research, in the establishment of “settlement houses”

to improve the lot of the poor, and in the application of “scientific” principles to
management and administration. At the heart of this attitude, expressed in calls for
societal change, was a confidence in science and the scientific method.

In response to this push for an administrative science, public administrationists

developed a philosophy that manifested itself in a growing literature, in schools for
training administrators, and in successful reform at the local, state, and national level. It
was

characterized

by

the

separation

of

decision

from

execution

(the

politics/administration dichotomy), by the development of principles of administration

based on scientific study, by the centrality of economy and efficiency as the goals of
administrative practice, and by the potential for using the impersonal, mechanistic
methods of the natural sciences to study and guide administrative behavior. However, by

the end of World War II, following a period of heightened opportunities for
implementation of a scientific administration, a new group of scholars began to seriously
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question the premisses upon which this orthodox conception of public administration was

based. One expression of this unease over public administration orthodoxy was evident
in Dwight Waldo's 1948 call for promotion of democracy at the expense of science. An
alternative reaction was a call for the adoption of a more scientific attitude toward

administration.

The framework that Herbert Simon (1945/1957) outlined in

Administrative Behavior became the centerpiece for this approach.

Both groups

criticized orthodoxy, but it soon became apparent that their greater challenge was not

public administration orthodoxy, but each other.

Those public administrationists, like Waldo, who emphasized democracy, also
encouraged conversation with other social sciences and exploration of alternative

philosophies that might or might not give science a privileged place. Simon's alternative,
based on logical positivist philosophy, was a rational, empirical science of administration

that separated fact from value and focused administrative research on the factual
components which, it was claimed, could alone be examined “scientifically” and
measured for success or failure by efficiency.

These two approaches took public

administrationists down two paths that, if not wholly incommensurable, were clearly at

odds with one another.
The first public expression of the philosophical differences of these approaches

came during the well-known Simon/Waldo Debate (Waldo, 1952a; Simon 1952; Waldo,
1952b), but that clash of titans was not the last to occur. In the years since that first
published debate, those who, in the tradition of Waldo, sought to promote democracy in
public administration by exploring alternative philosophies have regularly criticized the

logical positivist foundations and other assumptions of the empirical tradition (Spicer,
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2010; Miller and Fox, 2007; Luton, 2007; Adams and Balfour, 1998; White and Adams,
1994; Argyris, 1973; Storing, 1962). Initially, those emphasizing a rational, empirical
approach to the study of public administration appeared to hold the high ground, riding
the behaviorist wave through the 1950s and 1960s, confident in their methodology and

focusing attention on philosophical issues only when attacked. However the New Public
Administration movement that emerged from the 1968 Minnowbrook Conference

showed that the influence of the rational empiricists was waning. Subsequent growth in
alternative approaches based on postmodern philosophy, gender studies, and

phenomenology, among others, gradually forced rational empiricists to abandon their
defensive posture and to seek ways to acknowledge alternative philosophies without

abandoning their empiricism (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, 2001; Gill and Meier, 2000;
Dubnick, 1999). What is clear of the history of “science” in public administration is that
the agreement in public administration academia evident during the orthodox period

seems to have been lost. On the one hand are those who question the possibility of a
science of administration, on philosophical as well as practical grounds. On the other

hand are those whose faith in science remains unwavering and who continue to call for
more science rather than less.
It is the purpose of this work to add another voice to this debate. This voice will

not seek to remove science from public administration, nor even to undermine its

influence. Instead, it will seek to redefine science in a way that opens it to the influence

of alternative philosophies and makes it more compatible with democracy. The voice
that this dissertation will interject into the debate about science is the voice of a world-

renowned physical chemist who recognized the fallacy of a strictly instrumental science
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and abandoned his practice ofpure science to understand and defend it philosophically.

This is the voice ofMichael Polanyi who was called to a philosophical defense ofscience

by its misuse under totalitarianism at about the same time that American public
administration also began questioning the role of science.

Confronted, in the Soviet

Union, by a strong philosophical argument for centralization ofscience, he was forced to
ask,

What philosophy ofscience had we in the West to pit against this? How
was its general acceptance among us to be accounted for? Was this
acceptance justified? On what grounds? (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 9)

"Marxism” he confessed, “has challenged me to answer these questions” (Polanyi, p. 9).

It is doubtful that Polanyi's writings had much effect on Soviet policy, but his
search for a response to the misuse ofscience resulted in a philosophy ofscience that is

comprehensive in a way that few can claim. Diamond cutters agree that no two diamonds
are identical. The study ofan individual diamond can reveal its unique identity, made up

ofits physical and chemical properties as well as its comprehensive purpose as part ofa

necklace or an industrial cutter. However, it takes a more comprehensive view to see
beyond the particularity of a diamond to its role as a generalized representation, and
therefore a member, of all diamonds or all crystals or all solid compounds. That is
precisely what Polanyi accomplished. He set out to develop a philosophy ofscience that
could defend science against totalitarian demands for its subservience to the state, but as

he studied science his viewpoint broadened to include politics, economics, sociology,

theology, and philosophy. In the end, he recognized that science is not unique, nor is it a
pattern on which society should be modeled. Instead, it is but one instance among many,

including art, law, and economics, in which certain organizational principles are evident
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and which depend on a common epistemological foundation.
Science, Polanyi claimed, is but one example of personal commitment to “the
logic of self-compulsion with universal intent” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 396). Like art,
law, a market economy, and other arenas, science can not be centrally managed through a

hierarchy, but depends on “coordination by mutual adjustment of independent initiatives”
(Polanyi, 1962, p. 54). Scientific principles are enforced by a community through
tradition, and science is learned as a skill by apprenticeship to a master. Through a

process of tacit knowing, it discovers an independent reality pregnant with possibility and
rejects objective knowledge that is detached and impersonal.
Polanyi's journey of discovery in the defense of science led him to recognize the

Cartesian demand for radical skepticism and impersonal objectivity as illogical and the

foundation that, combined with utopian passion, resulted in totalitarianism and the
political turmoil experienced throughout Europe during the 20th century. His post
critical philosophy of personal knowledge and tacit knowing undermines the possibility

of impersonal, objective knowledge and the Cartesian need for philosophical doubt.
Consequently, it also undermines the logical positivist foundation and the rational,
empiricist definition of science that have been at the root of so much debate in public

administration. However, it redefines science rather than rejecting it, and does so in a
manner that allows it to more easily embrace alternative philosophies, frameworks of

inquiry, and methodologies. Polanyi's post-critical philosophy of personal knowledge

and tacit knowing not only establishes a more robust foundation for a science of
administration, it also hints at the possibility of mitigating some of the differences in
public administration that can be traced to this misunderstanding of the nature of science.
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A History of “Science” in Public Administration
This dissertation is a philosophical study, a “history of ideas” in the tradition of

Dwight Waldo, who argued for the importance of historical perspective and an appraisal

of "the theoretical content" of a literature, for facts are dependent on and related to “the

thought of a particular time and place” (Waldo, 1948, p. xxiii). It is impossible to turn a
history of ideas into an impersonal, objective method because “No human cognitive

effort can claim transcendence for its own point of view” (Gill, 2010, p. 24). Indeed,

Michael Spicer has noted, “there is no Archimedean point from which we can look down
upon public administration, freed of our moral and political presuppositions” (2008, p.

59). The desire for such a detached objectivity leads us to over-dependence on precise
method and a misunderstanding of the role of theory. As Sheldon Wolin (1969) has
suggested, because a theorist, and particularly an epic theorist, focuses on “problems-in-

the-world” rather than on “problems-in-a-theory”, a theory becomes a tool for

understanding and potentially changing the world, rather than a simple summary of a set

of “facts”. Only theories that actively engage the world as it exists are capable of
effecting the deeper understanding for which it calls.

This dissertation, then, is a history of ideas with administrative science as its
subject matter. It does not attempt to trace the full history of science over time, nor does

it take a snapshot of all conceptions of science at a particular time. Instead it attempts to

look at science in public administration through the philosophy of Michael Polanyi. By
looking at what Polanyi has said and written and practiced and by comparing it to what
public administrators have said and written and practiced, we gain insight into our

discipline and are better able to appraise it. Such an examination of the history of
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administrative science as an idea also helps us to avoid, as Spicer noted, “the recycling of
old ideas that have been tried in the past and found wanting” (2008, p. 52) and the

embrace of“political values that are incoherent with, or even contradict those which we
ourselves hold to be dear and true” (p. 60). Finally, a study ofthe philosophy ofMichael

Polanyi, applied to public administration, leads to new ways of approaching public
administration and ofengaging the world.
As children we are taught that part ofthe Copernican revolution was to oust man

from the center ofthe universe, forcing us to see ourselves with detached objectivity from
the perspective oftime and space. But, as Polanyi argued,
As human beings, we must inevitably see the universe from a centre lying
within ourselves and speak about it in terms ofa human language shaped
by the exigencies of human intercourse. Any attempt rigorously to
eliminate our human perspective from our picture ofthe world must lead
to absurdity.” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 3)

When we claim that the Copernican theory is more objective than the Ptolemaic
system that it replaced, we do claim universal significance for our choice, but the
objectivity that we claim is not detached and impersonal. Rather, “We abandon the

cruder anthropocentrism of our senses - but only in favor of a more ambitious

anthropocentrism ofour reason” (Polanyi, pp. 4-5). In either case, whether we commit
ourselves to Copernican or Ptolemaic theory, it is our personal involvement that
determines the objectivity ofan explanation ofphysical phenomena and it is its beauty
and elegance that determine the validity or legitimacy ofa scientific theory.

Polanyi's answer to the impersonal objectivity ofpopular conceptions ofscience

was the personal commitment by the scientist to a reality that is intimated in the
particulars ofthe empirical world, but always independent ofthem and therefore never
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absolutely predictable. Such a commitment is a responsible acceptance of a calling, not

only to accept my physical environment, but also the intellectual and cultural situation
that acts as a background to all of my existence. The scientist can never be sure of the
implications of the reality to which he commits himself, but she is nevertheless
responsible to make that commitment. “Objectivism” Polanyi wrote, “seeks to relieve us
from all responsibility for the holding of our beliefs. That is why it can be logically

expanded to systems of thought in which the responsibility of the human person is

eliminated from the life and society of man” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 323). He rejected
such an irresponsible reaction. His reliance on himself, both to search for and proclaim a
defense of science, and to attack the objectivity and radical skepticism of enlightenment

science, led Polanyi ever deeper in an examination of how and why a scientist comes to
discover the world. In the end, Polanyi acknowledged the indeterminacy of reality by

declaring his search “to achieve a frame of mind in which I may hold firmly to what I

believe to be true, even though I know that it might conceivably be false” (p. 214).
Called to responsibility, he acknowledged the tenuous nature of truth and yet embraced it
wholeheartedly as part of his calling. Even the most “impersonal” facts - say the number

of occupied residences on a particular street - are true only in the sense that someone has
judged them to be true. Personal knowledge shows that the positivist assumptions, upon

which a rational, empirical science is also based, are mistaken at best.
For personal knowledge to survive, however, it must be grounded in a society that
can be trusted to uphold the values so passionately affirmed by the person. In Polanyi's
words, “Articulate systems which foster and satisfy an intellectual passion can survive

only with the support of a society which respects the values affirmed by these passions”
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(Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 203).

Communication, learning, pure conviviality (both

cultivation of good fellowship and participation in joint activities), the organization of
society, the upholding of morality, custom, and law within a culture, and the

administration of both individual and civic culture, are all founded on a personal
knowledge in which a person commits himself to a reality that is claimed with universal

intent. Such a claim is possible only in the context of a tradition enforced by community,
whether a small group, a formal organization, or a larger society or culture. Personal

knowledge is rooted in community and the tradition and values that it upholds - even as

tradition and values are likewise dependent on individual, personal commitment.
While recognition of the personal nature of knowledge is an effective criticism of
enlightenment assumptions, alone it contributes little to the improvement of
administrative practices or outcomes. It must be coupled with a structure that enables it

to be put into practice.
contribution.

It is such a structure that is arguably Polanyi's greatest

This structure of the knowing process builds on the conception of

directionality in consciousness widely accepted since the work of Franz Brentano and
passed down through Phenomenology and Gestalt Psychology. However, it emphasizes
the background of subsidiary particulars missing in Brentano's work, adds the Gestalt
concept of a comprehensive entity, and incorporates the centrality of the person. Finally,

it builds these into a structure that illuminates and educates, that enables and creates.
This structure, Polanyi named “the logic of tacit knowing”.

Grounded in Polanyi's philosophy, in tacit knowing and personal knowledge, it is
the central thesis of this dissertation that a science of administration is a legitimate goal

for public administration if, and only if, the prevalent conception of a detached,
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impersonal and instrumental, rational and empirical science is replaced by one that
recognizes the personal nature and tacit structure of all knowing and its dependence on

tradition, dynamic order, and responsibility to a community.

Chapter Overview
In light of these goals, Chapter II will thrust the reader directly into a discussion

of Polanyi's central philosophical concept: the logic of tacit knowing.

Within that

framework, both epistemological concepts such as awareness, indwelling, belief, and
heuristics, as well as ontological manifestations of tacit knowing, such as indeterminacy,
dual control and layers of reality, will be examined.

Chapter III will turn to the

examination of his sociological and political discussions of tradition and community,

dynamic order and public liberty, moral inversion and the free society. These latter

concepts are foundational to the maintenance of an epistemological and ontological
framework that argues for personal knowledge and the intimate involvement of the
subject in a process of tacit knowing.

Once the reader has had an opportunity to absorb the concepts central to Polanyi's
philosophy, public administration, itself, will be addressed. Chapter IV presents the

dominant, positivist understanding of a science of public administration through the
writings of several public administration scholars, beginning with Herbert Simon.

Central to this vision of a science of administration is the separation of facts from values,
the reliance on formal methods and precise data, and the acceptance of a single

understanding of knowledge and the models and methods used to represent it.
Underlying such a vision, as evident in the writings and language of public administration

scholars, is a tacit acceptance of a deterministic reality. However, Chapter IV also
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reveals a paradox of positivism: its proponents often do not practice what they espouse in
theory, and Polanyi's post-critical epistemology, that depends on personal knowledge and
the logic of tacit knowing, undermines this theoretical approach and its assumptions
while presenting an alternative understanding of science that uncovers the possibility of
scientific discovery free from reliance on a deterministic reality and a positivist approach

to knowledge.

In Chapter IV the potential for a redefinition of science in public

administration becomes evident in the philosophy of Michael Polanyi.
Whereas Chapter IV begins with public administration scholarship as it exists

today and shows how Polanyi's ideas reveal a solution to the paradox of positivism,

Chapter V begins with Polanyi's prescription for a free society and shows how tradition,
dynamic order, and public liberty have been revealed in public administration literature.

It shows how a Polanyian understanding of tradition is revealed in the work of John Rohr,
and Michael Spicer; how a Polanyian understanding of dynamic or spontaneous order is
revealed in civil association, in incrementalism, and in networking; and how the concept

of public liberty is reflected in the idea of administrative conservatorship. In so doing,
Chapter V suggests that Polanyi's philosophy has already joined the public administration
conversation in the United States. This implies that public administration, itself, is

dependent on a self-modifying tradition, is spontaneously ordered, and may function

responsibly on behalf of a community.

In other words, a redefined science of

administration, based on personal knowledge and tacit knowing, may be accepted more

readily than at first intimated. According to Polanyi, science is a dynamically ordered
system that has been granted public liberty.

It follows that a science of public

administration is one too and it must therefore responsibly accept the freedom it has been
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given to act on behalf of a free society.
In Chapter VI, I conclude my argument by drawing additional attention to the
person in Polanyi's writing, drawing on the writing of Thomas Pfau and Murray Jardine

who, like Polanyi, understand the person as more than an isolated individual. I point to
several examples in the public administration literature that demonstrate an awareness of
the person in context, the person called to responsibility. Such examples become part of
a conversation with Polanyi who argued for a postcritical science anchored in the logic of
tacit knowing, the dynamic relationship of individual and community, and the central role

of personal involvement in knowing and being and doing.
Finally, I have included, as a postscript, a summary presentation of the argument
advanced in this dissertation.

While short on detail, this postscript emphasizes the

possibility of a postcritical science of administration anchored in an indeterminate rather

than a fixed reality, known tacitly rather than explicitly. Such an administrative science
helps to justify research based on personal encounter and intuitive insight, emphasizes the

dynamic nature of both individuals and the communities of which they are part, and calls

attention to the central role of self-modifying tradition in the maintenance of social,
economic, and political systems. At the heart of a postcritical science of administration is

the logic of tacit knowing - to which I now turn.
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CHAPTER II
TACIT KNOWING AND
THE LEGITIMACY OF RELYING ON
AN INDETERMINATE REALITY

A problem, a clue, a hunch, a discovery -- they all contain an element that is personal;
the whole heuristic process is personal, yet its significance is not subjective, for it
consists in anticipating some part of the truth yet to be discovered, which when
discovered will point beyond itself to reality. To meet this situation, I have coined the
term Personal Knowledge. (Polanyi, 1964a, p. 24)

All knowledge falls into one of these two classes:
it is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.
(Polanyi, 1967b/1969, p. 195)

Richard Gelwick (1977) appropriately argued that “a Society of Explorers”
encompasses the importance ofMichael Polanyi's philosophy. That phrase, taken from

Polanyi's The Tacit Dimension, includes both “the intense effort of the individual
pioneer” and “the social roots and ties that surround the seemingly individual triumph”

(Gelwick, 1977, p. xi). This duality, this tension ofpersonal discovery and a community
claiming universality, was evident both in Polanyi's philosophy and in his life. Anchored
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by many years of practice in science, and completely confident in its goodness, Polanyi
was appalled by its abuse in the Soviet Union of Stalin and, to a lesser extent, in Hitler's

Germany. Finding no robust philosophical foundation that allowed Western philosophy

to defend what he tacitly understood and affirmed from his own experience, he set out on
a voyage of philosophical discovery to explicitly state what he already tacitly knew. His

voyage of discovery resulted in a unique understanding of the process of knowing, and at
the end of that journey he made a claim with universal intent that all knowledge is

personal and is structured in a particular manner that he called “the logic of tacit

knowing”. Importantly, Polanyi's arguments for personal knowledge and tacit knowing
were always set in the context of a tradition and a community, and he was acutely
conscious that his personal efforts were both enabled and constrained by a polycentric
society that was dynamically ordered.

Indeed, it is the tension between personal

discovery and a community claiming universality that drives the knowing process.
The importance of tacit knowing becomes evident in watching an accomplished
pianist. Here, it becomes clear that there is more to piano-playing than simply knowing

how to hit the keys or to read musical notation. Indeed, the mechanism known as a piano

is designed in such a way that there is a finite set of sounds that may emerge from it - yet
an accomplished pianist is able to draw out infinite possibilities. In searching for those
possibilities, it is not unusual to observe the pianist playing with eyes shut, reaching into
the heart of the piano to express more than simple mechanical noise. This is the essence

of a skill: the master of a skill cannot specify what s/he is doing, yet s/he clearly knows
more than s/he can tell. Moreover, the knowing is not simply a past accomplishment, for

the playing of a piano is not fixed statically forever, but depends on the interpretation of
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each pianist. Others have acknowledged that we do know more than we can tell, but

Michael Polanyi claimed that "one can know more than one can tell" (Polanyi,
1966/2009, p. 8, italics added), for he understood that tacit knowing is a process rather

than a fact. We know by intimate acquaintance with the object of our knowing1, by
interiorizing or dwelling in a background of clues on which we rely to point to our true

focus.
Throughout his journey of philosophical discovery, Polanyi used the example of

science to show how we know and discover and what that also implies about what we

know. As quoted in the introduction, he was convinced that any attempt to eliminate the
person from the process of knowing, to honestly view reality impersonally and
mechanistically, “must lead to absurdity” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 3). Even if we could
define all relationships mathematically, there would be an infinite number of ways to

represent each element of a relationship to another; “Never yet has a definite rule been
laid down by which any particular mathematical function can be recognized ... as the one

which expresses a natural law” (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 21). Science is always dependent
on the judgment of a person within the context of a community. This is an issue central

to public administration, for public administration is normative; it is concerned with
possibilities and values, and to eliminate our human perspective would lead to absurdity
The Structure of Tacit Knowing

To better grasp the importance of tacit knowing to public administration, consider
the following hypothetical example. When a parent enters a government office loudly

swearing and complaining and demanding service for a handicapped child, the first task

1 The idea of "knowing by acquaintance" as a description of tacit knowing has been argued by Dale Cannon
(2002-2003).
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of a public servant must be an epistemic one - to understand the problem and to recognize
possible solutions. That epistemic act, that act of knowing, is a skillful act that possesses
a characteristic pattern. It is an act that is structured in a manner that, Polanyi argued,
characterizes all acts of knowing, a pattern that he called, “the structure of tacit knowing”

(Polanyi, 1967b/1969, p. 181).
Tacit knowing consists of a triad that Polanyi likened to “the triad of Peirce”

(1967b/1969, p. 181). It consists of subsidiary particulars, focal wholes, and a subject or

person who integrates from the particulars to the whole. As Polanyi put it,
the triad of tacit knowing consists in subsidiary things (B) bearing on a
focus (C) by virtue of an integration performed by a person (A); we may
say also that in tacit knowing we attend from one or more subsidiaries to a
focus on which the subsidiaries are brought to bear. (Polanyi, p. 182).
When a social worker sits down with an irate parent, she attends from the words and body

language of the parent, from information located in case files, from past training and
experience, and from her own bodily response - to an understanding of a specific problem

or to a solution to that problem. She integrates the surface details with any instruction
and bodily response into a comprehensive whole that is the manifestation of her effort,
the ends toward which she applies available means. Through integration she relies on the

subsidiary particulars in their bearing on her focus. The triad of tacit knowing teaches us,
then, that a public administrator attends from the subsidiary to the focal by integrating the

subsidiary particulars into a focal whole.
In The Study of Man, Polanyi stated that there are two kinds of human knowledge:

”What is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or maps, or
mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while unformulated knowledge,

such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form of knowledge”
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(1959a, p. 12). The first kind of knowledge he called explicit knowledge and the second,
tacit knowledge. This distinction has become widely accepted and integral to efforts

focused on the understanding of knowledge creation and management (Kakabadse,

Kouzmin, and Kakabadse, 2001; Nonaka, 1994; Schon, 1983). What is less readily
acknowledged is that Polanyi also described two different kinds of awareness. When the

social worker is focusing her attention on understanding an agitated client she can not
simultaneously be focally aware of her own bodily reactions or of the application of

lessons learned through training or experience. While the client is violently expressing
himself, the administrator‘s attention must be focused on him. She remains aware of her
body and of past lessons, but in a subsidiary manner.

Polanyi almost always described subsidiary awareness through an example. Of
the recognition of a physiognomy, he wrote “We are attending from the features to the

face”; of the performance of a skill such as piano playing, he wrote “We are attending
from these elementary movements to the achievement of their joint purpose” (Polanyi,
1966/2009, p. 10); and of the skillful use of a hammer, he wrote that “I have a subsidiary

awareness of the feeling in the palm of my hand which is merged into my focal
awareness of my driving in the nail” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 55). The social worker's

training and personal knowledge is not lost in the process of tacit knowing, but it is
known in a different manner than it would be if she were to focus on that training or

knowledge. She sees through the subsidiary or attends from the subsidiary to the focus.

Not only are there two types of knowledge, but there are also two kinds of awareness.
Recognizing this distinction between distinctions is critical to a clear understanding of
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tacit knowing2.

According to Polanyi, the art of diagnostics, the testing of objects, the practice of
skills, the skillful use of tools, the use of words and signs, and the act of perception all

involve the integration of subsidiary particulars into a focal whole. Explicit knowledge

we know by focusing our attention on it, but we can only know the subsidiary elements

of tacit knowledge “by relying on our awareness of them for attending to something else
that comprises them” (Polanyi, 1961, p. 241). It is our reliance on awareness of the

subsidiary elements, for attending to a comprehensive whole of which they are a part,

which leads to our appreciation of them. It is our reliance on the proximal particulars that
leads to our understanding of the distal whole.

Tacit Knowing as Indwelling

For a deeper understanding of tacit knowing, it is helpful to consider the use of a
tool, such as use of a probe to explore an unseen location. A probe demonstrates all three
elements of tacit knowing: the subject attends from the subsidiary arm and hand and

probe to focus on the comprehensive object being explored. However, in the skillful use

of a tool, we also recognize that subsidiary awareness of particulars involves an

interiorization; we indwell a probe, relying on it and making it an extension of our body.
In a sense, a tool becomes part of our body; "our awareness of its impact on our hand is
transformed into a sense of its point touching the objects we are exploring" (Polanyi,
1966/2009, p. 12). We are focally aware of the objects at the tip of the probe but we are

subsidiarily aware of our touch on the handle of the probe: we know the probe by relying
on it for attending to the object at its end, but in so doing, we dwell in the probe in a
2 The phrase “distinction between distinctions” is a variation of the phrase “distinction between two
distinctions” used by Richard Moodey, a sociologist at Gannon University (personal communication,
August 14, 2014).
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manner similar to the way we dwell in our own bodies.

Interiorization is clearly evident in the processes of perception. In touch, we are
focused on the outside world but subsidiarily aware of muscles and bones and skin and

joints. In hearing, we are aware of a multitude of sounds and may focus on one or several
by becoming subsidiarily aware of others. Hearing aid wearers are particularly sensitive

to the distracting effect that focal awareness of multiple sounds can have on effective
listening. In the world of vision, when we look at something, we mechanically perform a

set of actions and compile a set of subsidiary particulars, but the looking itself may be
meaningless - as when we stare blankly at an object. However, when we see something,

it takes on meaning because we integrate the subsidiary particulars by looking through
our eyes and brain to the object that has become our focus. Our body takes on a

subsidiary role as we attend from it to the object of our focal attention. In fact, Polanyi
wrote, “All conscious transactions we have with the world involve our subsidiary use of
our body” (Polanyi, 1968/1997, p. 318).

Polanyi distinguished the indwelling of tacit knowing from the indwelling or
empathy of Wilhelm Dilthey and Theodor Lipps. The latter led them to assert that
empathy “sharply distinguished the humanities from the natural sciences” (Polanyi,
1966/2009, p. 17). In contrast, the indwelling of tacit knowing is more precisely defined

and therefore more broadly applicable. For Polanyi, tacit knowing "is an indwelling

which mentally extends the knower, enlarges his existence and raises his sense of rational
being" (1964a, p. 25); such an indwelling applies to humanities and natural sciences

alike. When we rely on subsidiary particulars by integrating them in our focus on a
comprehensive whole, we indwell them.

When we know our own bodies, we do so by

20

living in them, and just as we live in our bodies, so we dwell in the subsidiary particulars

of a focal whole when we rely on them. Indwelling, then, is the process by which certain
things become known subsidiarily as they bear on the whole that is our focus, and tacit

knowing is the process by which we indwell or interiorize subsidiary particulars by
relying on them.

When we rely on our body to keep us balanced on a bicycle, we are dwelling in

our bodies, but we also rely on the bicycle wheels to turn smoothly, the pedals to provide

power, and the handles to adjust balance or direction. In that subsidiary reliance on them,
we interiorize them. Likewise, when a social worker relies on her perception of the

client, on her training, or on her previous experience, she is dwelling in those subsidiary
elements for attending to the message that the client is trying to express, just as she is

dwelling in her own body to hear and see and respond.

Through indwelling or

interiorization, those elements have become an extension of her body just as the bicycle
becomes an extension of its rider or the piano becomes an extension of the pianist.

Importantly, it is not only the social worker who is employing the logic of tacit knowing
in her encounter with a client.

The client, himself, must attempt to express his

frustrations, and may do so through sophisticated speech or by thrusting the blame and
responsibility on others. However, the social worker instinctively knows that she must

pay attention to more than the words being shouted. She must tacitly draw on all of the
elements mentioned above to read the external manifestations of the client's mind as

expressed through his speech and actions, and must interiorize those external
manifestations by dwelling in them while focused on their meaning. The client and

social worker are approaching a common problem from two directions, and Polanyi
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suggested that they are communicating through use of two sets of tacit knowing triads.

The client's attempt to describe his problem is an instance of “sense-giving” and

Polanyi likened it to a practical skill. The client attempts to integrate spoken word and
bodily action; he attempts to fuse his words and actions into a comprehensive whole that

is their meaning. He already has a tacit understanding of that meaning and must attempt
to make it explicit by internalizing external clues to integrate them into a meaningful

focus. In the case of sense-giving, “we may feel what we want to say, yet must grope

desperately for words to say it” (Polanyi, 1967b/1969, p. 187). The client must skillfully
thrust his imagination forward to seek an acceptable expression of that understanding.
The social worker's attempt to interpret the client's description, on the other hand,

is an instance of “sense-reading”. Where the client begins with an understanding of the
meaning and gropes for words to express it, the social worker hears the words and gropes

for the meaning that integrates them into a comprehensive whole. The sense-giver must
rely on tacit knowledge to make it explicit. The sense-reader must rely "on informal
judgment" (Polanyi, 1967b/1969, p. 188) to integrate explicit knowledge into a tacit

whole, indwelling it by relying on subsidiary particulars for an understanding that is

deeper or broader than the explicit words enunciated by the client. The words that are
spoken are clues that must be indwelt by the sense reader, who makes sense jointly of the
words and the experience that they describe, but the goal is an understanding of the
comprehensive entity known tacitly to the sense giver. No formula could bring about the

understanding that this tacit process occasions; “No explicit procedure can produce this
integration” (Polanyi, p. 191).
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Three Aspects of Tacit Knowing and Objectivization
The discussion of subsidiary awareness, comprehensive entities, and a subject

who integrates particulars into a focus, who attends from the former to the latter through a

process of indwelling, brings to light three important aspects of tacit knowing. The fromto relationship, of the subsidiary to the focal, Polanyi called the functional aspect of tacit

knowing. We are aware of the subsidiary particulars, but only “in the act of focusing our

attention on something else, away from them” (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 34). The
function of the subsidiary particulars is their bearing on the focal whole. As a result, we
are subsidiarily aware of the particulars of which it is composed by being focally aware

of the whole; the social worker is aware of the subsidiary particulars that inform her
decisions, but only as they manifest themselves in decision-making.
The joint meaning of the subsidiary elements of a tacit integration, apparent in the

focal whole, is the semantic aspect of tacit knowing. “The subsidiaries of from-to
knowing bear on a focal target, and whatever a thing bears on may be called its meaning”
(Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 35). What the client “means”, as he forcefully expresses

himself, becomes apparent only when his words and body language are integrated with
the knowledge and bodily response of the social worker. When we simply stare blankly

at a sunset while focused elsewhere, neither it nor the particular colors on display, nor the

silhouettes of trees or people. have meaning, but when we allow it to become our focus,
those elements of which we are subsidiarily aware also take on new meaning. When

focused on a physiognomy, we might say "that a characteristic physiognomy is the
meaning of its features” (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p. 12), and of symbols, tools, machines,
probes, optical instruments, and so on, Polanyi wrote that their meaning "lies in their
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purpose; they are not tools, machines, etc., when observed as objects in themselves, but
only when viewed subsidiarily by focusing attention on their purpose” (Polanyi, 1959a,
pp. 30-31).

The meaning given subsidiary particulars by their integration into a

comprehensive whole may be seen as a surplus meaning beyond their meaning

recognized focally or explicitly. If, instead of focusing on the purpose or meaning of a

tool or a face or a process or a concept, we turn our attention to the components of which
it is composed, its surplus meaning is lost. The semantic aspect of tacit knowing, then, is
the joint meaning that it brings to the subsidiary particulars of a comprehensive entity.
The third aspect of tacit knowing that has become clear is the phenomenal aspect

or transformation which “embodies the ontological claim of tacit knowing” (Polanyi,
1964/1969, p. 141)3. A tacit integration is irreversible: the “fusion” of the subsidiaries

into the focal, “brings about a quality not present in the appearance of the subsidiaries”

(Polanyi, 1965/1969, p. 212); the integration of subsidiary particulars into a

comprehensive whole creates something new that is not a simple addition of the clues. A

social worker's training or a set of rules can not anticipate the particular circumstances of
the particular client sitting in that particular chair on that particular day. That a freak

thunderstorm left the client soaking wet or that someone accidentally cut the client off as
he was turning into the office parking lot, can no more be anticipated by a set of general
prescriptions than can the presence of an electron be absolutely established by the rules of

physical chemistry. It is only from the integration of those particular circumstances,
together with a myriad set of other conscious and unconscious subsidiary elements, that
new knowledge or new decisions emerge.

Such knowledge or such decisions are

3 Polanyi's listing of these aspects varies from publication to publication. I have chosen to describe the
functional, semantic, and phenomenal aspects as elements of the structure of tacit knowing, and to discuss
his ontological theory of a stratified reality as a separate but related concept.
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comprehensive wholes that are unlike any simple addition of subsidiary elements. They
are new phenomena.

It is helpful to consider what happens to all three aspects when the process of tacit
knowing is reversed. When a social worker integrates all of the subsidiary clues upon

which she must rely to understand a client or to decide how to address the concerns of
that client, she does not look at those clues, but looks through them to the understanding

or decision upon which they bear. Consequently, she may be unaware of all of the
subsidiary particulars that have gone into her understanding or decision, and if she were
to attempt to turn her focus away from the comprehensive whole to the subsidiary
particulars, she may find that they are ineffable, that “they are largely submerged,
unspecifiable” (Polanyi, 1965/1969, p. 213). Therefore, to reverse an integration “is not

to retrace our steps, but to efface them. ... All the effects of the integration are cancelled”,
and the comprehensive entity is reduced “to its relatively meaningless fragments”
(Polanyi, p. 213). The undoing of a tacit integration unravels all three of its aspects.
When the from-to functional relationship of subsidiary to focal is undone, the

phenomenal transformation is also destroyed and the surplus meaning of the subsidiary
particulars evaporates.

Just as interiorizing knowledge or action facilitates our ability to tacitly look

through or rely on that knowledge or action, externalizing or objectivizing it switches our

attention “to something of which we had hitherto been subsidiarily aware” and turns that
thing “into a mere external object, devoid of functional meaning” (Polanyi, 1968/1997, p.

319). Externalized objects continue to have semantic content as focal entities, but when
objectivized, they lose the surplus meaning of their subsidiary participation in the
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comprehensive entity upon which they bear. Objectivizing destroys all three aspects of a
tacit integration. When we use a hammer, we interiorize it by pouring ourselves into it,

but if we externalize it to focus our attention on our grip or how our arm is cocked, we

destroy its surplus meaning, its phenomenal transformation, and its from-to function, and

we may well pay with a smashed thumb. As Polanyi put it, when we rely on a tool, a set

of standards, a theory, or a skill, “these things cannot be deliberately handled in
themselves or critically examined as external objects” (Polanyi, 1954/1974, p. 90). When

we rely on something uncritically, even for the critical examination of something else, we
internalize or dwell in it, pouring ourselves into it to make it a part of our body.

The explicit knowledge that we have of an object on which we focus is anchored
in the interiorization of a multitude of subsidiary particulars. Therefore, by externalizing

our knowledge through deductive or inductive inference, or by making it explicit, we

facilitate its precise specification and its broad distribution, but we sacrifice our
knowledge of the subsidiary particulars that allow us to integrate it as a comprehensive
whole. Just as a photograph leaves us with a more permanent record that is merely two

dimensional, so an explicit representation of the art of piano playing will leave us a set of

notes or a mechanical sound with little meaning. “All explicit forms of reasoning,” wrote
Polanyi, “are impotent in themselves; they can operate only as the intellectual tools of
man's tacit powers reaching toward the hidden meaning of things” (Polanyi, 1961, p.

243).
Tacit Knowing and the Discovery of a Hidden Reality

In his book, The Tacit Dimension (1966/2009), Polanyi wrote that, “I shall
reconsider human knowledge by starting from the fact that we can know more than we
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can tell” (1966/2009, p. 4). The functional, phenomenal, and semantic aspects of tacit

integration shed light on this sentence.

Because we look through the subsidiary

particulars to the focal whole, they can appear functionally invisible to us. Because there

is a phenomenal transformation of the particulars into the whole, the particulars are no
longer seen in the same light. Because tacit integration creates a joint meaning of the

subsidiary particulars, they can semantically be understood only in terms of the focal
whole that is their meaning. No techniques creating explicit representations of our tacit

knowledge can eliminate the fact that our ability to interact with that explicit
representation “displays a knowledge that we cannot tell” (Polanyi, p. 5). There is

always a gap that must be spanned between the background of which we are subsidiarily

aware and the comprehensive entity on which we focus. That indeterminacy must be
bridged by means of tacit integration.
The gap between what we tacitly sense and what we explicitly know is an

indisputable characteristic of our relationship to the world. Yet, as Esther Lightcap

Meek, explained, “[w]hen the knower moves in his or her struggle from dissociated
particulars to integrated coherent pattern, what once looked like empty spaces gets

reinterpreted as hiddenness” (Meek, 2003, p. 120). In the context of tacit knowing, fixed,
passive, and uninteresting facts become meaningful clues to unsuspected future
possibilities. The gap between what the client means and what he says creates a tension

that engages him in groping for a more precise expression. For what he means, while
indefinite, is not unknowable; it is merely hidden and therefore a problem worth solving.

Likewise, the gap between what the client says and what the case worker understands

may be bridged by relying on subsidiary clues to resolve an unspecified message worth
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pursuing. Understood tacitly, the gap between what is and what we understand becomes
an essential part of our knowing; the indeterminate reality becomes a hidden reality that

calls us to responsible discovery and determinate but meaningless facts become

indeterminate but meaningful clues to the resolution of problems worth pursuing.
Knowing more than we can tell recognizes the hiddenness of reality, the indeterminate

nature of our knowledge, and the calling that connects the two.

As Polanyi explained the logic of tacit knowing, we can know more than we can

tell because we know by integrating a set of indeterminate particulars, of which we are
only subsidiarily aware, into a comprehensive whole on which our attention is focused.
Not only are the clues that we integrate into a comprehensive whole “not fully
specifiable”, but neither is the process of integration “fully definable”, nor are “the future
manifestations of the reality indicated by this coherence” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 88)

exhaustible. That the subsidiary particulars that we integrate into a comprehensive whole

can not be fully specified and that the process of integration that makes tacit knowing
possible can not be fully defined, has been made clear in the description of tacit knowing.

That the reality indicated by tacit integration is made manifest by inexhaustible
possibilities has received less attention, but is apparent if we consider that “human

knowledge is but an intimation of reality, and we can never quite tell what reality will do
next” (Polanyi, 1964/1997, p. 339). Positivist objectivity recognizes reality as explicit

and observes it in a detached, impersonal manner.

Tacit knowing depends on the

personal involvement of the knower to affirm the independence of reality by accepting
that “[i]t is external to us, it is objective, and ... its future manifestations can never be
completely under our intellectual control” (Polanyi, p. 339).
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In “Logic and Psychology” (1968), Polanyi further developed the uncertainties of
a tacit integration. Beginning with the indeterminacy of the hidden reality revealed by
tacit knowing, he pointed out that what we accept today as fact must be reinterpreted

tomorrow as new data, new insights, and new interpretations come to light. Turning to
the indeterminate character of the coherence, the integration upon which we rely to

recognize truth, he argued that we commit ourselves to the validity of that integration
while recognizing that it may be mistaken; the clues do not absolutely determine the
coherence of our conclusions so we must judge between possible alternatives. Next

taking up the indeterminate nature of the very clues which we integrate, he pointed out

that we may be missing clues or our perception of them may be mistaken or distorted.

However, the indeterminacy of subsidiary clues may be divided into two elements: the
difficulty of identifying or tracing them and the fact that we are aware of them only by
looking through them to the focus of our attention. Indeed, we can not logically know
them determinately, for a determinate knowledge of them makes them our focus and

undermines their participation in the integrated whole that gives them meaning. Having
expanded his three indeterminacies of knowledge to four, Polanyi added a fifth. Every
time a person integrates subsidiary particulars into a focal whole, she makes existential

choices that modify the very grounds of her judgment and leave open the possibility of a
different integrated whole based on reformulated grounds of knowledge.

Our

understanding of the world, then, is indeterminate in at least five ways: (1) how one

person understands reality today leaves open the possibility of another understanding

tomorrow; (2) the process of knowing always involves judgment that may be mistaken;
(3) the clues that we integrate to an understanding may not be fully known; (4) when we
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integrate clues we are only aware of them subsidiarily as they bear on our understanding;
and (5) our very act of knowing reality involves choices which modify the grounds that

we use to know.

As noted above, it is significant that Polanyi wrote that we can know more than
we can tell. If he had merely written that we do know more than we can tell, he would
have left open the possibility of an explicit reduction of tacit knowledge. However, "this

capacity of ours to know more than we can tell" (Polanyi, 1961/1969, p. 133) is rooted in
our ability to know the unexpected; reduction of tacit knowledge to a formalized system

is logically fallacious, for tacit knowing is a process and the subsidiary particulars of a
tacit integration can not be exhaustively specified. “Formalisation” he acknowledged,

“can be extended to hitherto unformalised semantic operations, but only if the resulting

formal system can in its turn rely on yet unformalised semantic operations” (Polanyi,
1952, p. 313).

Explicit reduction of tacit knowledge remains dependent on tacit

integration. Moreover, since formal, explicit knowledge is necessarily grounded in the

integration of subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole, such knowledge can
never function without a person. Because people are free to choose, involvement of a

person opens up the possibilities inherent in indeterminate future action.

Polanyi's

concern was not with knowledge that is static and impersonal, but with the process by

which we come to know - a process that leaves open future possibilities. That we can
know more than we can tell leaves indeterminate the possibilities of our knowing, by
recognizing their hiddenness.
The Dynamics of Tacit Knowing

In Science, Faith, and Society (1946/1964), Polanyi likened scientific discovery to
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a person waking to the sound of a burglar next door. Ears sensitized by the lack of

visibility, the person immediately begins to speculate about possibilities in a darkened
world that is unknown and undefined. Empirical clues are needed to stimulate intuition,

but verification of a scientific theory depends, not on detached induction, but ultimately
on “mental powers”, on what Polanyi eventually identified as imaginative tacit

integration. This groping toward a focal whole, that is intuitively sensed but never fully
specified, also occurs when the social worker confronts her client. She can not predict
precisely what has caused the client to be upset, nor why he has chosen the agency to

resolve the problems he is facing. Yet, drawing on a background of tacit knowledge, she

often has a good idea of what is at stake - she intuitively senses the shape of undefined
possibilities, always recognizing that surprise is possible and even to be anticipated.

Having accepted her intuitive suspicions, she gropes toward a full understanding of
reality, ever mindful that her final conclusions, reliant as they are on sometimes

unspecifiable tacit knowledge of an indeterminate reality, may be mistaken, and even
when true, remain open to change and to an indeterminacy of their own.

The gap between the particulars of a tacit integration, known subsidiarily, and the

comprehensive whole of which we are focally aware, creates tension. That tension, of

potentially unspecifiable clues pointing to possibilities, is a heuristic tension in two
senses. On the one hand, once the gap between what is known and what is intimated has

been leaped and the tension released, there is no return; once a discovery has been made,
it can not be "un-discovered". On the other hand, a heuristic tension is open to future
possibilities. For example, as George Polya (1945/1985) also taught, the openness of
heuristic learning, as opposed to routine learning, draws the student into additional study
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and insight. Likewise, while systematic problem solving is "a wholly deliberate act"
(Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 126), its openness calls the problem solver to additional inquiry

through a process involving both active and passive stages. Drawing on the work of
Henri Poincare, Polanyi wrote that problem solving begins with a preparation period in

which a logical gap is recognized. Preparation is followed by incubation in which the

logical gap is explored, often unconsciously. Then comes illumination - the crossing of
the logical gap. Finally there is a period of verification in which a more permanent

bridge is constructed. Both preparation and verification are active while incubation and
illumination appear to be more passive. At both active and passive stages there is a
subject, for a logical gap is recognized as a problem “only if it puzzles and worries
somebody,” and the resolution of tension, the crossing of that logical gap, is recognized
as a discovery “only if it relieves somebody from the burden of a problem” (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 122).

Driving this process is the heuristic power of "the belief that there exists a hidden
solution which we may be able to find" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, pp. 126-127). With the

recognition of a problem comes the passion of the explorer who senses the possibilities of
subsidiary particulars pointing to a focal whole that is yet to be revealed. With the

recognition of a solution or discovery comes the enthusiasm of the explorer who

recognizes a comprehensive whole and becomes subsidiarily aware of all of the clues
which point to it. “A problem” wrote Polanyi, “is an intellectual desire ... and like every

desire it postulates the existence of something that can satisfy it” (p. 127). Obsession is
“the mainspring of all inventive power” (p. 127), and its focus must be the unknown; it
must be preoccupied by the unspecifiable. This is the heuristic power of a logical gap
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which calls the explorer to action: a hidden reality, revealed in its indeterminacy, sets up
a heuristic tension that incites our passion and calls us to the discovery of possibilities: "a
heuristic striving evokes its own consummation" (p. 127).

“We have here” wrote

Polanyi, “the paradigm of all progress in science: discoveries are made by pursuing
unsuspected possibilities suggested by existing knowledge” (1967a/1969, p. 79).

There are two elements that enter into heuristic problem solving. It is intuition
that spontaneously suggests an idea which calls the explorer to discovery.

Next,

imagination casts or thrusts forward to seek confirmation of the idea. This casting

forward may occur again and again as the passionate subject responsibly seeks to
discover a solution. Finally, intuition takes over again when the imagination pauses from

its frantic activity, spontaneously integrating old and new subsidiary elements in a flash

of insight that reveals a solution. “All three parts of a scientific inquiry are set in motion
by two mental powers” wrote Polanyi and Prosch:

They receive their guidance from integrative powers, while they are
propelled, and also supplied with suitable material, by thrusts of the
imagination. The integrative powers are largely spontaneous; to mark this,
we may give them the name of ‘intuition.' All the labor and anguish
involved in the creative process go into the thrusts of the imagination;
intuition is effortless” (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 96).
At the inception of scientific inquiry, at the stage of “strategic intuition”, intuition

is central while imagination functions solely in “keeping intuition alert to the sensing of a
problem” (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 96). At this stage, we intuitively sense the
possibilities of an indeterminate reality and we integrate existing knowledge to a

comprehensive whole. Sensing the potential of the comprehensive entity that we have

intuitively identified, we next “thrust the focus of our attention ahead of the subsidiary ...
by the powers of our imagination” (Polanyi, 1968/1997, p. 326). In fact, “[i]t is only the
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imagination that can direct our attention to a target that is as yet unsupported by
subsidiaries” (Polanyi, 1968, p. 40). Polanyi and Prosch called this second stage of
scientific inquiry, “questing intuition”.

Polanyi and Prosch finally described a

“concluding intuition”, in which a quest “is often brought to a close after a quiet interval
... by a sudden illumination which offers a solution for the problem” (Polanyi and Prosch,

1975, p. 96). This is an instant recognition of the whole, including both subsidiary and
focal, that is most often associated with the term, “gestalt”.
The heuristic tension evident in the interplay of intuition and imagination may be
found in every tacit integration of subsidiary clues into a comprehensive whole.

Consequently, this dynamic process contributes a mechanism to the logic of tacit

knowing by which discovery, the acquisition of a skill, and other heuristic acts of
knowing take place. Importantly,
This dynamism endows tacit knowing with creativity. It lends us the
power of acquiring a skill, and, by the same token, enables us to invent a
machine; indeed, to perform any possible creative action. (Polanyi,
1968/1997, p. 326)

Together, intuition and imagination open up space for novelty.

Set in the logical

structure of tacit knowing, their dynamic action orients the discoverer toward the hidden
future manifestation of a comprehensive entity. Guided by anticipation of a deepening
coherence and by the potential of a reality that is hidden yet accessible, the scientist or

artist or public administrator commits herself to passionately and responsibly integrate
both a dynamic intuition and a straining imagination in the pursuit of knowledge or
inspiration or a satisfied public. “Intuition” wrote Polanyi, “informs the imagination
which, in turn, releases the powers of the intuition” (1966, p. 91). Intuitively, the knower
recognizes the unspecifiability of a reality that remains possible but masked or disguised,
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yet a sense of approaching this reality results in passionate expectancy that is translated

into imaginative effort. Tacit knowing, therefore, allows us to anticipate a hidden reality
that is intimated in the subsidiary knowledge on which we depend; it calls us to unmask
the disguised and discover what is concealed.
At the end of an imaginative struggle inspired by an intuitive glimpse of

possibilities, the subject returns to a relatively calm interlude, and he does so “with a new

vision of coherence and reality” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 92). However, a new vision, a new set

of standards of coherence can never be known absolutely, for all aspects of tacit knowing
- the clues, the integrative process, the future manifestations of reality, and both intuition
and imagination - are indeterminate. New standards of coherence do not come into

existence through the action of explicit command, but through the covert action of

practice. As we apply the logic of tacit knowing through an intuitive / imaginative
struggle, we interiorize both the struggle and its results, tacitly abiding by any new values
and conforming to any new standards. It is in this manner that the results become

authoritative and by which new values and new standards emerge. By indwelling them
through tacit application, we come to rely on them and conform our actions to them.

New values, wrote Polanyi, “enter subsidiarily, embodied in creative action” (p. 92).
Moreover, because these interiorized values are known subsidiarily, “[t]he actual grounds

of a value, and its very meaning, will ever lie hidden in the commitment which originally
bore witness to that value” (Polanyi, p. 92).

We see, then, that just as discovery takes place by the dynamic integration of
subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole, so also do standards and values come

into being through a successive alternation of intuition and imagination within the logic
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of tacit knowing. Furthermore, noted Polanyi, “[w]hat the imagination achieves in the
mind, the process of growth performs spontaneously in the child, and evolution performs
likewise in the rise of higher forms of life” (1968/1997, p. 327). In each of these

instances can be seen a mechanism that facilitates the tacit integration of subsidiary
particulars into a comprehensive entity that is the meaning of, while being phenomenally

unspecifiable in terms of, yet nevertheless dependent on, those particulars.

In an

imaginative process, in a process of growth, or in evolution, “a transition may take place

gradually by a steady intensification of a higher principle from initial rudimentary traces,
up to the stage where it fully takes control over the lower level from which it has

emerged” (p. 327). From the subsidiary particulars of a lower ontological level, emerges
a comprehensive entity that integrates those particulars into a comprehensive whole. The

word, “emergence” suggests that the particulars determine, even cause, the
comprehensive whole, but the interaction of intuition and imagination show that it is the

alternation of intuitive insight with thrusting imagination that facilitates the emergence of
new understanding through new discovery. Neither focal nor subsidiary awareness of a
comprehensive entity take absolute precedence in the dynamics of tacit knowing.

Emergence and the Creative Tension of a Stratified Reality

That the dynamics of tacit knowing open up the possibility of emergence,
suggests that the structure of tacit knowing has an ontological aspect that is related to but

goes beyond its phenomenal transformation. The comprehensive entities that we know
by attending to them from subsidiary particulars, on which they rely, are themselves

structured hierarchically, are empowered by a heuristic openness to possibilities, and call

humanity to responsible judgment and action. Indeed, that "all understanding is achieved
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by indwelling" (Polanyi, 1962/1969, p. 160), itself points to an ontological significance,

for indwelling involves our bodies which are real. Knowing, itself, is somatic, for "[o]ur
body is the ultimate instrument of all our external knowledge, whether intellectual or
practical" (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p. 15). Moreover, the from-to structure of tacit knowing

is reflected in the hierarchical structure of comprehensive entities.
A machine, for example is a comprehensive entity that emerges from chemical
and physical elements, and is subject to the chemical and physical laws which govern
those elements, but which is formed by conditioning them through application of
engineering principles unaccountable by the lower level principles.

No detailed

examination of chemical and physical laws can reveal the engineering principles that

form lower level elements into a higher level machine. Just as a comprehensive whole is
known focally, as a whole, while its particulars are known subsidiarily, so a

comprehensive entity is governed by its upper level principles, as a whole, while its lower

level elements, and therefore the entity as well, are governed by the lower level principles

or laws that define them. Polanyi referred to this as the principle of dual control; a
comprehensive entity is subject to both the principles that govern its lower level elements

and the upper level principles that control and condition those lower level principles left
open at the margins (1967b/1997, 1968/1969). The emergence of a comprehensive

entity, then, is made possible by lower level entities "under the control of operational
principles that constitute (or determine) [their] boundaries" (Polanyi, 1967b/1997, p.

289).
To understand the practical implications of higher level principles controlling
lower level possibilities, one need only consider that a computer, for example, is made of

37

many hardware components that are each defined by a set of operational principles but
which may be assembled together in a number of ways to yield desktops, laptops, tablets,

or phones. However, once assembled into a comprehensive unit, by application of a set
of engineering principles, a new set of rules govern the functionality of that assemblage.
It is still subject to the rules or principles governing its storage unit, its screen, its input
and output interfaces, its central processing unit and so forth, for those elements remain

foundational to its functionality. Yet, the computer as a whole is also subject to the
engineering principles that constrain its components to allow the emergence of the

comprehensive entity that we recognize. It is subject to dual control. Polanyi also used a
chess strategy as an example of a higher-level entity defined by the strategy while also

subject to the principles defining the possible moves of the individual pieces. Likewise,
DNA is dependent on the properties of the four nitrogen bases that are so critical to its

function, but it is also subject to principles which limit the possible combinations of the

four bases and thereby store the information that is so critical to life. Indeed, if DNA
could be defined in a Laplacean, reduced fashion - in terms of the principles governing

physics and chemistry - it would carry no information. It is the indeterminately possible

combination of the four bases that gives their particular arrangement an informational
content.
What becomes evident in these examples is that "any general principle ... must

leave indeterminate a certain range of circumstances in which it can apply, and any
particular application of such a principle requires that these circumstances be fixed by
some agency not under the control of that principle" (Polanyi, 1965, p. 14). Polanyi

referred to these "indeterminate circumstances" as "boundary conditions" (p. 14) and
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argued that it is these boundary conditions that are shaped by higher level principles.
Both the function of machines and "the machine-like functions of living beings," he

wrote, "are determined by structural and operational principles which control the
boundary conditions left open by physics and chemistry" (p. 14). A processor or storage

unit or user interface are systems that are defined by principles that necessarily leave their
possible applications undefined. It is these possibilities that may be controlled by a

separate set of principles defined by some independent agency.
This process of control of lower levels by higher level principles is not limited to

two levels. In certain circumstances, the possibilities left undefined by higher-level
principles may themselves be controlled by other yet higher principles that condition
them without undermining either their influence on lower-level principles or the

indeterminate possibilities of the very lowest elements. Thus, the higher entities which
are subject to dual control become subject to yet higher levels of control which are,

themselves, subject to dual control. Each level of operational principles is subject to the

higher-level principles that create, condition, and control them while also remaining
dependent on the principles governing the lower level elements of which they are

composed (Polanyi, 1965, 1968/1969, 1968/1997). Speech is a clear example of a multi

level entity in which phonemes become meaningful when combined into words, words
when combined into phrases, phrases into sentences, and sentences into stories.

Likewise, computer components can be broken down into more basic components and
eventually into chemical elements even as computers, themselves, are given meaning

through integration by higher level operating systems or software applications or grid
computing systems.
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In all of these examples a gap between what is known of reality and what is

intimated but hidden, is evident. The components of a computer, the rules governing
movement of the chess pieces, and the A, T, G, and C bases upon which DNA is based,
are all elements of the comprehensive higher level entities that a separate set of principles

create. The upper-level principles that constrain the components, pieces, and bases

become tools to reveal an indeterminate aspect of a hidden reality.

Given such a

prevalence of uncertainty, simplification by reduction of higher level entities to lower

level principles might seem attractive. Freeing higher level entities from the control of
higher principles, however, does not simply result in a reduced set of principles. Rather,

it eliminates the boundaries that define the higher level and destroys the entity, itself.
“Smash up a machine, utter words at random, or make chess moves without a purpose,

and the corresponding higher principles ... will all vanish, and the comprehensive entity

which they controlled will cease to exist” (Polanyi, 1968/1997, p. 322). It is true that the
lower-level principles will remain in operation, but the higher entity that was to be
reduced only in terms of definition and control will also be reduced in fact - it will no

longer exist. This, Polanyi suggested, “presents us with an ontological counterpart of the

logical disintegration caused by switching our attention from the centre of a
comprehensive entity to its particulars” (p. 322). Higher, comprehensive entities rely

both on the principles governing the elements of which they are composed and on higher
principles that apply only to themselves. They can not be reduced to control by lower

level principles; they exhibit the logic of tacit knowing at an ontological level.
One of the most important offerings of a social worker is her ability to cobble

together a unique solution to a specific problem from a set of general solutions devised
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for broad application. Such general solutions leave open the possibility of applying

higher level principles that limit and define the elements of a particular situation for a
particular purpose. When a social worker turns from attempting to understand her client
to the devising of a solution, she turns from an epistemological task to an ontological one.

At an epistemological level we have seen that she integrates subsidiary particulars into a

comprehensive whole that is a new understanding. When she turns to the creation of a
solution, her efforts follow a similar pattern. What Polanyi has shown is that it is not just
the creative process, but even the solution, itself, that is characterized by a from-to

structure. The solution depends on the principles governing its components, but it is
defined by higher level principles that bring those components together in a particular

way to give them meaning. It is her engineering of such a higher level entity that makes
the social worker effective in her work.

The ability of upper-level principles to define or contain sets up a creative tension
that is central to meaning. Just as the subsidiary elements of knowledge become known
and meaningful in light of the comprehensive focus to which they point, so the lower

level elements of a multi-level entity are given meaning by the upper-level principles that
constrain them and form them into a higher level entity. Chess pieces and the rules that

define their possible movements are meaningful in the context of a strategy. A random

set of pen strokes takes on meaning when formed into letters, letters are given meaning
when formed into words, words are meaningful when constrained by grammar to form
sentences, and sentences make sense when limited by concepts and ideas. Likewise, the

advice or assistance given by a social worker is meaningful in the context of a client's
needs, paving materials become a road when constrained by a particular location, and
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force exerted by a police officer has proper purpose when applied within the limits of the

law.

The constraint of possibilities left open by lower-level entities provides a

meaningful ontological counterpart to the integration of subsidiary particulars into a
comprehensive whole. This ontological theory of a stratified reality shows how the
tension between indeterminate possibilities and constraint empowers creativity.
The Fiduciary Foundations of Knowledge

Central to the logic of tacit knowing are the concepts of “belief” and “faith”. As

early as 1936, Polanyi wrote that “the mere fact that there is no absolute security for the

validity of what we consider exact natural laws should lead to the conclusion that these

laws are only valuable in combination with the element of uncertainty in them, which is
compensated by the supreme sanction of validity, which is faith” (Polanyi, 1936/1992, p.

35). It is the indeterminate possibilities inherent in both reality and our knowledge that
gives them power; faith that we can know more than we can tell gives us confidence that
indeterminacy is not randomness, but hiddenness calling us to discovery. “Verification,”

therefore, “rests ultimately on mental powers which go beyond the application of any
definite rules” (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 29), and “must be taken in the light of our own

personal judgement of the evidence” (p. 30). Empirical evidence remains an important
source of clues about reality, but the integration of such evidence into the body of
scientific knowledge depends on faith in the standards, the methods, and the doctrine and

premisses of scientific tradition.
Over and over Polanyi referred back to the Copernican revolution, finding in it

both signs of coming modernism and clues to a post-critical approach to discovery. What
he showed was that Copernicus' claim was not to a better understanding of the
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relationship of heavenly bodies (he was happy just to match the descriptive and
predictive ability of the Ptolemaic system), nor to a more accurate representation of

empirical data (according to Polanyi, even Copernicus must have realized how inaccurate
some of his calculations were), but to a glimpse of a real but hidden system that exhibited

both orderliness and heuristic power. Yet his claim to the cohesiveness and reality of his
system meant little to those unwilling to accept it, for they simply dismissed it as “a novel
computing device” (Polanyi, 1967a/1997, p. 226). What Copernicus meant by real was a

system that he could rely on and that he could count on others to accept. He declared his
theory with universal intent, and his followers, like Kepler and Galileo, and through them

Newton, and on to Einstein, “testified to their belief that the Copernican system was real,
by relying on it as a guide to discovery” (Polanyi, p. 236, italics added). Confident in its
truth, they had faith in his system, even as they recognized its faults as problems to be

solved through further investigation and discovery. Their dependence on Copernicus'

theory proved their belief in the hidden reality that was intimated therein.

It is easy to focus on Copernicus' explicit description of a heliocentric system.

However, “To rely on a theory for understanding nature is to interiorize it. For we are
attending from the theory to things seen in its light” (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p. 17). By
interiorizing the Copernican system, by dwelling in it to rely on it, Kepler and Galileo,

and those who followed, realized the joint meaning of that system and of their own
observations and conceptions.

Their confidence in his system, together with an

appreciation of its elegance, called them, even compelled them to new discoveries.

Kepler and Galileo made claims to reality themselves, and Newton was able to prove his

confidence in their claims by relying on them, just as they had relied on the claims of

43

Copernicus. The story of Copernicus, then, illustrates that the importance of a discovery,
and its claim to reveal an aspect of reality, is not due to its certainty or even its accuracy.

Rather, it is due to its ability to “manifest its truth ever again by new surprises” (Polanyi,
1967a/1997, p. 244).

In the Copernican story we find evidence of two key concepts. Orderliness, for

Polanyi, is evidence of the intimate involvement of a person. Computer systems rely

extensively on circuits that are limited to two options (they may be on or off) and on
communication revealed in two voltage levels (high and low). Yet, when combined into

a matrix or strung together in a series, such binary options may reveal substantial
information.

The key, Polanyi pointed out, is the orderliness of such circuits or

communication set against a random background. The importance of this contrast
between background and foreground is particularly evident in the “wiping” of a mass

storage device. To clear a magnetic disk of all information one need only align all of its
individual magnets; a background that is perfectly ordered contains no meaningful

content. On the other hand, orderliness in the context of randomness points to the

involvement of a person and becomes evidence of information - the expression of
personal knowledge.

It is human beings, wrote Polanyi, who have “the power to

establish real patterns in nature” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 37). Note that an orderly pattern

need not be a pattern forced upon nature, as occurs in computer systems or in a written
document or a government agency. Even a “naturally occurring” pattern reveals personal

knowledge, for it is a person who recognizes such a pattern by integrating the observed
elements of nature into an orderly structure that may also be recognized by others.

Heuristic power is the second key concept evident in Polanyi's telling of this
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story. In his use of the idea of a heuristic, Polanyi drew on the work of his fellow
Hungarian, George Polya, who used this idea in two related ways. On the one hand,
heuristics can be thought of as “methods and rules of discovery and invention” (Polya,

1945/1985, p. 112). Such methods and rules are often devised as short cuts or rules of

thumb to facilitate solutions to a problem, particularly in mathematics or computer
science. A heuristic need not produce an exact or final answer so long as it moves

problem solving in the right direction. It is this openness that is central to the second way
that Polya applied the term in his writing: “Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded

as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the

solution of the present problem” (Polya, p. 113). The heuristic power of the Copernican
system was not its contribution of an absolute system that provided strict results, but of a

provisional system of indeterminate possibilities that was recognized by its orderliness as
a fitting rule of thumb or plausible method worth exploring and that led others to

demonstrate faith in its legitimacy by relying on it for their own work.
Indeed, wrote Polanyi, given the role that faith in or reliance on the judgments of

others plays in the search for scientific knowledge, the pursuit of such knowledge

demonstrates "an instance of the process described epigrammatically by the Christian

Church Fathers in the words: fides quaerens intellectum, faith in search of understanding”
(1946/1964, p. 45). Such knowledge is a gift “for which we must strive under the
guidance of antecedent belief” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 266).

By recognizing the

fiduciary foundation of all knowledge, Polanyi argued, we are free to openly confess our
true beliefs rather than allow them to be held unconsciously and thus susceptible to

corruption. Such a fiduciary framework is manifest in tacit knowing, in a passion for
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truth, in tradition, and in community.
The Fiduciary Call to Responsibility

Faith in or reliance on another (whether or not animate) is one side of a fiduciary
program; it is evident when we dare to trust in another. On the other side is the effort to

be trust-worthy; in the context of an orderly system that is heuristically powerful, faith
not only persuades a person to rely on another, but it also becomes a calling to
responsible commitment. Because personal knowledge is not made but discovered,

it claims to establish contact with reality beyond the clues on which it
relies. It commits us, passionately and far beyond our comprehension, to a
vision of reality. Of this responsibility we cannot divest ourselves by
setting up objective criteria of verifiability - or falsifiability, or testability,
or what you will. For we live in it as in the garment of our own skin.”
(Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 64)
The struggle to reveal a hidden meaning is a responsible struggle, a responsibility that we

“live in” or dwell in. It is a task and a duty that we accept when we passionately commit
ourselves to it, and no impersonal set of rules can detach it from our personal

involvement or eliminate our struggle to remain responsible. Our search is passionate

because we sense the potential of what is concealed and long to know its fullness. It is
responsible because it can succeed or fail and we are called to do our utmost to bring

about success.

By relying on Copernicus' heliocentric theory, Galileo and Kepler

committed themselves to it and ardently and responsibly accepted the consequences of

their commitment. They dedicated themselves to the discovery of a reality that was

uncertain and unforeseeable but which called them to its passionate pursuit.
This hidden reality is not wholly foreign to us because our background knowledge

already points subsidiarily to its possibility. However, because it does not originate fully
formed within us, we are forced to humbly acknowledge that, even though we submit to
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its claim on our energies, we may not succeed in our quest. This is not an objective
reality, impersonally observed in a detached manner and known dispassionately and
absolutely as “fact”. Nor is it a subjective reality, created by the god-like capacity of a
mind that is independent of any contact with the external world. Instead,

A passionate search for the correct solution of a task leaves no arbitrary
choice open to the seeker. He will have to guess, but he must make the
utmost effort to guess right. The sense of a pre-existent task makes the
shaping of knowledge a responsible act, free from subjective
predilections. And it endows, by the same token, the results of such
acts with a claim to universal validity. For when you believe that your
discovery reveals a hidden reality, you will expect it to be recognized
equally by others. To accept personal knowledge as valid is to accept
such claims as justified, even though admitting the limitations imposed
by the particular opportunity which enables the human mind to exercise
its personal powers. This opportunity is then regarded as the person's
calling - the calling which determines his responsibilities” (Polanyi,
1959a, p. 36).
A calling to responsibility will neither abdicate its intimate relationship to all knowledge,
nor permit a subjective abandonment of the universal intent of the discovery of an

independent reality. It is an opportunity - an opportunity to be responsible.
Whereas modernity, and positivism in particular, have "made us regard human

beliefs as arbitrary personal manifestations” (Polanyi, 1949/1974, p. 57), Polanyi argued
that "the holding of a belief is a commitment" (p. 59), and such a commitment implies

purposefulness. However, he also pointed out, "[t]o say that an action is purposeful is to

admit that it may miscarry" (p. 58). Specifically, he explained, "[s]uch a belief may turn
out to be true or false,” but “[t]he affirmation of a belief can only be said to be either

sincere or insincere” (p. 59). Because of the indeterminacy of knowledge and because
the possibility of being right assumes its opposite, commitment to a belief can never be
fully justified - for it may turn out to be mistaken or “rash”. However, “when a belief is
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both sincerely and responsibly held - that is, in conscientious awareness of its own
conceivable fallibility - there is present a form of affirmation which cannot be criticized
on any grounds whatsoever” (pp. 59-60).

As a fiduciary act, such commitment to a belief is an act of tacit knowing. The

integration of subsidiary particulars in terms of a comprehensive whole on which they
bear is a commitment to that whole. It is a belief in the whole's comprehensiveness
despite the uncertainty - in spite of the unspecifiability - of the subsidiary elements which

make it possible. Empirically, someone learning to ride a bicycle must rely on a host of
clues known only subsidiarily. She must have faith that half-understood momentum and

a body's ability to balance itself will enable effective forward movement.

More

generally, belief in the reality of a comprehensive entity is a personal commitment, and
reliance on subsidiary particulars, by looking through them or attending from them to a
comprehensive whole, is an act of faith. Therefore, the certainty of a reality claimed with
universal intent is a dynamic certainty and subject to modification. An explicit focus on

the subsidiary particulars of tacit knowing will dissolve the tacit integration that brings
into being the comprehensive entity to which a person makes a commitment; “the present

moment's belief can be rejected or modified by the next moment's reflection” (Polanyi,
1949/1974, p. 60). Commitment and reflection, therefore, are incommensurable: while

we reflect on our beliefs, we must relinquish our commitment to them; while we commit
ourselves to them, we ignore reflection on them.
Integration of subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole, then, is “an act

of hope”. It is a commitment to a hidden reality which is “expressed in the universal
intent of personal knowledge” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 65). Polanyi set out “to bring back
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the idea of reality and place it at the centre of a theory of scientific enquiry” (1967a/1997,
p. 225). However, “The resurrected idea of reality ... will turn out to be known only

vaguely, with an unlimited range of unspecifiable expectations attached to it” (p. 226).
Therefore, when we rely on such an indeterminate reality, we do so by faith, and when

we respond to its call to responsibly seek out and discover further aspects of that reality
and hold them with universal intent, we do so by faith. These are the two sides of a

fiduciary program driven by hope, by the tacit intimations of unspecified and even
unsuspected future manifestations of reality.

Beauty, Passion, and Legitimacy in Tacit Knowing
The responsible acceptance of a call based on intimations of a hidden reality

acknowledges the heuristic power of a logical gap. Such heuristic power was evident in
Copernicus' affirmation of his heliocentric system in the face of great opposition, but it
was more clearly defined in Kepler's reliance on Copernicus' system to develop his own
equations that at once affirmed the heliocentric system while disproving Copernicus'

particular version. And, of course, Newton's imagination would have been hampered
without Kepler's refinement of Copernicus' system as a foundation. However, we need
not reach out to ancient stories of astronomical discoveries to recognize the heuristic

powers of a trusted system. A social worker confronted with an irate client might simply
dismiss him as “a jerk” and refuse to listen for other possibilities. Alternatively, she
might choose to pay attention to subtle hints that point in other directions and suggest

other possibilities. The former response closes the door to future discoveries. The latter
leaves the door open, lending it heuristic power.

Openness to the heuristic power of a theory, an interpretation, or an action forces
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us to acknowledge "a beauty that exhilarates and a profundity that entrances us" (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 15). The ability to develop a theory, to devise an interpretation, or to
imagine an action that has heuristic power brings a sense of beauty to a situation because

it points to future possibilities that remain, themselves, indeterminate. Such a skill adds
orderliness to a theory, interpretation, or action, imprinting it with the responsible action

of a person. Against a background of heuristic randomness, any particular combination
of the four bases in DNA becomes meaningful. Likewise, the potential randomness of
electrical signals turns an orderly combination of signals into information, and the

unspecifiable range of possible strategies available to a social worker makes a particular

combination into a comprehensive plan. The beauty of a theory or idea or action - the
cohesiveness of a comprehensive entity that gives it meaning - is recognized by its

orderliness in the context of its heuristic power.

In Polanyi's writing, beauty and passion are closely associated, for intellectual
beauty is "a beauty which establishes a new contact with external reality" (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 148). Because reality is characterized by an indefinite range of unexpected
manifestations, it can only be discovered by leaping a logical gap. That heuristic process,

when combined with orderliness, gives the explorer a glimpse of reality that elicits a

passionate appraisal of its beauty. Through imagination, heuristic power thrusts the

explorer forward in the search for reality, while orderliness, through intuition, constrains
it to give it meaning. The anticipatory powers of an entity or system or idea call to the
scientist who sees in them the beauty of a cohesive system pointing to an aspect of a

hidden reality. This is what persuaded Copernicus that he was looking in the right
direction and that he could rely on his conclusions: “Everything is now bound together,
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he claim[ed], and this is a sign that the system is real” (Polanyi, 1967a/1997, p. 234).

Polanyi found the passion of recognizing beauty in a discovery especially evident
in the writing of Kepler. Kepler recognized that he might be wrong, but he was so

enthralled by the beauty of the discoveries he was making that, “He even went so far as to

write down the tune of each planet in musical notation” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 7). To

Kepler, “astronomic discovery was ecstatic communion” (p. 7), but it would not be

unusual for a social worker to also feel a sense of elation at uncovering the root of a

client's ongoing problems, or at devising a particularly elegant solution to a thorny
situation. As Kepler showed, the beauty of a cohesive discovery inspires a passionate
commitment to the reality intimated in such a revelation. It compels the knower to a

responsible reliance on the indeterminate possibilities of such a truth. Consequently,

science, wrote Polanyi, “exists only to the extent to which there lives a passion for its

beauty, a beauty believed to be universal and eternal” (1958/1962, p. 267).
The beauty of a tacit integration is evident in the passion with which it is upheld.
Because such an integration may be right, it may also be wrong, but its orderliness and its

heuristic power to point us toward further unexpected manifestations of an indeterminate

nature excite us and draw us toward a set of possibilities that yet lie beyond our reach.
The beauty of a tacit integration thus legitimizes it; beauty gives us the confidence

necessary to commit ourselves to the passionate search for yet more comprehensive
entities that point us still further in the pursuit of the real.

Facts, ideas, theories,

institutions, relationships - all become clues to an indeterminate reality, pointers that act

as signs along the way, indications that we are on the right path and that our destination is
approaching. The heuristic power of those clues calls us forward to passionately search
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out further evidence, but their orderliness simultaneously reveals to us, and validates for
us, the particulars, the background that anchors them. Legitimacy and validity, then, are

not the leftovers of certainty, but the passionate commitment that results from the

recognition of a beautiful integration of subsidiary clues into a comprehensive whole that
leaves the future open and undetermined.

A public servant endeavoring to interpret the exclamations of a client or a
scientist attempting to understand a problem both seek to make sense of something that is

hidden yet accessible, something that is real yet indeterminate. Both recognize that their
discoveries, their interpretations, their understanding may be wrong, and both recognize
that any progress they make is only the beginning of an ongoing process of discovery,
interpretation, and understanding. Because they live in an indeterminate world, they

intuitively sense that the product of their efforts must be indeterminate as well, yet when
insight strikes them, they have confidence in the results of their achievement and embrace

those results, dependent not on their certainty but on their potential to manifest
themselves unexpectedly in the future. The case worker's confidence in the legitimacy of
her interpretation, or in the validity of the historical records of a particular client, or in the

authority of the rules and procedures upon which she relies, is not based on their absolute

character but on their integration into a comprehensive whole that is bound together in
such a way that it points to a possible reality that is orderly and heuristically powerful. It

is the beauty of her interpretation of a client, of her solution to his problem - or of the
scientist's understanding of a problem - that validates it and gives it legitimacy and
authority. It is the beauty of a discovery that convinces the discoverer that it is not in

error and gives the knower confidence in its rightness.
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CHAPTER III
COMMUNITY, TRADITION, AND DYNAMIC ORDER
IN A FREE SOCIETY

We have now, in the instance of scientific inquiry, seen how a kind of moral association
of persons, through the exercise of mutual authority, welds tradition and freedom
together in a pursuit of the truth and how actions of persons in this association are
rendered responsibly universal in intent by a common belief in the existence of a reality,
further and further aspects of which may be uncovered by these persons through their
own originative actions. (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 196)

Science is governed by common beliefs, by values and practices transmitted to
succeeding generations. Each new independent member of the scientific
community adheres to this tradition, assuming at the same time the
responsibility shared by all members for re-interpreting the tradition and,
possibly, revolutionizing its teachings. (Polanyi, 1967a/1969, p. 85)

A free society, wrote Polanyi and Harry Prosch, "is not simply an "open" one, a
society in which anything goes" (1975, p. 196). Specifically, "[i]t cannot be a free
society by being open on matters such as these, that is, by being neutral with respect to
truth and falsehood, justice and injustice, honesty and fraud" (p. 197). "This is a very

serious mistake" they asserted, for a wholly open society "would be a wholly vacuous
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one - one which could never actually exist, since it could never have any reason for
existing" (p. 184). Instead, "a free society rests upon a traditional framework" (p. 184),

upon public liberties that, as shown in the example of science, enable moral associations

constrained and directed by tradition to freedom for responsible relationship with an

indeterminate reality. Such a society is one "in which men, being engaged in various
activities whose ends are considered worthy of respect, are allowed the freedom to pursue
these ends" (p. 196). Polanyi was an unrelenting defender of liberty and liberalism, but

he came to understand liberty and liberalism in a manner that linked them closely to his
conception of knowledge as personal and reality as indeterminate.

The concept of public liberty is at the center of Polanyi's understanding of a free

society. Public liberties are granted for a purpose (the achievement of meaning through
responsible relationship) but they are also constrained by structure and mechanism. They
are fostered by dynamically ordered systems that weld together tradition and freedom for

responsible action on behalf of a community and of society as a whole. Such entities are

provided structure and guidance by the mutual adjustment of individual initiatives, by

mutual authority and overlapping neighborhoods of knowledge and action, by self

modifying tradition, and by a hierarchy of "influentials." Those who embrace public

liberty are free to act responsibly with universal intent, yet they are at the same time

bound by tradition and hierarchy and the mutual authority of a community.

Given this emphasis on public liberty, Chapter III will show that tradition and
community provide a background and creative control that allow organizations to emerge

from individual initiative; that the dynamic tension evident in tacit knowing is also

reflected in the spontaneous order of social groups; and that the call to a responsible
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search for beauty through discovery is inherent in the public liberty granted to institutions
that comprise a free society. The picture of a free society that emerges will be described

primarily in terms of dynamic or spontaneous order and the tradition and community on

which such order depends, but tacit knowing remains foundational to any attempt to
understand Polanyi's political philosophy. The organization of such a society by the
mutual adjustment of individual initiatives will not be presented as a perfect order, but as

one that is necessary in light of our indeterminate, fallible nature as human beings, and in

light of the personal nature and tacit roots of our knowledge. Chapter III, therefore, will
examine Polanyi's understanding of community, of tradition, and of spontaneous order,
before focusing on three important functions of systems granted public liberty that

demonstrate how tacit knowing and an unspecifiable stratified reality come together to

reinforce responsibility in a free society.
Community

As discussed in the previous chapter, Polanyi showed that the heuristic tension of
a hidden reality, of a logical gap between what is known and what might be, incites

passion in the explorer. However, without a community that may recognize and affirm
the promise of a discovery and the values expressed in heuristic passion, discovery

becomes wasted effort, for once a discovery has been made, it must be shared; “[i]n order

to be satisfied, our intellectual passions must find response” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 150).
In seeking affirmation by another, a new logical gap appears, this time between the
discoverer and those who have yet to fully grasp his vision.

The discoverer "has

committed himself to a new vision of reality, he has separated himself from others who
still think on the old lines" (p. 150), and the tension resulting from that rift can not be
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resolved through formal rules of language and logic because the two parties now speak

incommensurate languages. Any one system supporting such a vision "is relatively

stable, for it can account for most of the evidence which it accepts as well established"
(Polanyi, p. 151), yet such a framework "is correspondingly segregated from any

knowledge or alleged knowledge rooted in different conceptions of experience" (p. 151).

Having embraced a new vision, the speaker faces a logical gap that, spurred on by the
prospect of response, calls him to cross it "by converting everybody to his way of seeing

things" (p. 150). This passion for affirmation by another is a persuasive passion that can
only be satisfied through endorsement by a representative of the community, and it
depends, like intellectual passion, on the logic of tacit knowing.

Polanyi used the term “conviviality” to describe the central relationship between
individuals in community and defined it as the “interpersonal coincidence of tacit
judgments” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 205).

In the awareness of such a coincidence,

community comes into being. Polanyi was confident that such community is possible

because its members share a common core of tacit knowledge, and “even though people

may conceivably misunderstand any particular words addressed to them, they can, as a
rule, convey information to each other reliably enough by speech” (Polanyi, p. 205).

Because speech, itself, is dependent on tacit knowing, the articulate systems of a
community or a society are made possible by shared tacit knowledge, and that shared

knowledge makes conviviality the defining characteristic of a community.
Because tacit knowledge cannot be known explicitly, it may be shared only by

indwelling another's speech and action; because there are no fixed rules defining
intercourse between individuals, true communication depends on the passionate leaping

56

of a logical gap. Acceptance of communication is therefore "a heuristic process, a self
modifying act, and to this extent a conversion" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 151). Moreover,
each person must maintain a humble openness to the other, and communication must be
approached responsibly: in speaking I have a responsibility to the listener; in listening I

have a responsibility to the speaker.

Furthermore, while the indeterminacy of all

knowledge leaves open the possibility that our claims may be mistaken, a responsible

integration of subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole assumes that others will

also recognize that entity and affirm the discovery so made. Anchored as it is in tacit
knowing, conviviality must forever be sensitive to the possibilities inherent in the other,

even as it relies on an intuitive sense of the indeterminate future manifestations evident in
a contact with another who is therefore real.

In a fixed, explicit world, a work crew discussion of a problem looks like
inefficient work practices, but if the centrality of tacit knowing is recognized, then such a
discussion may be seen as an attempt to reach beyond the fixed to the tacit knowledge

that allows it to be utilized.

In such a gathering both a discovery gap and a

communication gap are being simultaneously bridged to arrive at a single comprehensive

whole, at a discovery shared by a community. "I cannot speak," Polanyi wrote, "without
implying a reference to a consensus" (1958/1962, p. 209). In fact, "[s]uch granting of
one's personal allegiance is - like an act of heuristic conjecture - a passionate pouring of

oneself into untried forms of existence" (p. 208). Each person of the work crew depends
on tacit knowing for both discovery and communication, and when the discovery is

accepted by the crew as a whole the end result is conviviality and community.
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Tradition

Intellectual passion, then, may only be fully satisfied through and by a
community. However, not any community will suffice, for “[a]rticulate systems which

foster and satisfy an intellectual passion, can survive only with the support of a society

which respects the values affirmed by these passions” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 203). A
community which supports discovery must share the values of the explorer, and a
community which supports the persuasive passion of communication must share common

meanings.

As Polanyi pointed out, "[s]ince the advancement and dissemination of

knowledge ... forms part of cultural life, the tacit coefficients by which these articulate

systems are understood and accredited ... are also coefficients of a cultural life shared by

a community" (Polanyi, p. 203). To use science as an example, the premisses of shared
meanings “cannot be explicitly formulated, and can be found authentically manifested
only in the practice of science, as maintained by the tradition of science” (Polanyi,
1946/1964, p. 85, italics added), for "this tacit sharing of knowing underlies every single

act of articulate communication" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 203). Since "practical wisdom
is more truly embodied in action" (p. 54) and personal knowledge, such as the methods
and practice ofscience, "can be passed on only by example from master to apprentice" (p.

53), "[a] society which wants to preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to
tradition" (Polanyi, p. 53).

Tradition is not simply a set of rules and procedures handed down from some

absolute authority. Rather, the premisses of a tradition “are transmitted to us from the
past, but they are our own interpretations ofthe past, at which we have arrived within the

context of our own immediate problems” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 160). Such a tradition
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is therefore never fixed and absolute, but is constantly in flux as each member of the
community interprets it and contributes to its maintenance as well as its ongoing

development.

As an example, scientific opinion "represents only a temporary and

imperfect embodiment of the traditional standards of science" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p.
53). Tradition, as enforced by a community, is the tacit background conditioning the
possibilities of discovery, of communication, and of action, but that very community, and

the individuals of which it is comprised, personalize tradition and prevent it from ever

becoming a set of fixed rules and absolute principles. The indeterminate possibilities
evident in tradition are limited by a community, not to restrict them, but to affirm them

and give them meaning.

To the tacit nature of tradition and its potential for self-modification must be
added its dependence on fiduciary responsibility. This feature may already be seen in the

need for submission which is not the blind submission of a bureaucrat enforced by fixed

procedures but a responsible reliance on the authority of tradition, on its heuristic power
and its orderliness. Acceptance of tradition may be likened to the embrace of tacit
knowledge, which may only be grasped by "the person pouring himself into" (Polanyi,
1959a, p. 62) or indwelling its particulars. This act of submission to tradition recognizes

that "each person can know directly very little of truth" (p. 68), but "even so, a valid

choice can be made" (p. 62), for submission to tradition is the acceptance of the personal

nature of knowledge and is therefore a responsible act.

Tacit assent of traditional values

is "elevated to the seat of responsible judgment" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 312), and a
responsible decision is reached "in the knowledge that we have overruled by it

conceivable alternatives, for reasons that are not fully specifiable" (p. 312). Tradition
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cannot be accepted explicitly and impersonally; it can only be accepted through

responsible action, by first submitting to and relying on its authority.
Consider the personal and traditional foundation of scientific "facts" and the

premisses on which they depend. Conceptually, a premiss “is logically anterior to that of

which it is the premiss” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 161). But, we can only know a scientific
premiss once it has been applied, for a premiss in flux can only be seen tacitly, as it bears

on a comprehensive entity that relies on it. More specifically, “The logical premisses of

factuality are not known to us or believed by us before we start establishing facts, but are
recognized on the contrary by reflecting on the way we establish facts” (Polanyi, p. 162).

We define facts as those items that seem to us to be factual, but our understanding of
“factual” is determined prior to our definition of facts. Again, “we believe in certain

explicit presuppositions of factuality only because we have discovered that they are
implied in our belief in the existence of facts” (Polanyi, p. 162). Accordingly, we know

the premisses of a tradition subsidiarily as we rely on them for an awareness of the object

of our focus, on which they bear.
Tradition, then, as necessary as it is to both discovery and communication, can
never be defined absolutely, for it is known tacitly and responsibly, through practice. It is
constantly being changed by the community that, or individual who, submits to it. This

creative renewal always implies an appeal "from a tradition as it is to a tradition as it

ought to be" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 56). Contrary to common misconceptions, tradition

is a living thing, not a static set of rules and habits. Each appeal to its authority not only
defers to, but also modifies that authority in subtle but significant ways. This tension

between what is established as, and the change that comes from responsible use of, a
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tradition and its premisses, may be seen in the way science comes to understand the

world by choosing a problem worth pursuing, in the way in which authority is

apportioned, and in the way a tradition is passed down from one generation to the next

through apprenticeship. However, to properly understand problem solving, authority, and
apprenticeship, it is necessary to first develop a better understanding of dynamic order.

Dynamic Order
When Polanyi set out to argue against the central government control of science
so evident in Soviet rejection of "science pursued for its own sake" (Polanyi, 1946/1964,

p. 8), what he immediately recognized as a key to the survival of science, as he
understood and had experienced it, was freedom for scientists to determine their own path

of study. He found this freedom in dynamic or spontaneous order set in the context of

tradition and community, and he described its central operation as the mutual adjustment

of individual initiatives4.

Drawing on an appreciation for the free market, on his studies of fluids and

crystal formation, and on the writings of Gestalt Psychology, Polanyi showed that
spontaneous order is achieved by giving free rein to the elements ofa system, rather than

by limiting freedom as might occur in a rigid structure. For example, a fluid poured into

a vessel with a complex shape, if left to act freely, will dynamically fill all nooks and
crannies and come to rest at a common level: "[t]he water in a jug settles down, filling the

hollow of the vessel perfectly, in even density, up to the level of a horizontal plane
forming its free surface" (Polanyi, 1941, p. 431). Likewise, diverse molecules dissolved

4 Struan Jacobs (1999) has argued that Polanyi's use of the term “spontaneous order” changed somewhat
between 1941 and 1948, resulting in a distinction between spontaneous and dynamic order, but for the
purposes of this dissertation, the terms are synonymous. In later writing, Polanyi tended to eschew both
terms and wrote most often of mutual adjustment.
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together and allowed to act freely, will naturally sort themselves into separate crystals.

Or in economics, a market economy spontaneously orders itself through the action of
individuals mutually coordinating their efforts while guided by an “invisible hand”.

Polanyi suggested that dynamic order also applies to the handling of men in
corporations or in a discipline like science. Like the participants in a market economy,
scientists, acting individually but in competition with each other, select their own

problems for investigation and seek to make use of traditional standards and methods to
discover solutions to the problems they have chosen. Each scientific claim adjusts itself

to all previously established ones, with scientists calibrating their efforts using both
competition, like a consumer or producer, and consultation, like a judge (Polanyi, 1941,
p. 437). Importantly, each individual within a spontaneously ordered organization need

only maintain direct working relationships with two or three colleagues and more indirect
connections with up to a dozen others. Polanyi called this "the Principle of Overlapping
Neighborhoods", where "Every mature scientist knows an important part of science at

first hand" even as "other scientists, cultivating adjoining fields ... see a similar fragment

of science, parts of which overlap with the area well known to the first scientist"
(Polanyi, 1964b, p. 9). In such a system, each individual trusts the judgment of her
fellows by relying on them and thereby extending her realm of knowledge well beyond
her capacity to personally make contact with reality.

In small organizations, a bureaucratic hierarchy can be relatively effective, but in
large entities, this becomes impossible without the mutual adjustment inherent in
spontaneous or dynamic forms oforder. Rather than attempting to calculate an optimally

sized span of control, Polanyi went to the root of the problem, arguing that centralized
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control is simply not effective in the comprehensive, polycentric entities prevalent in our

modern, complex world. Indeed, "'A polycentric task can be socially managed only by a
system of mutual adjustments'" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 226). To organize a very large
number of units, specific assignments will not suffice; only spontaneous mutual

adjustment of individual initiatives will be effective.
Mathematically, Polanyi demonstrated that, while the hierarchy necessitated by
centralized control is severely limited in its ability to respond to, much less control, a
large number of nodes, a system of spontaneous order is virtually unlimited in the

number of individuals that can be accommodated (Polanyi, 1951/1998, pp.141-149).
Critically, centralized order is characterized only by vertical interactions and managed by

a single individual, while dynamic order is controlled through mutual adjustment of each

node to all of the others. Even using robots without subjective feelings and desires, he
argued, the problem of centrally determining the satisfaction of the robot customers of a
large enterprise, in a polycentric economy, evaluating an indefinite number of goods,

“would be an entirely insoluble problem” (Polanyi, 1948/1997, p. 149).

The only

solution is to establish a measure of exchange and allow the robot customers to each
resolve its own satisfaction problem in correlation with similar resolutions by its
neighbors; "the true scientific handling of an economic system of many centres does not

consist in taking into account jointly all the elements of the problem, but in disregarding

their vast majority at each move" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 225).

From a strictly

mathematical perspective, as designers of super computers have found, dynamic order

(through parallel processing) is the only effective way to manage large complex
machines, just as it is the only credible way to order complex molecules, organisms, or
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organizations.
Empirically, Polanyi used the Soviet economy to show that, a centralized shell of
5-year plans and top level administrators gives the appearance ofa command based order

but, at the level where production actually takes place, government has to rely on the
mutual adjustment of individual initiatives. Any comprehensive plan is, in reality, "but a

meaningless summary of an aggregate of plans, dressed up as a single plan" (Polanyi,
1951/1998, p. 165) and claiming "economic powers that are only imaginary" (p. 169). In

fact, Polanyi argued, in this respect the “rigorous free-traders” such as L. von Mises, F.

H. Knight, and F. A. Hayek (in The Road to Serfdom) were mistaken in admitting the

possibility of a centrally managed economy, albeit at the price of freedom (Polanyi,
1951/1998, 1957/1997, 1962/1997). In real life, involving real circumstances, a complex

economy can only be ordered spontaneously. Moreover, dynamic order is not limited to

economics.

To Polanyi, the necessity of spontaneous order was evident in

comprehensive tasks as simple as completion of a jigsaw puzzle, as challenging as the
implementation of a chess strategy, or as indeterminate as science. Any attempt to

structure the completion of a puzzle by a team of puzzlers, to hierarchically divide up
responsibility for multiple games ofchess, or to centrally direct scientific research, would
bring progress to a halt. In practice, such tasks are managed dynamically, for only the
mutual adjustment of individual initiatives can effectively take into account the specific

context ofa strategic decision or a complex, comprehensive entity.

Philosophically, Polanyi's argument in favor of spontaneous order may be linked
to the logic of tacit knowing in multiple ways. Firstly, tacit knowing is a dynamic

process, rather than a static object, and the intuitive recognition of a discovery may be
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understood as "a spontaneous coalescence of the elements which must combine to its

achievement" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 33), a process "of spontaneous mental

reorganization uncontrolled by conscious effort" (p. 34). The Gestalt process by which
tacit knowing integrates subsidiary and focal elements, itself occurs spontaneously.

Secondly, if all knowledge is personal and dependent on a process oftacit knowing, then

a truly centralized, fixed organization of the elements of a comprehensive entity is
impossible in practice, for such a structure must depend on explicit knowledge that is
certain and absolute. Because explicit knowledge, isolated from the tacit knowing that

gives it meaning, is impossible, "a decentralized and free procedure ofmutual adjustment

through self-coordination achieves the greatest total progress possible" (Polanyi and

Prosch, 1975, p. 190). Thirdly, like tacit knowing, spontaneous order allows for the
indeterminacy of reality and is therefore more flexible than centrally managed order in

terms ofsize ofthe entity being ordered, interms of types of knowledge that it maytake
into account, in terms of complexity of organization or function, and in its ability to

motivate organization members. In the theoretical world of a perfectly coordinated
corporate body, only the person at the top of the pyramid acts independently and sees
broadly; “All others must obey first, and act only within the limits of, the changing

directives issued daily by their superiors” (Polanyi, 1941, p. 434). In a complex entity,
the consequences of limiting the full ability of organizational members, and of ignoring
the tacit root of all knowledge, are “large-scale maladjustments” (p. 434).
Spontaneous order is, like tradition, characterized by a tension between the

dynamic changes enacted by individual initiative and the standards and knowledge that
constrain the system as a whole. On the one hand we find that the mutual adjustment of
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individual initiatives is empowered by the heuristic talent and passion of individuals
acting freely. In a community of scientists, for example, it is the freedom to choose a

problem that takes center stage; in a market economy it is the freedom to buy or sell
according to individual dictates that is of overriding importance; and in a court of law the

freedom of the judge to decide a case according to personal knowledge is paramount. On
the other hand, the freedom evident in individual initiative is also constrained.

In

science, it is the community enforcing a tradition, reinforced by values and skills

appropriated through a process of apprenticeship, which act as boundaries to define new
meaning. In a market economy, it is primarily scarcity, set in a traditional structure of

individual property rights enforced by law, which constrains individual choice. In a
court, tradition, evident in previous judgments, predominates, creating a framework
within which individual decision becomes more than the whim of a rogue judge. This
heuristic freedom, in tension with orderliness, will be clearly evident in the following

discussions of problem solving, the distribution of authority, and apprenticeship.

Problem Solving in a Dynamic Order
The practice of dynamically ordered systems like science, Common Law, or a
market economy; the search for knowledge by a scientist, the decision by a judge, the

weighing of values by buyers and sellers; may all be seen as instances of problem

solving. In all three examples, there are choices to be made and one may recognize "a
first stage of perplexity followed by a second stage of doing and perceiving which dispels
this perplexity" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 120). Such "a readiness ...to make sense of

[our] own situation" (p. 120), involves the recognition of a problem followed by effort to
find its solution. The result of such a search is "a purposive tension from which no fully
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awake animal is free" (p. 120), a tension that is resolved by the tacit integration of
subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole. In a dynamically ordered discipline

like science (or Common Law or a market economy), the individual scientist (or judge or
buyer/seller) is driven by such a purposive tension, called to identify and understand

problems and to resolve them heuristically, always recognizing that such a resolution is
not only irreversible, and thereby impossible to describe explicitly, but simply shifts the

heuristic tension forward by suggesting new possibilities. The "readiness" ofthe scientist
or judge or buyer/seller is in tension, not only with the situation, but also with a tradition
as enforced by a community.

According to Polanyi, the scientific tradition, for example, teaches the scientist to
weigh creativity, plausibility, and scientific value in the search for a problem worth

solving. The value of a scientific problem depends on its profundity or systematic
relevance, on its intrinsic interest, and on its validity (its certainty, accuracy, or
exactitude). These three characteristics work together to attract the scientist to problems

promising results of scientific value. Validity, profundity, and intrinsic interest are not
enough, however, to identify the merit of a scientific proposition; a scientific problem
and its solution must also be plausible and original (Polanyi, 1946/1964, pp. 16, 49; 1962,

pp. 57-58). If a problem and solution are too unusual or if similar problems have
regularly been rejected, the implausible will be ignored by the scientist as beyond reach.

At the same time, a problem that is both plausible and scientifically valuable may yet be a
waste oftime ifit contributes nothing unique to the body ofscientific knowledge. Thus,

a problem or its solution must also be original, and the measure oforiginality is surprise the unexpectedness of the contribution. The tension, between the heuristic power of
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originality and theorderlinessofplausibilityandscientific value, results in a science that
“is constantly revolutionized and perfected by its pioneers, while remaining firmly rooted
in its tradition” (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 56).

The choice of a problem, then, is rooted in tradition, but such a weighing of

plausibility and scientific value against originality, of "unsuspected possibilities
suggested by existing knowledge" (Polanyi, 1967a/1969, p. 79), also intimates an

"inexhaustible profundity" (p. 79) impossible to an impersonal, mechanistic science that

recognizes only certain knowledge of a fixed reality and a determinate future. Problem
solving that recognizes the uncertainty of an indeterminate future, on the other hand,

heuristicallyopensitselftounlimitedpossibilitiesandinexhaustibleprofunditybecauseit

perceives "an aspect of reality, and aspects of reality are clues to yet boundless

undisclosed and perhaps as yet unthinkable experiences" (Polanyi, 1967a/1969, p. 79).

"Indeed," Polanyi and Prosch argued, "the process by which this unknown thing will be
brought to light will be acknowledged as a discovery precisely because it could not have

been achieved by persistent application of explicit rules to given facts" (Polanyi and

Prosch, p. 193).
Anchored in tradition, scientific problems are living things. Each appeal by a
scientist to plausibility and scientific value not only lives in tension with originality, but

modifies the very grounds upon which it relies. The scientist senses the potential of a
problem, recognizes the existence of a logical gap that must be crossed, and becomes
passionate about the possibilities realized therein. However, "the investigator takes a

decision fraught with risks" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 124), and must choose a problem that
is "neither too hard nor too easy" (Polanyi, 1962, p. 56). The contingency of such a
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decision makes the application of fixed, explicit rules impossible.

Only the tacit

integration of subsidiary particulars by a person - by the individual scientist - can make
the weighing of plausibility and scientific value against originality feasible, for "[t]he

freedom of scientists to make truly original contributions has thus been shown to rest on

various traditional beliefs enforced by the community of scientists as a whole" (Polanyi
and Prosch, 1975, p. 190). Only the responsible submission to a tradition authorizes the

independent initiative of the individual in a dynamically ordered system like science or
Common Law or a market economy.

Mutual Authority in a Dynamic Order
Problem solving, then, is a dynamic process that may only take place within a
discipline that is organized spontaneously, for each individual must choose for herself a

problem of the right difficulty and then responsibly attempt to solve it in a manner
conducive with the tradition to which she has committed herself and on which she relies.

The individual is therefore subject to the authority of the community that upholds that
tradition. This relationship between problem solving and the authority ofthe community
comes into full view when comparing the selection of a scientific problem and that
community's support of the scientific tradition. Because scientific problem solving lives

in a tension between heuristic possibilities and an orderliness that gives them meaning,

The professional standards of science must impose a framework of
discipline and at the same time encourage rebellion against it. . Thus, the
authority ofscientific opinion enforces the teachings ofscience in general,
for the very purpose of fostering their subversion in particular points.
(Polanyi, 1962, pp. 58-59)
Just as the scientist must weigh plausibility and scientific value against originality in

choosing a problem worth pursuing, so the tradition of science, expressed as authority,
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insists on conformity while inviting revolution; it remains conservative while opening
itselfto new sources of knowledge.

In a dynamically ordered entity, each individual is accredited and, together, a
community of individuals expresses the authority of the organization by laying down

general presuppositions that leave it “subject to control by [its] own body of opinion”
(Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 57)5.

Such general rules leave open possibilities at the margin

that require discretionary personal judgment. Therefore, reliance on authority is personal,
and just as personal knowledge depends on the acceptance of a calling to responsibility,

so too does authority rely on responsible commitment to a tradition expressed by a

community. The authority ofa dynamically ordered entity like science lives in a tension
between submission to the tradition that calls it into being, and creative renewal through

exercise ofthe general presuppositions that are its expression. "The tradition ofscience,"

wrote Polanyi, "can be made use of by scientists only if they place themselves at its
service" (p. 54). As he pointed out, marginal changes by individual participants are not

only useful in accomplishing specific goals, but may also serve normatively to modify the

general rules that make specific application of those rules possible.

Such creative

renewal assumes that individual community members are capable ofmaking contact with

reality and therefore implies “an appeal from a tradition as it is to a tradition as it ought to
be” (Polanyi, p. 56). .
Authority, then, depends on tacit knowing, for our knowledge or actions become

authoritative only when someone demonstrates their trust in them by relying on them:
The learner, like the discoverer, must believe before he can know. But
while the problem-solver's foreknowledge expresses confidence in
5 Michael Oakeshott (1962/1991, p. 454) described "non-instrumental rules" similar to Polanyi's description
of general presuppositions.
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himself, the intimations followed by the learner are based predominantly
on his confidence in others; and this is an acceptance of authority.
(Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 208, italics added)

Authority, therefore, links the problem-solver's intellectual passion with the learner's (and
speaker's) persuasive passion.

It gives legitimacy to the knowledge or actions of

individual members of a community by acknowledging their contribution to the tradition
that gives them meaning. Authority is faith in a claim that is made with universal intent;
it is personal knowledge that is asserted in the context of tradition. Thus, "when the

premisses of science are held in common by the scientific community each must
subscribe to them by an act of devotion . they are not merely indicative, but also

normative" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 54).
In a dynamic order, made up of many individuals acting independently but
responsibly, authority becomes a corporate entity; it becomes a mutual authority of the

whole community in which "each scientist is both subject to criticism by others and is

encouraged by their appreciation" (Polanyi, 1967a/1969, p. 85). Each scientist can know
and therefore authorize only a restricted field ofscientific knowledge, "but their restricted

fields form chains of overlapping neighbourhoods extending over the entire range of

sciences" (Polanyi, p. 85). The general principles laid down by a mutual authority

empower the members of a community to act freely and creatively. Just as the tacit root
ofauthority suggests a purposive tension to validate and justify individual action within a

specific situation, so the traditional root of mutual authority legitimizes the tradition as a
whole by enabling the emergence ofthe creative work ofindividual scientists.
It is important to note that the mutual authority of a spontaneous order is not
democratic in an ideal sense. Polanyi acknowledged that there is a hierarchy to the
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structure of authority in the community of scientists. Indeed, he noted that it is the

"influentials" (Polanyi, 1941, p. 441) who control appointments to research opportunities,
referee papers submitted to journals, and control the review and consequently the success
of textbooks.

They qualify scientific opinion expressed in popular literature and

newspapers through public expressions of approval or disapproval, they regulate the
teaching ofscience in schools by the same mechanism, and they manage the distribution

ofmaterial resources and personal effort. Infact, since “the wholeoutlookofmanonthe

universe is conditioned by an implicit recognition of the authority of scientific opinion”
(Polanyi, 1962, p. 60), the "influentials" are granted uncommon authority. However, the
authority evident in the discipline of science remains a distributed authority and the

hierarchy of influentials remains a dynamic hierarchy, for not even an influential knows
one part in a million of the body of scientific knowledge.

Thus the hierarchy of

influentials remains dependent on and subject to the mutual authority ofthe full scientific
community; they are called to act responsibly on behalfofthe community as a whole.
Apprenticeship in a Dynamic Order

The tension between heuristic possibilities and the orderliness that gives them

meaning, that is evident in tacit knowing, in the process of discovery, in communication,
in problem solving, and in mutual authority, is also evident in the process by which a
tradition is handed down from one generation to the next and by which membership in a
community comes to be. In a scientific community membership is not inherited but

earned, and it involves three steps. The first step to community membership is to learn
the language and conventions of the community, much as an immigrant must learn the
language and conventions of a newly adopted country. The second step to earning a
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voice and a vote is to learn to recognize the community's “uncertainties and its eternally
provisional nature,” while gaining “a glimpse ofthe dormant implications which may yet

emerge from the established doctrine” (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 43). It is not enough to be

able to translate explicit meanings of individual words or to memorize rules or rituals.

Someone intent on becoming a member of such a community must learn the informal,

implied meanings of its rules and rituals, must begin to learn its methodology and
experience it in practice, and must be "impelled to imitate" (p. 44) its expert guides.

Having developed both an explicit and a tacit understanding, the third step to
membership in the community is the achievement of independence. Polanyi argued that
such independence is usually achieved “only through close personal association with the

intimate views and practice of a distinguished master” (1946.1964, p. 43).

As he

described it,

In the great schools of research are fostered the most vital premisses of
scientific discovery. A master's daily labours will reveal these to the
intelligent student and impart to him also some of the master's personal
intuitions by which his work is guided. The way he chooses problems,
selects a technique, reacts to new clues and to unforeseen difficulties,
discusses other scientists' work, and keeps speculating all the time about a
hundred possibilities which are never to materialize, may transmit a
reflection at least ofhis essential vision” (Polanyi, pp. 43-44).
Neither memorized rules and rituals nor tacit knowledge of the potential of science are

enough. An apprentice scientist must learn to live independently as a scientist before

being granted authoritative freedom.
What becomes clear in Polanyi's writing is that knowing and discovery,

communication and judgment all become meaningful in the midst of a tension between

conservative impulses and disruptive ones.

Boundaries are defined, only to be re

imagined by application of new principles; gaps are recognized, only to be creatively
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hurdled. Comprehensive entities are recognized and authoritative judgments are made in
the context of particulars recognized only subsidiarily. The process of apprenticeship

into a community and a tradition is conservative, demanding long hours oftraining in the

presence of a master. That training results inafaithin, a reliance on the premisses ofthe
tradition as held by the community, but its goal is independence of the individual to

transcend the constraints that make independence possible.

The end result is a

community of individuals who are committed to the tradition and thus bound together

into a comprehensive entity, yet dynamically ordered by the mutual adjustment of
individual initiatives and disciplined by the mutual authority of the community as a

whole.
When the mutual adjustment of individual initiatives is coupled with discipline
under the mutual authority of each member, the individual who has completed his

apprenticeship is authorized and granted freedom to act responsibly for the benefit of
community and society by choosing his own problems and by seeking their solution.
However, "science can exist and continue to exist only because its premisses can be

embodied in a tradition which can be held in common by a community" (Polanyi,
1946/1964, p. 56). Indeed, "[t]his istruealso ofall complex creative activities which are

carried on beyond the lifetime of individuals" (p. 56). A participant in a dynamic order
such as science voluntarily chooses to accept and support the tradition that governs the

community that is so ordered. That tradition, together with the individual's personal

background and experience, as well as the traditions embodied in a larger culture or other
entitiesofwhichshe isapart, culminates in a calling to responsibility that she can accept

orreject. It is acceptance ofthat calling, the commitment to rely on a community and its
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tradition, that binds the individual to the community and gives its members confidence
that they may also rely on her to act in accordance with the tradition that supports it. A

dynamic order without responsibility will soon unravel just as a contaminated liquid may
crystallize before it can spontaneously order itself, thereby allowing outside forces to take

control. A system, lacking corporate command to constrain it from the outside, must rely

on responsible self-control to do so from within.
Public Liberty and a Free Society
Apprenticeship, then, brings together community, tradition, and dynamic order in
such a way that the result is a call to responsible action. This is a calling to what Polanyi

called public liberty. The freedom granted to one who has accepted such a call is not
personal freedom “in which a man's obligations are defined, and not to be varied at a

master's pleasure” (Polanyi, 1941, p. 430). Rather, public liberty is freedom of the
individual to act “with a responsible purpose” (p. 438). It is a “privilege combined with

duties” (p. 438). Public liberty is neither negative liberty (freedom from "being interfered
with by others") nor positive liberty (freedom ofthe individual "to be his own master") as

defined by Isaiah Berlin (1969/1971, pp. 123, 131)6. On the contrary, it “is not for the

sake of the individual at all, but for the benefit of the community in which dynamic
systems oforder are to be maintained” (Polanyi, 1941, p. 438). Public liberty emphasizes
responsibility, tradition, and community; private liberty emphasizes individual freedom
and spontaneous order. Both public and private liberty deserve protection, "but it is
damaging to the first that it should be demanded and its justification sought - as often

happens - on the grounds ofthe second" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 195). Indeed, the need

6 Note that Berlin's full discussion of liberty recognized more than its private sense, but his definitions
emphasize the importance of the private benefits to freedom.
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to defend public liberties, against a totalitarianism that may favor personal freedom, was
the impetus for Polanyi's recognition of the broad application and essential nature of
spontaneous order.

In contrast to a totalitarian regime that will always eschew public liberties,

Polanyi wrote that “[a] free society is characterized by the range of public liberties
through which individualism performs a social function, and not by the scope of socially
ineffective personal liberties" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 194). For example, science, being

a dynamically ordered system that fosters the practice of public liberty, is granted the

freedom to choose its own problems and discipline its own members. However, its
freedom is granted for the benefit of society as a whole and conditioned on its submission

to the liberal tradition that gave it birth, just as the freedom of individual scientists is

granted for the benefit of science as a whole, so long as they accept the traditional
premisses of science handed down to them through the process of apprenticeship. In

addition to science, Polanyi frequently used the economy and Common Law as examples

of dynamic orders that foster public liberties, each characterized by its own unique set of
premises or traditions. To these he added a wide variety of dynamically ordered systems

found "in the intellectual and moral heritage of man" (Polanyi, 1941, pp. 436), including

"[t]he social legacies of language, writing, literature and of the various arts, pictorial and

musical; of practical crafts, including medicine, agriculture, manufacture and the
technique of communications; of sets of conventional units and measures, and of customs

of intercourse; of religious, social and political thought" (p. 438). As Polanyi saw it, “all
these are systems of dynamic order” which, like science, are characterized by "direct

individual adjustment" and by "a public mental heritage" that is handed down "from
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generation to generation" and "accessible to all" (p. 438). Furthermore, each ofthem can

"safeguard the complete independence" of its legacy "[o]nly by securing popular respect
for its own authority" (Polanyi, 1962, p. 61). The pursuit, by these different systems of
dynamic order, of the "moral support of society," "financial resources," and "recruits"
turns each of them into "rivals," and "[s]ociety divides its attention, its funds and its

recruits between them" (Polanyi, 1941, p. 446). The motives of society as a whole for
supporting various systems of dynamic order may vary, but "once [society] has decided
to lend its support to such a system, its intentions can be seen to be all transformed into

an allegiance to the ideals by which the system itselfis guided" (p. 446).

Dynamic orders, then, as well as the public liberties they serve to protect, are
constrained by their reliance on and commitment to a tradition comprised of standards
and practices, principles and habits. This is also true more broadly of a free society

which "must exist within the context of a tradition that provides a framework within
which members of the society may make free contributions to the tasks involved in the

society" (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 202). If a free society is, indeed, a traditional
society, it is important to consider "what premisses will guide conscience" (Polanyi,
1946/1964, p. 67) within such a society. Polanyi identified a commitment to truth as

foundational, for "[o]nly in the supposition that most people are disposed towards truth

essentially as you are yourself is there any sense of opening yourself up to them" (p. 70).
Given such a commitment, Polanyi suggested that "a practical art which embodies" the

premisses ofa free society; a "tradition by which this art is transmitted;" and "institutions
in which it finds shelter and expression" are essential. In a free society, he identified "the

art of free discussion" (including "fairness" and "tolerance"), a "tradition of civic
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liberties" (evident in public opinion), and "the institutions of democracy" (including
legislatures, courts, churches, the press and other forms of communication, local

government, and a variety of independent organizations) as the key elements of the
traditional foundation for a free society. Faith in the truthfulness of others, then, is
embodied in free, that is fair and tolerant, discussion, supported by a public committed to
such values and implemented through a host of civic institutions. Of course, "[e]ach

generation has the problem of sorting out the few great innovators from a multitude of

cranks and frauds" for the survival of a free society ultimately depends on "the outcome
of individual decisions made in as much faith and insight as may be everyone's share"
(Polanyi, p. 72).

"Thus," wrote Polanyi, "to accord validity to science - or to any other ofthe great

domains of the mind - is to express a faith which can be upheld only within a

community" (1946/1964, p. 73). Moreover, by facilitating the exercise ofpublic liberty,
these domains “constitute the intellectual and moral order of society” (Polanyi, 1941, p.
445), for they cultivate ideals that are widely acknowledged as real and living, and are
approved by society for continued nurture of human and material values. “This hope of

progress through the pursuit of various forms and aspects of truth ... by a number of
autonomous circles,” wrote Polanyi, “is the essential ideaofa Liberal Society” (p. 448).

Furthermore, the mutual adjustment of systems fostering public liberty within such a
Liberal Society, and society's reliance on and commitment to a set of traditional

premisses allay Joseph Agassi's (1981) concern that the authority granted to science is
dangerous because ofthe great influence such a small number may exercise. The public

liberty enjoyed by science is a freedom to act responsibly on behalf of society, but it is a
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freedom that is limited by its particular scope, for the system within which it is expressed

is subject to traditional values and set in a context of other systems also exercising their
own liberty on behalf of society. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, a plurality of

dynamic systems practicing public liberty is not simply an "open" society. Instead, it is a
society that is founded on the conception of human beings seeking to serve the truth

while also dependent on a set of traditional premisses which may be adapted by that

service to point to freedom (Polanyi, 1959a, p. 82). A free society is one in which each
system fostering public liberty is constrained by its neighbors and together they are

constrained by a set of traditions - by values and morals and limits to freedom.

A Liberal Society, therefore, can not completely recreate itself each generation, as
Thomas Paine advocated. Instead, it must always look to tradition, for it is tradition,
implemented by the granting of public liberty to individual institutions, which gives

meaning and purpose to the indeterminate possibilities, to the inexhaustible profundity of

free individual initiative. Such liberty must be understood tacitly with traditional practice
giving meaning to the theoretical possibilities of freedom. As Polanyi put it, dynamic

orders practicing public liberty find protection “not in the explicit content of their
constitutional rules, but in the tacit practice of interpreting these rules” (Polanyi,
1955/1997, p. 203) for, "[j]ust as a person cannot be obliged in general, so also he cannot

be free in general, but only in respect to definite grounds of conscience" (Polanyi,
1946/1964, p. 65). It is in the traditional practice of freedom that liberty resides, not in

its promotion or declaration.7

A free society lives in the tension of individual possibilities straining against

tradition as revealed in practice. Specific institutions, granted freedom on behalf of
7 Richard Allen argues this point extensively in Beyond Liberalism (1998).
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society, pull it in various directions, constrained only by their responsibility to a tradition
they have embraced. "[T]he whole purpose of society lies in enabling its members to

pursue their transcendent obligations" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 83), yet their actions are
only meaningful in the context of the society as a whole, and are ever subject to the
mutual authority of each other. In a spontaneously ordered society, authority is not based

on certain, absolute rules, but on the faith others have in the individual authority of each
person or institution, and in the collective authority of the whole order. Such faith is

validated by an indwelling of another's speech and action, an indwelling based on tacit

integration that emerges from a tension between a tradition that is recognized subsidiarily
in its bearing on individual initiative, or between that individual initiative and the

community that focuses it and gives it meaning.

Because reliance is a fiduciary

affirmation that may be mistaken, rather than an absolute statement that requires no

personal intervention, it leaves society in tension between what is and what might be,
between potential success and possible failure.

Moral Inversion in a Free Society

The possibility that a free society may fail was a central concern of Polanyi's, and
he argued that its potential is evident in the very attributes that make such a society

effective. Thus, he suggested that the fusion of two key trends was central both to the
growth of thought in European society that found expression in Enlightenment values,
and to its potential breakdown. On the one hand there was an embrace of free thought

anchored in " anti-authoritarianism and philosophic doubt" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 117).

At the same time, there was also "a fervent religious revival, accompanied by a schism of

the Christian churches" (p. 116) that left a Utopian longing for a better society and the
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elevation to dominance of "the deliberate contriving of unlimited social improvement"

(Polanyi, 1960/1969, p. 8).

According to Polanyi, the tension between a radical skepticism that rejects all

moral authority and a utopian striving for moral perfection is potentially unstable. If a

traditional reliance on moral responsibility remains in place, the tension will be

manageable and will lead to an unbridled creativity. Alternatively, moral principles may

be masked for a time in objectivist terminology by "pretending that ethical principles
[can] actually be scientifically demonstrated" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 121). For example,

Locke did just this "by asserting that good and evil could be identified with pleasure and
pain, and suggesting that all ideals of good behaviour are merely maxims of prudence"

(p. 121). "Camouflaged as long-term selfishness," Polanyi noted, "the traditional ideals

of man are protected from destruction by scepticism" and it is in this manner that "the
Anglo-American tradition ofliberty" (p. 121) has been preserved. Polanyi also pointed to

the "distinctly religious character" of Anglo-American liberalism, and to "the

establishment ofdemocratic institutions at a time when religious beliefs were still strong"
(p. 122) in these countries, as keys to its survival in the face of this tension between

skepticism and a longing for perfection.
However, Polanyi argued, "it is dangerous to rely on it that men will continue

indefinitely to pursue their moral ideals within a system of thought which denies reality
to them" (1958/1962, p. 234). Suchan"objectivist masquerade" is only feasible so long

as moral convictions "remain comparatively peaceable" (p. 234), so long as traditional
morality remains in effect.

When, as took place in Continental Europe in the 20th

Century, "a real substitution ofhuman appetites and human passions for reason and the
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ideals of man" comes into being, utopian moral passions are left hanging without a home
(Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 126). In such an environment, "[t]he public, taught by the
sociologist to distrust its traditional morality, is grateful to receive it back from him in a

scientifically branded wrapping" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 234) and a great "upsurge in
moral demands ... must seek a more forcible expression" (pp. 234-235). Lacking a
tradition of public liberty that emphasizes responsibility to a community, this more
forcible expression of moral passion is injected by a philosophy of radical skepticism

"into a utilitarian framework" and "turns into a fanatical force of a machinery of
violence" (p. 235).

This is moral inversion: "man masked as a beast turns into a

Minotaur" (p. 235).
When an individual or a society forsakes reliance on traditional morality and
abandons responsibility for conserving and refining it, morality becomes meaningless in

its own right, a tool to be manipulated in the service of power. Rather than conditioning
the actions of individuals or societies, morality is conditioned, itself.

When human

appetites and passions replace reason and values in practice, morality is inverted and the
end result is nihilism on the part ofindividuals and totalitarianism on the part ofsocieties.

"The morally inverted person has not merely performed a philosophic substitution of

moral aims by material purposes, but is acting with the whole force ofhis homeless moral
passions within a purely materialistic framework of purposes" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p.
131). The horrors of the 20th Century "were not the outcome of any weakening of

morality by scepticism," but were powered by "a rising tide of moral passions compelled
by scepticism to accept merciless violence as the only effective mode ofpolitical action"

(Polanyi, 1959b, p. 63). Such moral inversion compels a person to give effect "to his
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immanent morality by his manifest immorality" (p. 63), and the only solution is the

reclaiming of the fiduciary foundations of liberalism by once again relying on the self

modifying tradition of morality that gives us hope for a future in which we, ourselves,

may play a part.

Key to the avoidance of moral inversion is an understanding, then, that a free
society is dependent on moral ideals anchored in tradition and on responsible
commitment to beliefs held in common. Communities, having submitted to and therefore

being dedicated to such a tradition, may be confidently granted public liberty so that
individuals may freely and dynamically act on their own initiative while adjusting their

thoughts and actions to those of their neighbors. Together, the members of such a
community form a network of mutually adjusting individual initiatives and discipline

under mutual authority, anchored in a tradition that encourages responsibility rather than

anarchy. So long as society recognizes “that truth, justice, and morality have an intrinsic
reality” (Polanyi, 1966/1969, p. 36), such a partnership is safe from descent into full

moral inversion. Yet, if our values are separated from their tacit roots, we cannot simply

adopt a new philosophy; a simple changing of spectacles is not enough and our only
recourse is “a smashing of spectacles” (p. 36):

For this is the fact. The recognition granted in a free society to the
independent growth of science, art and morality, involves a dedication of
society to the fostering of a specific tradition of thought, transmitted and
cultivated by a particular group of authoritative specialists, perpetuating
themselves by co-option. To uphold the independence of thought
implemented by such a society is to subscribe to a kind of orthodoxy
which, though it specifies no fixed articles of faith, is virtually
unassailable within the limits imposed on the process of innovation by the
cultural leadership of a free society (Polanyi, 1958/1962, pp. 244-245).
The lessons of indeterminacy taught by the logic of tacit knowing can be seen once again.
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We are called not only to individually “keep holding beliefs that can conceivably be

doubted,” but we must also pledge allegiance to "a manifestly imperfect society, based on
the acknowledgment that our duty lies in the service of ideals which we cannot possibly

achieve” (Polanyi, p. 245).
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CHAPTER IV
LIKE CLOWNS IMITATING PUPPETS:
FACTS AND CLUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Natural science deals with facts borrowed largely from common
experience. ... On the other hand, the assumption of persistent features in
nature is certainly not a sufficient premiss for the establishment of natural
science. It gives us grounds for referring to facts and for thinking of the
universe as an aggregate of facts. But factuality is not science. Only a
comparatively few peculiar facts are scientific facts, while the enormous
rest are without scientific interest. (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 161)
Modern science disclaims any intention of understanding the hidden
nature of things; its philosophy condemns any such endeavour as vague,
misleading and altogether unscientific. (Polanyi, 1959a, p. 20)

Like clowns imitating puppets, we pretend to be pulled by strings,
so as to conform with a mechanistic conception of man. It is part
of this pattern that we dare not confess that we hold the scientific
beliefs which we actually hold, for fear of the empiricist
policeman behind us. (Polanyi, 1950, p. 31)

As suggested in the introduction to this dissertation, a "science" of administration

has been a central goal for American public administration since it first began to define
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itself through civil service reform, through progressive movement attempts to fashion
more effective and equitable administrative bodies, and through the writings of political

scientists and public administrators like Wilson, Goodnow, Willoughby, and on to White,
Gulick, Urwick, and many others. Yet there was an uneasiness about the relationship

between science and administration that found expression in a bifurcation of public

administration scholarship following World War II. On the one hand were those who
argued that the ambiguities evident in early "scientific" administration were due to a lack

of logical discipline. Best represented by Herbert Simon's writings in Administrative
Behavior, this camp claimed that additional discipline was needed in public
administration, with a clear separation of facts and values allowing administrators to

study their field of facts in an impartial, detached manner, using the mechanistic models

so useful in understanding the physical world around us. To quote Simon,

A valid approach to the study of administration requires that all the
relevant diagnostic criteria be identified; that each administrative situation
be analyzed in terms of the entire set of criteria; and that research be
instituted to determine how weights can be assigned to the several criteria
when they are, as they usually will be, mutually incompatible.
(1945/1957, p. 36)
On the other hand were those, well represented by Dwight Waldo's critique of
administrative science in The Administrative State, who emphasized the values

underlying the work of public administrators in the United States, values that included the

democratic embrace of individual participants and an openness to alternative ways of
thinking about the world. As Waldo put it,

Students of administration, following a line of precedent which begins in
the modern period with Hobbes, have simply been willing to accept the
verdict of science - or more accurately, popular conceptions of the verdict
of science - as to the nature of reality. It is appropriate to inquire whether
these concepts of reality are consistent among themselves, whether they
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are valid within their proper realm, and whether, if valid, they have been
extended beyond the bounds of their validity. (Dwight Waldo, 1948, p. 21)

The first group has emphasized a positivist, while the second has emphasized a

normative, approach to public administration. The first group has sought to describe the
world in objective terms, stressing the certain nature of reality and modeling their efforts
on the work of physicists and chemists who allegedly study their subject matter
impersonally and without bias. "'Correctness' as applied to factual propositions" wrote

Simon, "means objective, empirical truth. If two persons give different answers to a
factual problem, both cannot be right" (1945/1957, p. 53).

The second group has

described the world subjectively, recognizing the centrality of personal values and

judgment and the power of ideas and words to shape our understanding of reality.
"Administrative study" wrote Waldo, "is concerned primarily with human beings, a type

of being characterized by thinking and valuing" (1948, p. 181), and "despite occasional
claims that public administration is a science with principles of universal validity,

American public administration has evolved political theories unmistakably related to
unique economic, social, governmental, and ideological facts" (1948, p. 3, italics added).
As we have seen in the previous two chapters, Michael Polanyi argued that
knowledge is neither objective nor subjective, but personal and characterized by a
reliance on tacit knowing. Personal knowledge eschews the belief that we can know an

indeterminate world in absolute terms, but it nevertheless claims that reality does exist
and that we are empowered and obligated to seek the truth and proclaim what we
discover with universal intent. The search for truth, that we call science, is possible

because the real is true, but the evidence of reality comes from its unexpected future
manifestations and its indeterminate possibilities rather than from its fixed and absolute
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nature. Science is a worthy pursuit, but its central attribute is discovery, not method. As
a scientist, himself, Polanyi affirmed its claim to discover reality, but he also recognized

that its ability to do so depended on an uncritical acceptance of beliefs and traditions that

give meaning to its efforts. He recognized that it was the embrace of both a program of

radical doubt (that rejected the claims of first principles defined by a tradition) and a

passion for utopia (inherited from a system of beliefs and traditions) that led to a
mistaken belief in an impersonal, detached reality knowable by impersonal, detached

methods of inquiry.

In the previous two chapters I focused my attention on Polanyi's construction of a
philosophy based on an indeterminate reality, on the tacit knowing of personal

knowledge, and on a dynamic social order anchored in responsible public liberty and

tradition enforced by a community. While his critique of modernism and of a positivist
science is powerful on its own, it is in the light of his constructive claims, with their focus
on discovery, that the shortcomings of a positivist approach to science can most clearly

be seen. Acceptance of Polanyi's constructive argument for personal knowledge of an

indeterminate reality effectively forswears allegiance to the positivist understanding of
knowing that underlies much of scientific inquiry.
In this chapter, I will show how a Polanyian understanding of the dynamics of
reality, forever in tension between what is and what might be, weakens any argument for

a deterministic public administration and will show how his insistence on the
indeterminacy of reality and of the process of tacit knowing leads public administration

beyond a simple admission of fallibility.

I will also show how his claim that all

knowledge is personal and discovered by a process of tacit knowing undermines a
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positivist administrative science while giving it new life as a search for knowledge of a
real world that is independent of, yet potentially known by, the administrator or
administrative scholar. While developing these two themes, I will demonstrate that
administrative discovery and problem solving is already characterized, to a large extent,

by the logic of tacit knowing.

These arguments are not totally new to public

administration scholarship, but Polanyi's understanding of scientific discovery, his
emphasis on the personal nature of knowledge, its tacit, from-to structure, its fiduciary

foundations, and its dynamic character, all set in a world that can only be known
indeterminately, can free public administration from its need to claim objectivity in an

absolute, impersonal manner, without forcing it to also abandon the potential
contributions of scientific study.

Objective, Empirical Knowledge in Administration
By the time Woodrow Wilson turned to the German example for a public

administration that was scientific and bureaucratic, the United States had already
embraced science for its technical benefits, so the foundation was already laid. The
science of administration that was to be developed would be built on “a foundation of

practice” (Riccucci, 2006, p. 57) and would prove its utility and ensure public trust and

support through its links to technology. Wilson captured this sentiment when he wrote
that, “as it is the office of the constitutional reformer to create conditions of trustfulness,

so it is the office of the administrative organizer to fit administration with conditions of
clear-cut responsibility which shall insure trustworthiness” (Wilson, 1887, p. 213).

"Administration is ordinarily discussed as the art of 'getting things done'" wrote

Herbert Simon, in acknowledgement of this pragmatism (1945/1957, p. 1). However, he
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turned his attention away from "processes and methods for insuring incisive action" to

"the choice that prefaces all action" (p. 1). "The task of 'deciding'" he wrote, "pervades
the entire administrative organization quite as much as does the task of 'doing' - indeed, it

is integrally tied up with the latter" (p. 1). "The task of decision involves three steps:" he
added, "(1) the listing of all the alternative strategies; (2) the determination of all the

consequences that follow upon each of these strategies; (3) the comparative evaluation of
these sets of consequences" (p. 67). However, since "[i]t is obviously impossible for the

individual to know all his alternatives or all their consequences" (p. 67), it must also be
"impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of

rationality” (p. 79). Nonetheless, Simon emphasized, in an organizational context, a

“higher degree of integration and rationality can ... be achieved, because the environment

of choice itself can be chosen and deliberately modified” (Simon, p. 79). For Simon,
rational decision making was the goal, but because perfect knowledge is impossible, it is
only within an organizational context that human fallibility can be minimized and rational

decision making realized. He believed that what he termed the “stimuli,” that initiate and
determine the decisions of individuals working in organizations, could be controlled by

managers “so as to serve broader ends, and a sequence of individual decisions ...
integrated into a well-conceived plan” (p. 109).

To gain control ofthe decision making process, Simon first turned his attention to
the problem of knowing. Building on the work oflogical positivists, he argued that it is

possible to break down the administrative decision process into those elements that are

based on values or ethics, and those that are based on facts. “In so far as decisions lead
toward the selection of final goals,” he wrote, “they will be called ‘value judgments'; so
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far as they involve the implementation of such goals they will be called ‘factual

judgments'” (Simon, 1945/1957, pp. 4-5). Factual judgments or statements - the realm of

administrators charged with implementing political decisions - are empirical statements
and may be tested for truth or falsehood. Value statements, on the other hand, possess
“an imperative quality - they select one future state of affairs in preference to another and
direct behavior toward the chosen alternative” (Simon, p. 46). Value statements are

therefore essential for setting direction and context for decisions, but it is factual

statements that detail the achievement of goals and thereby allow one to predict and
control outcomes.

For, Simon, “an administrative science, just like any other science” should only
be “concerned with factual statements” and he saw “no place for ethical assertions in the
body of a science” (1945/1957, p. 253). Indeed, he argued, only factual statements could

have “any relevance to science” (p. 253), because, while “factual propositions may be

tested to determine whether they are true or false ... there is no way in which the
correctness of ethical propositions can be empirically or rationally tested” (pp. 45-46).

While “a factual statement .

is validated by its agreement with the facts,” a value

judgment is “validated” simply by “human fiat” (p. 56).
Consistent with this positivist perspective, Simon argued for the development of
“a practical science of administration,” consisting of “propositions as to how men would

behave if they wished their activity to result in the greatest attainment of administrative
objectives with scarce means” (1945/1957, p. 253). In his view, “the central concern” of
such a science was to be "the rationality of decisions - that is their appropriateness for the

accomplishment of specified goals” (p. 240). In other words, Simon sought to develop a
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value-free theory of administration that would be useful to practice because, while

exclusively concerned with the facts of administration, it would nevertheless enable an
almost mechanical evaluation of administrative actions and institutions in instrumental

terms. It followed, for Simon, that “an administrative decision .

is correct if it selects

appropriate means to reach designated ends” (p. 61) and “‘efficiency' - the attainment of

maximum values with limited means - must be a guiding criterion in administrative
decision” (p. 65).

Viewed in this way, administrative decisions should ideally be

determined in an instrumental and impersonal fashion through the application of clearly

delineated rules ofmethod.
Furthermore, Simon argued, under the authority of reason, in the descriptive
activity of science, “we are free to study subsystems - to abstract out a part of the whole
reality in order to achieve a more thorough understanding of that part” (Simon, 1973, p.

353). Indeed,hewrote,justasthe "normative activity ofengineering design rests on the
descriptive theories ofphysics", so also we must depend on a "corresponding foundation

of descriptive knowledge about human and social behavior" (p. 351). By separating
factual judgments from value judgments, a clear descriptive knowledge of human and

social behavior, upon which to build and control an administrative state, becomes
possible.

Simon's continuing influence is evident in the choice of his "The Proverbs of
Administration" as the first classic essay reviewed for the 75th anniversary of Public

Administration Review. Kenneth Meier began his review by affirming Simon's argument

that "[t]o be useful, to be relevant, means that prescriptions ofpublic administration must
have empirical validity, that they must be supported by strong scientific evidence" (2015,
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p. 15).

However, he critically observed that "[w]e are a long way from knowing

precisely how various actions of public administrators affect the efficiency or

effectiveness of programs" (p. 21). Neither has theoretical development "kept pace with
the empirical work," and as a result, public administration "looks to other fields and other
disciplines for its basic theories" (Meier, p. 21). Meier concluded by recommending a

focus on "improving the skill set of scholars in public administration; improving the

review process ofour journals; making the research process, particularly data generation,
more efficient; engaging in a serious effort to develop theory; and seeking to generalize
our research findings" (p. 20).

This final emphasis on formal method, efficiency, and generalizability reflects
Meier's concern for application of research to practice, but it also suggests the
prominence of arguments for precise knowledge developed through empirical research.

In 2000 he and Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. did their own examination of proverbs, this time
of those used in The New Public Management.

Using "evidence-based public

management" (2000, p. 4), they argued that the field needed to reconsider conventional
wisdom by using an approach that begins with "a precise set of theoretical predictions
contained in a formal model .

itself a generalization" (Meier and O'Toole, p. 18). This

model, they argued, could be (like a machine) "then disaggregated into smaller parts that
can be studied systematically .

using elaborate statistical controls .

and arrive at

conclusions that are true" (p. 18). As Simon had insisted on a formal method that

separates fact from value to strip out ethical content, so Meier and O'Toole have
contended that the truth ofsuch conclusions is directly connected to the use of"accepted

techniques of social science research" (Meier and O'Toole, p. 18). This blending of

93

formal method with empirical research may also be seen in a methodological manifesto
issued by Meier in partnership with Jeff Gill, a manifesto that called for standardized data
as well as "more rigorous mathematical, statistical, and formal theoretic applications to

questions in public administration" (Gill and Meier, 2000, p. 193). Standardized sources

of independent data, paired with standardized methodology, make the separation of facts
from values feasible and the application of rigorous, formal, theoretic approaches

possible.
Laurence E. Lynn, Carolyn J. Heinrich, and Carolyn J. Hill, have expressed a
similar attention to formal methods in arguing that "[t]he most useful research .

derives

empirically testable propositions from a clearly developed theoretical framework or
explicitly posed set of questions that reflect a logic of governance" (2001, p. 177).

Claiming that "'theory' constitutes explanation .

based on concepts or principles

independent of what is observed or explained" (Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, p. 80), they

have suggested that "theory-based models" therefore play "an indispensable role in
securing understanding of the social phenomena of interest" (p. 81). Consequently, an

"abstract parameterization of a logic of governance provides a framing device" for
studying a "policy environment that is more complex than any research design can

accommodate" (p. 81), and the end result is a reduced-form model (p. 81) of governance
that can be easily manipulated and used to predict and control otherwise indeterminate
processes. The knowledge necessary for effective practice is to be obtained through a

formal process involving the application of theoretical models to empirical data wherein
the former provide a framework for managing the complexity of the real world.
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Objective, empirical knowledge, as espoused by Simon, Meier, et. al., may be

discovered, then, through empirical research using formal methods and interpreted by

formal, theoretical models that isolate facts from values. By employing this type of
positivist approach to public management, detached, impersonal knowledge may be
obtained and used to predict and control decision making within public organizations.

Such a focus on a positivist interpretation of administrative decision and action does not

eliminate consideration of morals and values, but it allegedly permits administrators to
anchor their efforts in a value-free "scientific" world before also incorporating ethical

questions.
Facts and Values in Administrative Science
Critics of science in administration have tended to focus their arguments around
several epistemological themes. One of these is the relationship of facts and values that

was so central to Simon's framework. For example, in contrast to Simon's de-emphasis

oftheir importance for administration, Waldo affirmed the importance ofvalues when he
observed that "administration is generally suffused with questions of value" (1948, p.
182). Moreover, he argued that fact and value can never be fully separated because they
are joined organically. "Whileitispossible in the study or laboratory to divide all reality

into two neat pieces," he wrote, "reality as it is experienced in the process of living is a
seamless web" (Waldo, 1955, p. 63). Moreover, any attempt to identify the ends of

administration with the realm of values and the means with the realm of facts and

efficiency, must take into account what Simon had also noted, that "the efficiency ofany
mean is relative to particular ends" (Waldo, p. 64). Therefore, the "value neutrality of
means asserted by logical positivism is false" (p. 64); the administrative means of
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accomplishing any end are always informed by values. Contrary to belief that the
certainty of facts gives meaning to reality, Waldo recognized that limiting reason to the
study offacts that are valueless "opens the door to action that is meaningless" (Waldo, p.

64) and forces the realm of values and meaning into the irrational. “The split between

fact and value, ‘is' and ‘ought,'" he wrote, "makes for a split personality” (p. 62). On the
one hand, the scientist can not help but carry “the baggage of moral beliefs he has
received from the past” (Waldo, p. 62), for the assumptions of a positivist science are,

themselves, values. On the other hand, in the world of facts, those values are uprooted
and left floating without justification and without anchor.

This last consequence of a separation of facts from values is particularly evident
in the language of positivism. To facilitate an examination of facts independent of

values, Simon attempted to create "an entirely new language” that is “free of the defects
of common sense” (Storing, 1962, p. 150). However, as Michael Spicer has argued, any
attempt to create such a neutral language, by setting aside values, is problematic. Human

beings, he made clear, "must always think, talk, write, and even act on the basis of a

particular language or vocabulary" (2015, p. 189), and "[n]o matter how neutral we might
try to be," our thinking "will reflect some set of ethical or political values" (Spicer, p.
189). Indeed, regarding the possibility of a neutral language devoid of values, "there is,
frankly, little if any reason to believe in the possibility of any such language" (p. 189).

Simon, Spicer pointed out, set out to "construct a vocabulary" that would allow

description of "exactly how an administrative organization looks and exactly how it
works" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. xlv), yet "the language [Simon] employed was anything
but value-free" (Spicer, 2015, p. 192).

96

Theory and Formal Method in Administrative Science

A second epistemological theme emphasized by the critics of a positive science of
administration, has been the consequences of formalizing method and of representing the
world in terms of abstract, universal theory. This is the issue Waldo recognized when he
wrote that "[w]hat is presented as an instrument of analysis becomes inevitably a program

of action - with unfortunate results" (Waldo, 1955, p. 63). A certain reality lays the
foundation for formal methods of research and precise theoretical representations of the

world, but there are consequences to such an approach that may not be desired.
Among those who have criticized the possibility of a rigorous, formal method for

knowledge making, Ralph P. Hummel has been particularly effective in identifying the
unfortunate results that Waldo noted. "Scientific thinking" wrote Hummel, "grants no

validity to subjective thinking" (Hummel, 1994, p. 210). Instead, "[i]t insists on objective
thinking .

[i]t aims at proving the coherence of the world. .

it seeks total certainty" (p.

210). Science, according to Hummel, seeks to simplify and quantify: "[t]he humanly
involved yields to the methodically correct and objectively detached" (Hummel, 2006, p.

74). "By looking at the world through the lenses of only a few factors at a time, science
wins clarity and coherence in forming a picture of how things work according to its
assumptions about the world" (Hummel, 1994, p. 204). Then, "keeping a precise and

clear construction of reality in mind, and forcing reality to respond (or not) to it, and

measuring the degree of congruence, the modern scientist [frees] himself of the

complexity, confusion, and fuzziness of being fully immersed in reality" (1994, p. 206).
In the end, human beings are seen as objects, their only value derived from the arbitrary

construction of reality that abstract theory demands of us.
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The problem with this process is that "playing with .

abstract pictures" becomes

"a technical preoccupation" (Hummel, 1994, p. 204) that turns into a "trained arrogance"
(p. 205) and a "detachment from the flow of life" (p. 205). As a result, the client in a
bureaucracy becomes an impersonal case (Hummel, pp. 34-36), and administrative

scientists criticize "how public managers acquire knowledge" and "condemn how public

administration professors guide research, and how students write dissertations," while
failing to consider the possibility "that public managers and teachers and students know

what they are doing" (Hummel, 1991, p. 31).

"In modern scientific thinking" wrote

Hummel,
we purposefully compare what we find in nature to models we already
have constructed of it.
For more exact comparing we measure.
Measurement enables us to create formulas determining how elements of
the model relate to each other and how reality relates to the model
(Hummel, 1994, p.210)

The world that is created by a positivist science is a "formula world" that assumes a
certain reality that can be disassembled, measured, and described in an abstract,
impersonal manner.

While the true scientist "escapes into discovery, where instinct and knowledge

both rule, there are enough equations for the bureaucrats of science - technicians - to

immerse themselves in the details ofcalculation" and in the end, "[s]cientists are reduced
to technicians" (Hummel, 1994, p. 211). Disassociated from the whole that gives them

meaning, the disaggregated parts (including individual human beings) are either accepted
as examples ofthe formula or model or are classified as accidents or anomalies. Because

the parts have been segregated from abstract theory and forced to respond to or comply

with it, theory may stand independently and be applied in an impersonal and universal
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manner. Because the mechanistic, mathematical, abstract representation becomes the
new reality, the theoretical future may be predicted effortlessly, and because real
particulars are forced to fit the theory, control seems elementary.

What becomes clear in Hummel's critique ofa positivist science is that, to accept
such a science one must accept the existence of two worlds: the abstract, theoretical

world ofscience and the real world in which we live. These two worlds are incompatible
and potentially incommensurable, and if both are to continue to exist, communication

between the two will require translation, for they speak different languages. When a

scientist "operationalizes" the real world to "freeze" it for measurement and calculation,

she is translating "our fluid experience of life to become the clear and well-defined

propositions or hypotheses demanded by formal science" (Hummel, 2008, p. 1015).
When she attempts to apply her measurements, her abstract theory, her conclusions, to

real life, "[w]hat is required is judgment" (p. 1016), and judgment is anchored in a sense
of beauty that cannot be compelled, but only wooed. Its "dedication to numbers" brings
"clarity and distinctness" to scientific data analysis, and those attributes are "made even
more exact by precise measurement" (Hummel, p. 1018), but such a science exists in a

parallel world.
Hummel suggested that a "hands-on" approach to knowledge may be a better

way. From Martin Heidegger he appropriated the concept of being "already involved"

(Hummel, 1994, p. 269), the rejection of "the tendency of modern Man to see himself as
the center of the world" (p. 270), and the acknowledgement that "[t]he human being

becomes itselfonly in the encounter with the world" (p. 271). From Edmund Husserl, he

appropriated an understanding of measurement and numbers that suggests that "man can
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again become the measure of all things," but only if we choose to "use judgment to put
measurement back into its proper place, mindful that the numbers are never the full

measure of the man (or woman or child)" (Hummel, 2006, p. 76). Most pointedly, from
managers he learned to appreciate stories (Hummel, 1991), and from workers, he learned
the importance of being "inside the work" (Hummel, 1983, p. 73).

What he

recommended was an alternative method of knowledge making based on an alternative
model of reality.

Alternative Models, Methods, and Forms of Knowledge

If a theoretical world amenable to formal methods is found wanting, what is
needed is an openness to alternatives. However, there has been a strong inclination

among advocates of a positivist approach to administrative science to promote an ideal,

or even a single best model, method, or form of knowledge. If other models, methods,
and knowledges are recognized, as they often are, they tend to be recognized as

substandard and deficient.

"Actual behavior falls short .

of objective rationality"

(1945/1957, p. 81), wrote Simon, for science "is concerned with the factual aspects of
meaning, but not with the ethical" (Simon, p. 249). Waldo identified this tendency when
he described how "faith in science and the efficacy of scientific method" (1948, p. 21)

had so thoroughly permeated the literature of public administration that it readily

accepted the need to also become rationally objective:
Science has its experts: so we must have "experts in government."
Science relies upon exact measurement: so let the data of administration
be measured. Science is concerned only with facts: so let the "facts" be
sovereign. Science makes use of experiments: so let the mode of
administrative advance be experimental. (Waldo, 1948, p. 21)
In the United States, Waldo argued, "scientific" had become such an "honorific" word
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that "even religion and ethics found it expedient to become scientific" (p. 20).

Consequently, a third epistemological theme repeatedly mentioned by the critics

of a positivist approach to administrative science has been the need to recognize
alternative methods of research, forms of knowledge, and models of administration. This

theme is evident in Waldo's assertion that "the nature of the subject matter must define
the method" (Waldo, 1948, p. 191); in his emphasis on "the integration of public

administration with the other social sciences" (Waldo, 1955, p. 68); and in the need for
"the application to administrative study of all possible perspectives and metaphors"
(Waldo, p. 68).

It is similarly evident in Ralph Hummel's argument that "public

managers and teachers and students [may] know what they are doing" (1991, p. 31) when
they are "not scientific enough" (p. 31), choose story telling as a method for knowledge

acquisition and communication, and depend on "intuition," "judgment," and "flying by

the seat of your pants" to "determine what is going on in their world" (Hummel, p. 32).

As Polanyi recognized, a positivist approach to science, and therefore to
administrative science, is but a child of the Enlightenment; it is a particular model and a

particular form of knowledge with a particular method. As a human creation, it is
problematic to the extent that it becomes an unexamined set of beliefs that distort our

understanding of reality and isolate us from important elements of our humanity.
Consequently, some of the most effective criticisms of scientific administration have

been examples of how real people in real situations respond. Polanyi understood the
importance of such "real life" examples and interspersed his writings with such
illustrations while also emphasizing the practical wisdom of tacit knowing and therefore,

scientific discovery.
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In the realm of public administration, one important demonstration of the

importance of alternative forms of knowing and doing, and the dangerous consequences
ofignoring alternative kinds ofknowledge, is Mary Schmidt's account ofthe 1975 failure
of the Teton River Dam. Contrary to safety investigators, Schmidt argued that the

underlying cause of the disaster was not a lack of safety guidelines or engineering
procedures or bureaucratic rules. Instead, the disaster was due to a failure to accept
alternative types of knowledge, a failure that was rooted in a dominant model ofscience

and reality, enforced by a science "that dismisses knowledge expressed as feelings," by

an engineering "that scorns the knowledge of the uneducated laborers," and by a
bureaucracy "that disaggregates such knowledge" (Schmidt, p. 527).

According to Schmidt, there were three types of knowledge that were ignored to

meet production deadlines of dam construction: "a feel for the hole," "a feel for the
whole," and "a kind ofpassive knowledge" (Schmidt, 1993, p. 527). What she called "a

feel for the hole" was the "art of grouting" (p. 526) - the tacit knowledge of grouters who

attempted "to stabilize the material under the foundation" ofthe dam (p. 526). They did
this by pumping grout "into closely spaced holes," (p. 525) despite being unable to

"directly observe conditions deep below the surface" (p. 526). To be effective at their
work, therefore, required "continues attention to a host of subtle qualities" and the

combination of "data from many senses" (p. 526). What Schmidt called "synthesis" of
information and knowledge is the tacit integration of subsidiary particulars into a

comprehensive whole, into a sense ofthe appropriate solution, into "a feel forthe hole."
A second type of knowledge ignored in the decision to bring the dam online was
what Schmidt called "a feel for the whole." This second kind of knowledge was not the
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intimate knowledge of a single process in a focused location, but the acquisition by

surface crews, over time, of "a more complete knowledge of the heterogeneous surface
than anyone had before or would be able to ever have again" (Schmidt, 1993, p. 526).

This was a "collective knowledge" that was "disaggregated by the formal organization
and working conditions" and that "was ephemeral" and "would soon be forgotten" (p.

527). This general knowledge was potentially explicit, but it was held by multiple

individuals and only the tacit integration of each individual's knowledge into a
comprehensive whole could make use of it.
The third type of knowledge identified by Schmidt, but ignored by science,

engineering, and bureaucracy, was "a kind of passive knowledge" that enabled workmen
to tacitly sense that the decision to "stop their work" was problematic (Schmidt, 1993, p.

527). Indeed, they were "at first bewildered," but their immersion in the tacit grand

narrative enforced by the institutions of science, engineering, and bureaucracy led them
to try "to construct an explanation" that gave credit to their superiors even though, it

turned out, such credit was undue (p. 527). Schmidt noted that this was a type of

knowledge that was not recognized by an "engineering that scorns the knowledge of
uneducated laborers" (p. 527). Polanyi might have pointed out that it is regularly ignored

because there is a false assumption that knowledge is fixed and impersonal and thus the
property of experts.

However, argued Schmidt, the explanation for this failure was not as simple as
“the lowly status of these workers” (1993, p. 527). Rather, the disaster could be traced to
the three institutions of science, engineering, and bureaucracy which “interact in complex

ways” (p. 527) and, taken together, promote a system that claims to “know and represent
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physical reality directly with general theories couched in abstract terms" (Schmidt, p.
527). According to Schmidt, one solution to the failure of such a hegemonic system

would be the adoption of an alternative model of science and reality. Taking the work of
Barbara McClintock (Keller, 1983) as a template, Schmidt proposed a framework for
science and reality that “shifts the focus from an hierarchical model of a relatively simple

static system to more interactive models of complex dynamic systems” in which nature
becomes “an active partner in reciprocal relationships with an equally active observer,”

an observer who assumes “an attitude of humility, patience, and open attentiveness”
(Schmidt, 1993, p. 528). Such an approach encourages “intimate knowledge” (p. 529)

and, recognizing the complexity of many problems and projects, it relies on “social
rationality” (p. 530). It recognizes knowledge of "specific phenomena," calls for "direct,

bodily involvement in acquiring knowledge," demonstrates a need for "synthesis of data

from several senses, from a feel for the hole ... or from several individuals," is
qualitative, and demonstrates that "'we know more than we can say'" (p. 530)8. The
alternative model of science and reality that Schmidt proposed would also open the way

to an embrace of alternative types of knowledge such as "a feel for the hole," "a feel for

the whole," and "a kind ofpassive knowledge". However, "the tacit, grand narrative of

technical rationality" (White and Adams, 1994, p. 2) underlying science, engineering, and
bureaucracy, is not easily displaced.

A Deterministic World of Administration

The image of "objective, empirical truth" (Simon, 1945/1957, p.53)promotedby
some public administration scholars and criticized by others, remains a dominant picture

8 Schmidt accredits Donald A Schön as the source of this variation on Polanyi's well known statement
about tacit knowing.
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in part because its basic elements have been internalized by Western societies as "an

unexamined and tacit set of beliefs " (White and Adams, 1994, p. 3) that are dependent

on a "scientific-analytic mind-set and technological progress" (p. 1), and reinforced by

"powerful social forces of enculturation" (p. 11), evident in both practice and explicit
education. As a result, this "scientific-analytic mind-set has to be almost 'unlearned'
before other, alternative ways of knowing can be grasped" (p. 11). The call to treat facts
and values organically, the call to adopt a "hands-on" approach to knowledge that

emphasizes personal judgment and encounter with the world, and the call to embrace
alternative models, methods, and forms of knowledge, has strong proponents but it is set

against a positivist framework, a vision of knowing that is anchored in an understanding
of reality that is tacitlyassumed to be deterministically fixed and absolute.

It is beyond the scope ofthis dissertation to define determinism in absolute terms,
if that were, indeed, possible. What may be helpful, however, is to consider Kant's

distinction between individual action, that is characterized by free will and therefore

indeterminate, and aggregate summaries of human action seen retrospectively "as if"
determined by "some guiding thread" (Kant, 1784/1963, p. 1). Echoing Kant's argument,

Polanyi and Prosch pointed out that "[t]here are two possible ways of viewing the
progress made by the front line of scientific discoveries as it advances over a period of
time" (1975, p. 192):

We may look back upon such progress as the growth of thought in the
minds of gifted people along the determined or “caused” pathways of
science. . Yet, looking forward, before the event, the act of discovery
appears personal and indeterminate. (pp. 192-193)

Looking forward to an indeterminate future, our focus turns to the individual, but looking
backward we may choose to focus on aggregate data that, in retrospect, appears guided or
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even controlled. Determinism, then, may be thought of as an attempt to turn such
aggregate observations forward in time as prediction and control of societies or
organizations or even individuals.

As the argument made by White and Adams suggests, affirmation of such a
determinism occurs tacitly, often recognized only as it bears on research or decision
making or action. For example, when Meier concluded that Simon's goals for public
administration have not been realized and "[w]e are a long way from knowing precisely
how various actions of public administrators affect the efficiency or effectiveness of
programs" (Meier, 2015, p. 21), his use of the word, "precisely" was suggestive because

it emphasized the importance of the explicit and the absolute. Polanyi argued that such
an emphasis on precision was problematic even in the exact sciences, which seek "to

establish complete intellectual control over experience in terms of precise rules which

can be formally set out and empirically tested" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 18, italics added).

It is such an establishment of "complete intellectual control over experience", as modeled
by the exact sciences, that Simon, Meier, et. al. have sought through "precise rules which
can be formally set out and empirically tested" to yield explicit knowledge. However,
such exactitude is only possible in a world where reality, itself, is fixed and mechanistic,

and reliance on a certain reality may be seen as evidence of a deterministic understanding

of the relationship between cause and effect and between means and ends.
A fixed, unchanging reality has important implications for public administration.

It suggests that all aspects of our world may be measured, that an explicit description of

reality is possible, and that clear causal chains may be discovered. In the extreme, this is
the deterministic message that, in principle,
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we can all be regarded as essentially objects subject to general causal laws
and that our experiences and actions, as dependent variables, can be
explained and predicted in terms of factors that are outside of our control.
(Spicer, 2005, p. 258)

Ralph Hummel suggested that this objectification of human beings begins when lived
experience is turned into a fixed entity that can be measured and controlled. This is
followed by a second transformation of the real into the theoretical, of "a science of

visible shapes and human concerns into a system of symbols and their relation"
(Hummel, 2006, p. 68). Determinism expresses the belief that reality is absolute and

unchanging and can therefore be observed and measured in a detached, impersonal
manner. Because such a reality can be known absolutely and relied upon to "cause"
actions and experiences in a mechanistic, predictable manner, it may also be modeled

using abstract theoretical representations that are universal and generalizable.
While public administration scholars rarely embrace, and generally disavow

determinism, their language and methodology often demonstrate the deterministic
assumption of a fixed reality that leaves human beings, at least in principle, subject to

causal laws. Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill, for example, proposed "a logic for the systematic,

empirical study of governance and public management, utilizing quantitative and
qualitative methods" (2001, p. vii). Given that governance "generally refers to the means

for achieving direction, control, and coordination" (p. 6), they defined it as "regimes of
laws, rules, judicial decisions, and administrative practices that constrain, prescribe, and

enable the provision of publicly supported goods and services" (p. 7). The words that
they used are telling: they sought "systematic, empirical study" utilizing "quantitative and

qualitative methods" to achieve "direction, control, and coordination" through use of
processes and procedures that "constrain, prescribe, and enable" provision of appropriate
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goods and services. These are the words of those who believe in a rational system of

administration that can treat human beings as objects of study, objects whose behavior
may be explained, predicted, and controlled in a detached, impersonal manner.
Central to determinism is the assumption of causality and, wrote Lynn, Heinrich,

and Hill: "The central theoretical problem in governance research is applying theories
that impose a causal ordering or a priori structure on the logic that links context,

governance, and consequences or outcomes" (2001, p. 17).

This central theoretical

problem is coupled to a central empirical problem - the gathering of data that enables

investigators "to explore causal relationships" (p. 18). Making use of economic theory,
Lynn, et. al. were able to develop "a rigorous deductive framework" (p. 20) that

integrates concepts about and sharpens insight into management. Indeed, they argued,
"[a]ny governance regime ... is the result of a dynamic process that can be summarized in

terms of a core logic" (Lynn, et. al., p. 28) that "assumes rational behavior by social
actors" (p. 33). The assumption, here, of an objective reality that can be known with

certainty, suggests a deterministic understanding of human beings living in a
deterministic world that may be described in objective terms, modeled on the work of

physicists and chemists, and managed impersonally according to absolute rules. As
Waldo observed,
The answer of positivism to the problem of the basis of decision is that
"science," "facts," "measurement" answer questions of "What to do?" It
asserts that what is objective can and should "determine," that the
imperative of "the facts" should be substituted for chance and will. (1948,
p. 80)
Against such a determinist view, however, Waldo argued that it is a "fundamental error"
to believe that "'ifa science ofcause and effect could be worked out, it would be possible
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to tell what government should do and when the response should be made'" (p. 182). In

truth,

If mechanical cause and effect obtained in the realm of human affairs, no
one would need to tell government what to do; what it does would be
predetermined, fixed, and invariable. It is only because free will exists
that it is necessary or possible “to tell what government should do and
when the response should be made.” (1948, p. 182)
Again, few students of public administration believe that every act or every

decision is determined by external factors over which we have no control. However,
assumptions, whether held explicitly or implicitly, have consequences. "Although most

social scientists do not reflect much upon the philosophical implications of their approach

to research," noted Michael Spicer, "in the adoption of the methodology of the natural
sciences, social scientists implicitly assume what is an essentially deterministic view of

human action" (2005, p. 258). According to Spicer, what is at stake in assuming a
deterministic view, is "the very notion of human freedom" (p. 260), and the potential for

encouraging individuals "to try and absolve themselves of responsibility for their action"
(p. 262). However, even setting aside the philosophical and moral questions of freedom

and responsibility, Spicer suggested that "it is far from clear that public administration
practitioners themselves have been able to find very much guidance from the

deterministic vocabulary of mainstream social science" (p. 264). Given the questionable

value and potential danger of a deterministic administration, and despite its expression of

"certain important human values in the discourse of public administration" (p. 267),
Spicer concluded that "an excessive focus on deterministic social science would seem

inappropriate for public administration" (Spicer, 2005, p. 267).
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Personal Knowledge and the Paradox of Positivism
The alternative to belief in a deterministic world is to accept the indeterminacies

of reality and its "independence and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways
in the future" (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p. 32). While the proponents of a positivist approach

to public administration may protest that "[a]ny social scientist who is deterministic in the

manner that Spicer depicts ... is likely delusional" (Meier, 2005, p. 652), their written

words are influential and not only demonstrate deterministic assumptions, but suggest
both its epistemological and ontological implications. As noted above, the tacit grand

narrative of technical rationality, with its foundation in determinism, must be "unlearned"
before an alternative way of understanding the world can be accepted.

This is the

problem that Polanyi faced when he turned his attention to a defense of science from
totalitarianism.

When he looked closely at the arguments of totalitarian regimes, he

realized that there was no philosophical alternative in the West. Faced with a similar
dilemma in public administration today, we can learn much from Polanyi.
In response to the positivist approach to science, one of Polanyi's early and more
important observations was that scientists who profess a positivist approach do not in fact

conduct scientific research in the way that they claim. Practicing scientists do not choose

a problem based on explicit coupling of data and theory but already sense the solution to
a problem before it is explicitly defined: "nothing is a problem or discovery in itself; it
can be a problem only if it puzzles and worries somebody, and a discovery only if it
relieves somebody from the burden of a problem" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 122). Polanyi

understood Plato's Meno dilemma that,

to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity. For either you
know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do
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not know what you are looking for, and then you are not looking for
anything and cannot expect to find anything. (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 14)

However, he also recognized that we are called to search out and discover the
possibilities that we tacitly sense; "A potential discovery may be thought to attract the
mind which will reveal it - inflaming the scientist with creative desire and imparting to

him intimations that guide him from clue to clue and from surmise to surmise" (Polanyi,

p. 14).

Practicing scientists tacitly accept the uncertain nature of a problem or a

discovery and seek to understand reality by integrating clues that are often unspecifiable

or known only in focusing on the comprehensive whole on which they bear. They claim

a positivist, detached neutrality, but it is their passion for the unknown that motivates
them and resolves the paradox ofthe Meno. What concerned Polanyi was that those who

know better have no philosophical argument to defend what they sense to be true. My
argument is that the answer Polanyi identified for the natural sciences applies equally
well to a science ofpublic administration.
"It is widely assumed" wrote Polanyi, "that the pursuit of science represents a
field of intellectual activities which does not require the acceptance of any doubtful

beliefs" (1950, p. 27). Yet, he continued, experience suggests that "there are certain not

indubitable beliefs involved in our acceptance of science" (p. 27). In practice, "[t]he
scientist's decision depends on the strength of the beliefs in the light of which he
interprets his observations, and we approve of this decision if we share these beliefs"
(Polanyi, p. 30). What Polanyi recognized was that arguments like Simon's, that embrace

a science that abrogates responsibility for discovering the truth by focusing solely on
description or a summary of evidence, are part of a more general trend of "pseudo
substitution", in which we mask our true beliefs and values to avoid saying anything
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metaphysical or to avoid claiming that truth is accessible.

We are induced to

"camouflage in utilitarian colors our transcendent faculties and obligations in order that
they may pass muster before a skeptical philosophy" (p. 31). This is the central argument

that Polanyi makes against a positivist science dependent on determinism. In reality we
are complex human beings who freely and passionately seek out a hidden reality by

employing a process of tacit knowing that affirms a knowledge that is personal. Yet, we

don a positivist costume and pretend to be absolutely controlled by deterministic "laws"
so that we might appear to be indifferent and neutral about the issues that matter most to
us.

We become like "clowns imitating puppets," pretending to be controlled

deterministically so that our "mechanistic conception" of human beings may be proved
true (Polanyi, p. 31).

As Polanyi showed, the freedom and creativity of reason, isolated from morality
and from any obligation to rely on traditional values or to be responsible for action that
validates a community and a tradition, is the freedom and creativity to be

inconsequential. Simon argued that it is reason that is "the instrument through which

Man sees the world and his own life, understands them, and invests them with meaning”

(Simon, 1973, p. 353). Polanyi argued (1970b/1997, 1975) that it is the tacit integration

of subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive entity, the framing of a picture, or the

context of a metaphor, which gives them meaning, and such an integration or frame or
context is only possible with the involvement of a person. The naturalistic outlook,
"according to which events affecting human fate may be purely accidental" leaves such
events "entirely meaningless" (Polanyi, 1950, p. 32). Simon argued, and Meier and

others argue, for a parallel universe severed, temporarily for the purpose of analysis, from
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moral obligation or responsibility. In such a universe, a fixed reality passively awaits

description by the scientist. As Polanyi showed, such a world is of no interest because its
meaning has been lost.

Simon promoted an impersonal, detailed examination of

subsidiary particulars; Polanyi demonstrated that, while the "detailing" of subsidiary

particulars is possible - and often necessary - a truly detached, impersonal examination of

data, at any level, is not only impossible, but also meaningless unless its tacit foundation
is constantly acknowledged. Indeed, he wrote, "[s]cience can never be more than an

affirmation of certain things we believe in" (Polanyi, 1950, p. 35), and ultimately,
our protests must rest on the affirmation that our own scientific beliefs are
true. There is no way of divesting ourselves of the responsibility for
holding these beliefs and for committing ourselves to their dissemination
and defense. (p. 36)

An Indeterminate World of Public Administration

The paradox of positivism is that its advocates do not follow the principles that
they profess, for there is no practical way to isolate science from moral beliefs and to

examine the world neutrally and impersonally.

While avowing the necessity of an

objective world of indubitable data governed by categorical principles for the scientific
study of administration, public administrationists admit that such a positivist world is an
ideal that may only reveal for us "under what conditions" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. 250) a

desired result may take place. To determine "whether we ought" (p. 250) to take a
particular action or accept specific knowledge, we must turn to values and beliefs to

discern our direction. As suggested above, Ralph Hummel argued that this rift between
an abstract, theoretical, "formula world" of science and the real world in which we live

requires translation.

To obtain data for analysis, reality must be translated into

measurable language, and to apply the results of those measurements, they must be
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translated back into real world terms. In 2007, Larry S. Luton appropriately asked
whether the translation efforts of public administration empiricists have been successful,
and after examining a number ofstudies by empiricists, he concluded that, " [i]f there is

an objective reality, they are not measuring it" (Luton, 2007, p. 542). Furthermore, he

went beyond questioning the effectiveness of translation efforts to question the very
existence ofan objective reality, confessing that "it is unclear to me whether we can ever

be certain about such a thing" (p. 528).
Luton's agnosticism about the existence of an "objective reality" caught the

attention of Meier and O'Toole. For them, the need to believe in a certain reality was
anchored in their understanding ofthe very practice ofpublic administration research. As

"a pragmatic, design science," they claimed, public administration "requires one to

believe that there is an identifiable reality and that some aspects ofthat reality are capable
of adjustment, change, and - indeed - manipulation" (2007, p. 793). In such a world,

"facts" must be treated as fixed attributes of reality that provide a "way ofjudging" and a
means "to make decisions .

in the face ofuncertainty" (p. 794). After all,

If one doubts the existence of an objective reality, how does one teach
public administration? ... More importantly . if one is agnostic that an
objective reality exists, how does one judge one's own actions? ... How
does one judge not just the empirical referents ... but the moral ones?
(Meier and O'Toole, pp. 793-794)?
For Meier and O'Toole, certain, objective reality is indispensable to address normative

questions; a fixed, determinate reality is necessary to make sense ofa world that directly
confronts practitioners in ways that cannot be understood subjectively; and indubitable
values and an absolute morality are essential to facilitate wisdom. In short, “the reason
public administration has value is to make decisions ... in the face of uncertainty” (Meier
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and O'Toole, p. 794), and “without a concept of objective reality, we have no way of
judging whether, for instance, your perception of reality should be given more
consideration than ours” (p. 794).

As a realist, Polanyi, too, eschewed the possibility of a subjective reality that can
be created at will. However, instead of retreating to a frozen world that is deterministic
and known in a mechanistic manner, he took a closer look at the meaning of reality, and
discerned that reality, itself, must be redefined by focusing our attention on an element of

the real that most of us take for granted. "We meet here with a new definition of reality"

he wrote.
Real is that which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future.
Hence an explicit statement can bear on reality only by virtue of the tacit
coefficient associated with it. This conception of reality and of the tacit
knowing of reality underlies all my writing." (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 10)

To affirm the independence of "the other," we in the West have emphasized its explicit
precision but in so doing we have neglected its possibilities for revelation, for

application, for action in the future. What makes something real, recognized Polanyi, is
not its absolute certainty but its unspecified, unexpected, even unsuspected possibilities.
This new definition of reality deals a heavy blow to a deterministic outlook on

public administration and to a positivist approach to knowledge making. If being real
means being indeterminately revealed in the future, it becomes impossible to precisely

describe, much less measure, reality. That the described and measured is a recognizable
pattern is not a function of the object's certainty but a personal judgment of the
discoverer, for "the appraisal of order is an act of personal knowledge" (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 36). If reality "will yet show up in an indefinite number of unpredictable

ways" (p. 311), we can never predict it with absolute assurance, nor can we confidently
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attempt to control it. Whereas a fixed, deterministic reality is isolated from the person

and becomes known only in a detached manner, an indeterminate reality demands the

intimate involvement of the person, and we are faced with "the paradox of our self

reliance in seeking contact with a reality of which we believe that it will yet manifest

itself in unexpected ways" (Polanyi, p. 117). If reality is pregnant with possibilities, then
it can only be described, measured, modeled, predicted, and controlled tentatively, by
means of personal judgment.

To demonstrate our reliance on personal judgment in making contact with reality,

Polanyi pointed out that the location of the pebbles in the station garden of Abergele "is
an objective fact as compared with the personal fact that the pebbles form a sentence in

the English language” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 36). When we perceive something, we

integrate the subsidiary “objective” facts into a comprehensive whole that has “personal”
meaning. As an alternative example, he described a digital message made up of "X"s and

"O"s. Without personal recognition of a pattern, such a collection is merely a random set

of characters. The translation of such "objective" data into meaningful information is a
personal act of discovery that, as Hummel pointed out, must be "wooed" by drawing out

what may be merely random as an aspect of a hidden reality that is knowable.

The heuristic gap, between an indeterminate, random reality and a hidden reality
that can be identified and known, can only be bridged through a process of tacit knowing.
Once recognized, the centrality of the person in perception, in conscious attention, or in
skillful action seems clear, but Polanyi was not arguing for subjectivity as it is commonly
understood. In the same breath that he rejected “any attempt to avoid the responsibility

for shaping the beliefs which we accept as true”, Polanyi also rejected “the existentialist
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claim of choosing our beliefs from zero” (1958/1962, p. xix). A reality that may reveal
itself indeterminately will support neither a detached objectivity nor an absolute
subjectivity. Instead, it is a person who integrates the particulars of an indeterminate

reality to reveal a comprehensive whole. The logic oftacit knowing teaches us that there

is a reality that anyone can know but, because it is hidden, it can never be known
mechanically or impersonally, nor created ex-hihilo. A determinism that attempts to turn

a backward summary of aggregate data into forward looking prediction or control is
doomed to failure, for it cannot account for the unspecifiable and indefinite.

Facts and Clues in Public Administration
Given Polanyi's understanding of a reality that reveals itself unexpectedly and

indeterminately in the future and our reliance on the logic oftacit knowing to understand

a knowledge that is personal, Simon's "framework for the analysis and description of
administrative situations" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. 247) must be seen in a new light. First,
his claim that "an administrative science, like any science, is concerned purely with
factual statements" (Simon, p. 253) must be rejected as unjustified, for "[e]very factual

statement embodies some measure of responsible judgment as the personal pole of the
commitment in which it is affirmed" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 312). Likewise, because

every act ofknowing involves a person responsibly integrating subsidiary particulars into

a focal whole, Simon's assertions that "factual propositions cannot be derived from
ethical ones .

nor can ethical propositions be compared directly with the facts"

(1945/1957, p. 46), make little sense. Indeed, there is no need to separate the factual
from the ethical parts of a statement - even if it were possible - for tacit knowing
integrates them together in the knowing process. As Waldo insisted, "fact and value are
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joined not merely mechanically, but organically" and the possibility of a true value

neutrality of means is "false" (1955, pp. 63, 64). Indeed, the isolation of facts from
values leads to action that is "meaningless, irrational" (p. 64).

Second, Simon's effort to set out a formal process of decision making not only

overlooks the personal appraisal that makes recognition of pertinent information
significant, but his decision making process, that begins by listing alternative strategies,

can never be complete in an indeterminate world. Neither is determination of, nor the
comparative evaluation of, all the consequences possible without personal assessment, an

indwelling of the alternatives, and their integration with knowledge of the situation. That

"our knowledge may include far more than we can tell" (Polanyi, 1961/1969, p. 133)
affirms its hidden nature; not only does reality reveal itself unforeseeably, but our

knowledge, itself, is unspecifiable and dependent on personal judgment. The weakness

of Meier and O'Toole's (2000) argument in favor of precise predictions derived from a
formal theoretical model, or of Gill and Meier's (2000) call for more rigorous methods,
can now be seen clearly, for the precision of a prediction or a measurement or a
description is dependent on the tacit affirmation and personal commitment of the one

predicting or measuring or describing. Indeed, the precision of descriptive terms "can

mean something real only if they are not strictly precise" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 252).
Third, any attempt "to abstract out a part of the whole reality" (Simon, 1973, p.
353) must result in the destruction of the comprehensive entity on which the parts bear,
for no attempt to "understand thoroughly how the system is constructed" (p. 353) can

make up for the destruction of a whole that results from shifting one's focus to its parts.

Indeed, separating facts from values not only leaves the "facts" meaningless, but it also
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disassociates values from their material foundation. That a model of reality may be
"disaggregated into smaller parts that can be studied systematically," even if the use of

"elaborate statistical controls" is guaranteed (Meier and O'Toole, 2000, p. 18), must be
questioned, for reducing reality to its parts impedes its functionality, undoes its
phenomenal transformation into a comprehensive entity, and renders it meaningless. The
tacit root of all knowledge teaches us that the best designed methods that fail to account

for the indeterminacy of reality and the personal nature of our knowledge will inevitably

focus all effort on studying problems that have no heuristic power and are therefore
meaningless and of no real interest to humanity.
In a positivist world of fixed reality, disaggregated particulars are seen as facts
that are complete in themselves and that may be treated independently of their context.

Indeed, the words "disaggregated" and "disassembled" found in positivist publications,
suggest a mechanistic understanding of knowledge and of "facts" that have no organic
relationship to each other. In contrast, Polanyi wrote of "detailing" when it is necessary

to turn one's focus from a comprehensive whole to its subsidiary particulars, a detailing

that keeps the comprehensive entity in mind to avoid losing sight of the subsidiary status

of particulars that point to a whole. Consequently, he often used the word "clue" rather
than "fact".

In the context of a comprehensive entity, its particulars are known

subsidiarily as they bear on the focal whole. They are clues to the whole that must be

integrated by a person using a dynamic process involving intuition and imagination -

rather than facts that can be logically fitted together to create a whole. "Clues and tools
are things used as such and not observed in themselves" (1958/1962, p. vii), wrote

Polanyi. Facts become clues when they point to something outside of themselves, when
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we skillfully rely on them to comprehend a focal whole. In an indeterminate world, the
integration of indefinite clues results in a comprehensive entity that will manifest itself

unspecifiably and unexpectedly in the future.
In their 2007 defense ofcertainty, Meier and O'Toole argued that it is necessary to
assume an objective reality if one is to design a better administration, to teach public

administration, and to judge value. From a Polanyian perspective, designing a better
administration, like all activities involving the skillful application of knowledge, is
anchored in tacit knowing.

There is no fixed knowledge that can be applied to

administrative design because reality, itself, is hidden and indeterminate. However, there
are clues that can be discovered by focusing on a comprehensive whole.

Indeed,

knowledge acquired through tacit integration takes full advantage of all relevant clues,

even those known only unconsciously, and effective teaching becomes an exercise in
apprenticeship of tacit skills rather than the memorization of explicit facts. Finally, no

fixed, impersonal knowledge can facilitate judgment, for judgment is a personal action
that must rely on the logic of tacit knowing by integrating a plethora of clues that are
often known only subsidiarily. Certain knowledge is not adequate for design, teaching,

or judgment. What is needed is tacit knowing.
Scientific or bureaucratic thinking that simplifies "[b]y looking at the world

through the lenses of only a few factors at a time" (Hummel, 1994, p. 204) must force

reality to fit or not fit its preconceived framework.

Consequently, by simplifying,

scientific or bureaucratic thinkers are actually enforcing a particular, or strictly speaking,

a personal understanding ofthe world, for "simplicity in science can be made equivalent
to rationality only if 'simplicity' is used in a special sense known solely by scientists"
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(Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 16). Yet, scientific or bureaucratic thinkers hide their personal

motives behind objective terminology.

This practice of masking moral or essential

qualities, of hiding expressions of personal values behind the allegedly neutral language

of science or bureaucracy is an instance of what Polanyi called "pseudo-substitution". In
pseudo-substitution, what is at stake is a refusal to accept our personal responsibility for

what we know and what is lost is an awareness of values. "The positivist movement"
wrote Polanyi, "is shown isolating science on the one hand from any extra-scientific first

principles and on the other hand from reality, since neither of these is recognised"
(Polanyi, 1967b/1997, p. 236). The alternative to formal, positivist models and methods

is to recognize description and action and theoretical construction as tentative rather than
absolute, as meaningful clues rather than cold, hollow facts.
Tacit Knowing as an Alternative Model for Administration

American public administration has long sought legitimacy through the practice
of a "scientific" administration that is allegedly concerned with objective "facts" and the
instrumental implementation of a purpose that is politically determined by others. Since
such an administrative science implies a deterministic understanding of reality, and in the
face of overwhelming evidence that the practice of administration does not, and even can
not, follow deterministic rules, some public administration scholars, as we have seen,

have sought to introduce alternative methods, models, and forms of knowledge into
administrative study.
The alternative that Polanyi offered was the fiduciary embrace of and reliance on

a background of tacit knowledge integrated through a process of tacit knowing into a
comprehensive whole.

Such knowledge is personal and becomes, itself, part of a
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background from which a scientist attends to the choice of a problem, the observation of

data, the discovery of a solution, or the communication of results. In recognizing the
personal nature of knowledge and its reliance on the logic of tacit knowing, Polanyi

pointed the way forward to a science characterized by discovery rather than method, by a
responsible search for meaningful truth rather than the practice of meaningless technique.

Rather than being isolated from the influence of traditional values and from influence on

a fixed reality, such a science submits itself to tradition and responsibly addresses an
indeterminate reality. It is conservative on the one hand and disruptive on the other, but

it is always embedded in reality and humbly aware of its fallibility even as it passionately
seeks to leap the logical gap that separates its intimations of reality's possibilities from

reality's actual manifestations in the world.
Looking to the past, a science characterized by responsible discovery recognizes
orderliness as evidence of personal involvement, but looking to the future, an uncertain
and unspecifiable reality focuses our attention on "an indeterminate range of yet

undreamed consequences" (Polanyi, 1957, p. 484). It is therefore commitment "that
lends universal intent to a scientist's most original solitary thoughts" (p. 484); it is the

involvement of the scientist that validates a scientific claim.

In light of such an

understanding of science Polanyi suggested that our approach should be to "try training
ourselves to study human affairs by intense participation in human problems instead of

by detachment from them" (p. 482)

The recent works of Nicholas C. Zingale offer good examples of public
administration scholarship that reflects an understanding of the personal nature of
knowledge and the responsible participation of the scholar.
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Anchored in the

phenomenological philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, his work may

be seen, in terms of Polanyi's ideas, as a responsible search for understanding of an

indeterminate reality, as an academic study that makes use of the logic of tacit knowing.
In his examination of the decision making of environmental managers, for example,
Zingale observed more than raw descriptive data, reviewing categories like
"Experience/Behavior," "Opinion/Belief," "Feeling," and "Knowledge" while also

considering management purpose and incorporating field observations that resulted from

"looking and listening, observing and interviewing" (Zingale, 2007, pp. 56, 60, and 56).

A similar sensitivity to the personal nature of knowledge may be seen in a 2016 study of
San Francisco cable car operators by Zingale and Justin T. Piccorelli. In this latter study,
the research team spent three days observing and interviewing cable car operators,
maintenance personnel, and powerhouse operators while "paying particular attention to

people, processes, procedures, and workplace practices conducive to emergent
knowledge" and while "remaining open to indications of developing and applying
situational expertise" (Zingale and Piccorelli, 2016, p. 351).

Both studies focused on a phenomenological approach to knowledge that "lets"

rather than "makes" knowledge. Within such an approach, "facts" are supplemented by
"attitudes and behaviors" and "what is already there" by "what is still possible" (Zingale,

2007, p. 50). In other words, facts become clues that must be integrated together to point
to a comprehensive whole. For Zingale and Piccorelli, intentionality became the key to
understanding, whether interpreted as "the ability to engage the consciousness in a

meaningful way," (2016, p. 347), as "shared in the experience and already there when one
is completely immersed and involved in a situation" (p. 348), or as hermeneutically
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understood "skillful coping ... that comes from practicing, doing, learning and adjusting "

(p. 349). Whatever the definition, intentionality suggests "the application of ...know
how to that which is lived" (p. 355), know-how that is described in a manner similar to
tacit knowledge.

This relationship to tacit knowing is evident in the manner in which the
participants in both studies relied on a background oftacit knowledge that was integrated

to bear on a comprehensive entity that was their focus. For Zingale's environmental
managers, "being an expert is not something that can be empirically measured, but is an

innate and intuitive sense of knowing how and what to do and when to do it" (Zingale,
2007, p. 60). "Knowing that" is the knowledge ofa novice, but an expert has "a felt sense

or know-how that pre-determines the range of our decisions and actions" (p. 61).
Similarly, Zingale and Piccorelli described grip operators "letting the cable 'speak to him

or her'" or a repair technician being able to tell "'by looking at the grip itself which
operators were on the car'" (2016, pp. 360, 353).

Conceptually, "we bring our

experiences forward to inhabit the moment in space and time; a moment at which I

belong to, and which is always slightly anew due to the particulars of the space/time
experience" (2016, p. 356). The various ways of describing the knowing process evident
in these works share with the logic oftacit knowing the concepts of intentionality and of

a background that bears on and is integrated into a foreground that is our focus. Both
quoted studies down-played a detached, impersonal knowledge based on fixed facts.
Instead, the researchers boldly committed themselves to what they had discovered, a

commitment based on clues that they gathered through intimate participation and
confidence that their work represented a legitimate contact with reality.
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Neither Polanyi's epistemology nor his ontology can be "proved" in an absolute

manner. Indeed, to do so would undermine his very purpose. If there is a hidden reality
that may be known only indefinitely and contingently, and if all knowledge is tacit or
rooted in tacit knowing (and therefore personal), then any claim to knowledge must,
itself, be tentative even as it claims universality. "It would not be consistent with my

own views" wrote Polanyi, to expect a skeptic "to abandon a complete system of beliefs

on account of any particular series of difficulties" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 315). Tacit
knowing is "an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill"
(Polanyi, p. vii). Consequently, any attempt to describe it precisely must fail, for a skill

depends on personal factors that must be learned through practice.

Furthermore,

"[p]ersonal knowledge is an intellectual commitment" (p. viii), and

To accept commitment as the framework within which we may believe
something to be true, is to circumscribe the hazards of belief. It is to
establish the conception of competence which authorizes a fiduciary
choice . The paradox of self-set standards is eliminated, for in a
competent mental act the agent does not do as he pleases but compels
himself forcibly to act as he believes he must. (Polanyi, p. 315)
Because of its radically contingent nature and its reliance on belief, tacit knowing is

never general and universal and always runs the risk of being mistaken. It is possible
only through humble commitment, held with universal intent.

It is "the deliberate

holding of unproven beliefs" (p. 268), and in the end we can only confess with Polanyi,
himself, that "in spite of the hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth

and state my findings" (p. 299).
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CHAPTER V
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, TRADITION,
AND DYNAMIC ORDER IN A FREE SOCIETY

We may conclude that when very large numbers are to be arranged carefully,
this can be achieved only by the spontaneous mutual adjustment of the units; not
by specific assignment of the several units to positions in a prearranged plan.
(Polanyi, 1941, p. 432)
But this should not prejudice us in favour of order by mutual adjustment, and
against specifically planned order. ... The two alternative and opposite methods
of achieving order - by limiting the freedom of the particles, or by givingfull
scope to their interactions - have their respective proper occasions. Unless one
of these methods is preferredfor its own sake . it should in general be easy to
decide which task can be accomplished by one and which by the other. They
will combine in the way mutually exclusive functions combine, namely each
fitting into the gap left open by the other. (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 192)
"it is not a taboo to return andfetch it when you forget"
(Seeman, 2010, p. 109)

In Chapter IV, I showed that acceptance of Polanyi's definition of reality as "that

which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future" (1946/1964, p. 10),
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together with his assertion that all knowledge "is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge"
(1967b/1969, p. 195), undermines the possibility of a determinate world and a strict

positivist understanding of knowledge and discovery.

Efforts to separate facts and

values, it turns out, are unnecessary (for tacit knowing integrates the two) or fruitless (for
truly isolated facts become meaningless and of no interest). Likewise, fixed, formal

methods, seeking precise knowledge of empirical data, are seen to be nonsensical in the
face of an indeterminate reality and personal knowledge. Furthermore, tacit knowing's
recognition that faith in or reliance on a method or model or form of knowledge is the
true measure of its legitimacy opens the door to a variety of alternatives that may be

integrated or indwelt as tools for discovery and action.

In Chapter V I turn to Polanyi's understanding ofcommunities, organizations, and
society at large. Three concepts will be central to my examination: tradition, dynamic
order, and public liberty. As outlined in Chapter III, Polanyi understood a free society to

be made up ofa collection ofsystems fostering public liberty, organized dynamically and
subject to a tradition or a set of traditions.

However, communities or organizations or

institutions that exercise public liberty, are themselves organized internally in a dynamic

or spontaneous fashion, also subject to tradition. Chapter V will show how signs of

reliance on tradition and on spontaneous order reveal themselves in the public
administration literature. Finally, it will consider the concept of public liberty and its

implications for a dynamically ordered administrative state.

Tradition in the Public Administration Literature
The alternative that Polanyi offered, to a formal, hierarchical structure that
promotes a planned order based on an imagined impersonal objectivity, is the fiduciary
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embrace of and reliance on traditional values expressed and enforced by a community.

For scientists, to use Polanyi's central example, such a tradition is part of a background
from which they may attend to the choice of a problem, the discovery of a solution, or the

communication of new insight.

Science can not be isolated from the influence of

traditional standards, for it relies on them subsidiarily as they bear on the problem or

discovery or communication that is both the focus of the scientist and the comprehensive
meaning of the tradition. Furthermore, because traditional values are known tacitly and

responsibly through practice, they are always subject to modification or renewal. In other
words, just as tacit knowing is both conservative and disruptive, so also is a science both
anchored in tradition conventions and creative. Tradition is a set of lower level principles

that define the conditions from which a traditional order may emerge by controlling the
possibilities left open by the tradition, itself. However, the application of those upper

level limits not only creates a new entity but also modifies the very tradition that makes it
possible. A tradition that is known only in practice is necessarily contingent, for each

participation in the tradition, by trusting it or relying on it, necessarily modifies it. It is,
as noted above, "an appeal from a tradition as it is to a tradition as it ought to be"
(Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 56). Tradition, therefore, is always embedded in a community

that depends on, enforces, and also refines it. The West African term "sankofa" comes to
mind: returning to fetch what has been forgotten is not taboo, for tradition pushes forward

into the future by looking back at and relying on the past (Seeman, 2010).
The link between a society or community anchored in tradition and personal

knowledge can be seen in the parallel language Polanyi used to describe the two. Both
are fiduciary concepts in which the participant or the knower relies on a background (of

128

traditional values or tacit knowledge) while accepting responsibility for a foreground or
focus on which it bears. Both are conservative and disruptive, depending on the heuristic
power of a logical gap, between what is and what might yet be, to incite passion for

action or discovery in participant or knower.

Both acknowledge the capacity of

communities or individuals to fashion orderliness and both recognize that orderliness,
when combined with heuristic power, produces beauty, which legitimizes.

Both a

community anchored in tradition and personal knowledge are unspecifiable, realized in

practice, and ordered dynamically. Indeed, the two are inextricably linked. On the one

hand, the knowledge contained in a tradition is personal knowledge that cannot be
characterized explicitly and absolutely.

On the other hand, the preservation and

facilitation of personal knowledge depends on submission to a tradition. In effect, to the
extent that our knowledge is unspecifiable, "we accept the verdict of our personal
appraisal, be it at first hand by relying on our own judgment, or at second hand by

submitting to the authority of a personal example as carrier of a tradition" (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 53). To know, we either rely on personal judgment facilitated by tacit

knowing or on a tradition evident in a community.
In To Run a Constitution (1986), John A. Rohr used such an understanding of

tradition in seeking to "legitimate the administrative state in terms of constitutional
principle" (Rohr, 1986, p. ix) Against the argument that their "fears of governmental

abuse" made the framers of the Constitution "implacable foes of the wide-ranging
activities of modern government" (p. 7), he sought first to "at least neutralize" and even

enlist them "in support of the modern administrative state" (p. 7). Secondly, he drew on
the work of Hannah Arendt to explain and justify the Constitution as "the symbol of the
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founding of the Republic" (Rohr, p. 7); the Constitution, as the founding document

representing the founding as a whole, was and is authoritative, for "'foundings' are

normative" (p. 7). According to Rohr, the "moral force of the founding period" (p. 8)
makes it unfortunate that Woodrow Wilson, in particular, failed "to ground his theory of

administration in American constitutional principle" and suggests that calls for
"fundamental constitutional changes to accommodate administrative needs" are "unwise"
(p. 9). However, it is not enough to "have our Constitution as the object of civil religion"
(p. 9). "To legitimate the administrative state in constitutional terms," argued Rohr, "we

must examine the Constitution rather than simply revere it" (p. 9).

Like Polanyi, Rohr recognized that, while tradition is anchored in the past, its
primary function is to guide a community or society into the future. In light of its
importance in augmenting the foundational status of the Constitution, Rohr strategically

chose "to emphasize the constitutional tradition rather than the text of the Constitution"

(1986, p. 172) as a source of administrative legitimacy. Rather than rely on the words of
the framers, including those supporting arguments for and against specific aspects of the
Constitution, he "found compelling the image of the Constitution as the conclusion of the

great public argument of one hundred and fifty years of colonial experience and the
premise of the great public argument of the next two centuries" (p. 173). This image "put
the Constitution at the center of American political experience" and defined that

experience, including the development of the administrative state, as an ongoing
"civilized public argument" (p. 173).

For Rohr, the constitutional tradition was a

continuing, active process, not a static set of rules and procedures, and it was such a
dynamic tradition that gave public administration legitimacy as part of that tradition:
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Because the founding was in argument, it was only fitting that the
development of American politics should be in argument as well. And
because the administrative state is part of American politics ... it, too,
should be part of the argument that is a projection in time of the act of
founding. (Rohr, p. 180)

Rohr admitted that careful readers might "find my work defective", but he was
more concerned that readers would conclude that "what I am doing is not worth doing at
all" (1986, p. 178). In other words, to paraphrase Polanyi, he achieved a frame of mind

in which he could hold firmly to what he believed to be true, even though he knew that it

might conceivably be false. He made a claim to personal knowledge, and in the end he
could boldly profess that "my argument is grounded in the fact that the founding period is

normative for American politics" (1993, p. 246), for a rejection of that fact would force
one to "enter the public argument on any topic with an insurmountable disadvantage" (p.

246). The tradition ofthe founding ofthe United States is a tradition that is both greater

than and defined by the founding, itself, just as the founding is both greater than and

defined by the Constitution.

Within that context Rohr could humbly respond with

confident universal intent.
Common Law, as Polanyi emphasized, is an important example ofself-modifying
tradition in a public administration context. "Common Law is founded on precedent," he

wrote, and this practice "recognizes the principle of all traditionalism that practical

wisdom is more truly embodied in action than expressed in rules of action" (Polanyi,
1958/1962, p. 54). Specifically, "precedent is constituted by the decision of a court,

irrespective of its interpretation" (p. 54, italics added); it is practice that defines a
tradition, rather than its theoretical definition or interpretation. Because the premisses of

a traditional domain "are tacitly observed in the practice of [its] pursuits and in the
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acceptance of their results as true" (p. 161), the practice of a tradition or of personal

knowledge can not be transmitted from one generation to the next by memorizing fixed

facts and reliable rules but must be handed down by a process of apprenticeship.
Precedent is established by the practice of judges, then, but at the same time it is

that same precedent that judges consult in deciding a new case. Thus, we find judges
relying on tradition (represented by precedent) even as they consciously or unconsciously
bring about its change by their own practice. What becomes evident is that the body of

judges functions as a dynamic order characterized by "a process of direct adjustments

between succeeding judges" (Polanyi, 1941, p. 436), a process that takes place over space
and time. As noted earlier, this mutual adjustment of individual judges is enabled by the

mechanism of consultation, in contrast to the competition that empowers a market
economy or the combination of consultation and competition that facilitates the operation

of science. The practice of each of these domains is an art, guided by traditional values,
principles, and rules, and we find that, while Common Law can never be "exercised
according to its explicit rules," those same rules can be "of great assistance ... if observed

subsidiarily within the context of its skilful performance" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 162).
It is the skill of its practitioners that makes possible the exercise of the law. However,

"the aim of a skilful performance is achieved by the observance of a set of rules which
are not known as such to the person following them" (p. 49). Common Law looks to
traditional rules and traditional values that are useful to the extent that they are applied

subsidiarily "within the framework of personal judgment" (p. 31). In other words, it
relies on tacit knowing.
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Michael Spicer has noted the importance ofcommon law reasoning as a possible
model for ethical reasoning in public administration. He has argued that "common-law
reasoning in the exercise of administrative discretion" (Spicer, 1995, p. 90) is consistent

with an "anti-rationalist" view, expressed by the American Founders, that stresses the
limits of human reason and the importance of looking to past experience in determining

action.

In advancing his argument, he particularly noted Polanyi's explanation of

Common Law's requirement that judges (as administrators) "draw upon the knowledge

both explicit and implicit in past decision making, to interpret this in light of current
social values and conditions, and then to contribute their own knowledge in the form of

precedents for future decisions" (pp. 91-92).

The example of common-law reasoning was also noted by Spicer and Larry D.
Terry (1996) in suggesting guidelines for the administrative interpretation of statutes.

Responding to the 1984 Supreme Court decision, in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, that granted to "administrative agencies and public administrators .
greater discretionary authority and power in the realm of statutory interpretation" (Spicer
and Terry, p. 39), they argued that "public administrators need guidance to enhance their

effectiveness and overall performance in this area" (p. 40). First considering standard

categories of statutory interpretation, they concluded that "textual, intentionalist, and
public values approaches may provide valuable guidance in certain instances" (p. 45).
However, as they saw it, each of these approaches exhibits deficiencies, and they

concluded that "common-law reasoning can provide an additional valuable approach to
statutory interpretation that is consistent with our constitutional heritage" (p. 45).
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Importantly, common-law reasoning may be understood as "reasoning by

example" (Spicer, 1995, p. 90; Spicer and Terry, 1996, p. 44) in which judges "try to find
principles or rules from past cases that they can use to guide their own decisions" but are
"not bound necessarily by the actual rules applied in past cases" (Spicer and Terry, p. 44).

Inthe practice ofreasoning by example, each judge has "some freedom to determine his
or her own rule or rationale for that past decision and to use that rationale to support a
decision in a current case" (p. 44). Spicer and Terry argue that the practice ofthis type of
reasoning by administrators can, among other things, check "the arbitrary use of
discretionary power by public administrators;"

provide "greater predictability in

administrative actions for citizens;" and enable administrators "to combine the knowledge
and experience explicitly or implicitly contained in past decisions with their knowledge

of current circumstances" (pp. 44-45). Moreover, as Spicer and Terry observed, "this

approach to statutoryinterpretations is consistent with the perspective ofthe founders" (p.

45). It is therefore part of the constitutional tradition that Rohr had highlighted and that
legitimizes the administrative state. It is part of a tradition that is greater than its own
local arguments.

Planned Order in Public Administration

In addition to its clear illustration of the self-reforming character of a traditional
order, the example ofCommon Law demonstrates the spontaneous order ofelements free
to adjust their actions to those of their neighbors without external constraint. This is the

dynamic order described in Chapter III and it was an unstated assumption integral to
Spicer and Terry's argument, for their concern was to provide guidance to individual

administrators acting independently to interpret statutes in a comprehensive "New World
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Order" (Spicer and Terry, 1996, p. 38). Such an assumption, however, places their

argument in opposition to those who advocate a hierarchical, planned or corporate order,

a "method ofestablishing order" as Polanyi put it, which "consists in limiting the freedom
of things and men to stay or move about at their pleasure, by assigning to each a specific

position in a prearranged plan" (1941, p. 431). It is helpful here to illuminate Polanyi's

description of spontaneous order by comparing it to the argument for planned order
outlined by Herbert Simon.

For Simon, the unreasonable requirement "that all the possible plans be worked
out in full detail before any decision is reached" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. 99), and the
impossibility of knowing all alternatives or all consequences for decision making, led

him to accept that perfect rationality is unattainable with individual human beings.
However, set in an organizational environment, such perfect rationality may be

approached more closely, for "[i]ndividual choice takes place in an environment of
'givens' - premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his choice" (Simon, p.

79), and if those "givens" or "premises" can be controlled by choosing and deliberately

modifying the "environment ofchoice", rational decision making in the efficient pursuit
of organizational ends or objectives becomes more possible.

The purpose of

administrative efforts, then, is "the construction of an efficient administrative
organization" (Simon, p. 2), a planned order in which authority, work assignments,
decisions, and structure are all effectively determined by the organization rather than the

individual.
Whereas Simon recognized complexity as a fault to be overcome by shifting the

decision making responsibility to the organization, Polanyi embraced complexity and
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indeterminacy, not only as the key to understanding reality, but also as a central

characteristic of efficient organizational structure and function. According to Polanyi,
precision in planned order depends on full characterization ofall possible responsibilities,
and such a "programme" becomes overwhelming "as it would demand the formulation of

an indefinite range of impossible tasks" (Polanyi, 1951/1998, p. 221). However, "by

giving full scope" (p. 192) to the interactions of each individual, a spontaneous and

dynamic order may be achieved.
Simon acknowledged the possibility of "self-coordination", but "[l]acking formal

coordination," attainment of the "best" result is unlikely "unless the intentions of each

member of the group can be communicated to the others" and in most situations such

"self-coordination is infinitely less effective than a predetermined scheme of action that
relieves each member ofthe group ofthe task ofanticipating the behavior ofthe others as

a basis for his own" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. 106). Indeed, according to Simon, "self
coordination" ofcorporate activity is only plausible for small groups, and the solution to
complexity is a formal organization that is deliberately planned and controlled through a

centralized, hierarchical structure. Through a planning process, an organization places its

members "in a psychological environment that will adapt their decisions to the
organization objectives, and will provide them with the information needed to make these
decisions correctly" (Simon, p. 79). A planned order, then, one that initiates objective

rationality and purposive behavior in personal decision making, is necessary for all but
the smallest organizations.

For Polanyi just the opposite seemed self-evident.

The complexity of a

polycentric entity led him to reject the possibility of a planned order except for small
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groups. Polycentric tasks that may be calculated exactly, as a planned order requires, are

limited by the sheer number ofcalculations and exactness ofinformation that are required
to coordinate individual actions and interactions within larger groups (Polanyi,
1951/1998, p. 211). Computers are much faster and more powerful today than they were

in Polanyi's time, but even the most powerful computer has limitations. The solution,

then, is "to approach the matter in a piecemeal manner" (p. 221), by disregarding the vast

majority of a set of independent calculations (p. 225), and by turning attention to "one
centre at a time while supposing the others to be fixed in relation to the rest, for that

time" (Polanyi, p. 213).

Simon described a planning process that also involved

particularization and an examination only of "the most 'plausible' alternatives"

(1945/1957, p. 99), but rather than give each center a measure of autonomy, he relied on
one central planner to judge the plausibility of an option and to evaluate it accordingly.
Simon sought to restrain indeterminacy by centralizing the planning process and by

circumscribing individual choice. Polanyi recognized the impossibility of that task and
sought to embrace indeterminacy by welcoming individual initiative and delegating the

planning process to a multitude of independent centers. Indeed, Polanyi concluded, "'A
polycentric task can be socially managed only by a system of mutual adjustments'"

(1951/1998, p. 226), a system in which individuals are free to act while adjusting their
efforts to those of their neighbors, a system characterized by overlapping neighborhoods
of responsibility and authority that bears evidence to the logic of tacit knowing in its

integration of subsidiary particulars into a comprehensive whole.

For Simon the behavior of individuals, particularly "within administrative
organizations" (Simon, 1945/1957, p. 4) is purposive, and this purposiveness brings about
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"an integration in the pattern of behavior" and provides "a principal criterion in

determining what things are to be done" (p. 4). Such behavior is purposive "in so far as it
is guided by general goals or objectives; it is rational in so far as it selects alternatives

which are conducive to the achievement of the previously selected goals" (Simon, p. 5).

In contrast, Polanyi's identification of decision making with problem solving, and with
tradition and responsibility, suggests that decision making is in reaction to "a purposive

tension .

to make sense of [one's] situation" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 120). Whereas

purpose for Simon comes from outside the individual, by way ofa planning process, and

from outside the organization, by way of a central decision maker or decision making
body, purpose for Polanyi emerges from an individual tension to make sense of the

world. An animal's sense-making, as Polanyi described it, involves an effort "to retain
control ofitselfand ofits surroundings" (p. 120), but it must come to terms with the same

effort on the part of its neighbors, leaving its effort tentative and uncertain. This is a

heuristic tension, never fully resolved, that draws the discoverer or decision maker
onward by pushing the tension forward to new problems and new choices. Through a
planned order, purpose, and therefore meaning, are handed down from outside the

situation by way of external stimuli, subject to explicit rules. In a spontaneous order,

purpose and meaning emerge heuristically from within the situation, from the very
essence of a responsible, conscious being, and they are therefore dependent on the
personal and responsible application of the logic of tacit knowing. On the one hand we

find an external purpose enforced by external stimuli within a planned order. On the
other hand, we discover an internal purpose emerging through the responsible action of

individuals within a dynamic order.
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Given Simon's emphasis on a purpose handed down from outside the situation, it
is natural that he would claim that "[t]he concept of purposiveness involves a notion ofa

hierarchy of decisions - each step downward in the hierarchy consisting in an
implementation ofthe goals set forth in the step immediately above" (Simon, 1945/1957,
p. 5). This hierarchy is critical to a planned order, for the purposes defined by a plan are

distributed downward by particularizing upper level plans in the broad decisions oflower
levels.

In such an order, standards and guidelines and training function to limit

participation to a prescribed set of actions handed down from the "higher ranks". As

Polanyi noted, such a corporate or planned order limits "the freedom of things and men"
(Polanyi, 1941, p. 431); it seeks to determine decision-making and therefore action.

In a spontaneous or dynamic order, on the other hand, tradition functions as a

lower-level set of operational principles that are integrated by the free participation of
individual agents.

Writing of science, Polanyi argued that "[e]ach new independent

member ofthe scientific community adheres to this tradition, assuming at the same time
the responsibility shared by all members for re-interpreting the tradition and, possibly,

revolutionizing its teachings" (1967a/1969, p. 85). The mutual adjustments necessary in

a dynamic, traditional order "must be initiated by individual agents" (Polanyi, 1951/1998,
p. 229); they must emerge from the bottom rather than being handed down from the top.

Indeed, "a system that develops from the bottom up, through free interaction ofits parts

upon one another .

is the only social system that can meaningfully be called free"

(Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 204). The difference between planned and spontaneous
orders is significant. In a planned order, authority flows downward through the hierarchy

to limit the freedom of the lower levels; in a dynamic order, authority is a mutual
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authority in which each member is free to act independently, subject only to general rules

defined by tradition and enforced by community. Thus, in a planned order, purpose is not
only handed down from outside the situation, but it is determined from above, and

guidelines are assigned in the expectation of conformity. In a spontaneous order, on the
other hand, purpose emerges from below, from the integration of an indeterminate set of
particulars that are often known only in their bearing on the comprehensive entity toward
which they point.

Consequently, guidelines are never certain, for they point to

possibilities rather than certainties and their embodiment in a real world "makes them
liable to failure" (Polanyi, 1959a, p. 67), as well as to success.

The positivist tendency, to resort to a static formula or model to define and
understand public administration, is also evident in Simon's preference for planned order.
At the heart of the latter's argument was the assumption that legitimate choice must be

rational. However, rational decisions can only be guaranteed in a formal organizational

context that provides a framework in which "the stimuli of decision can themselves be
controlled" (p. 109). Significantly, Simon discounted "older traditional institutions like
the family" (p. 101), clearly asserting his preference for formal organizations which are

"rapidly assuming a role of broader significance" (p. 102). Formal organization has
advantages, he suggested, "for administrative organizations are usually constructed and
modified with a deliberation and freedom from tradition which - though far from
complete - gives them great adaptability to meet new needs with new arrangements"

(Simon, p. 102). Therefore, it is through such administrative institutions, characterized
by formal organization, indeed by a planned order, that "the achievement of human

rationality" (p. 102) becomes possible.
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Polanyi, on the other hand, understood that the premises and consequences of
decisions and behavior can never be evaluated in a strictly detached and impersonal
manner because they are always rooted in a process oftacit knowing and always point to

a reality that is uncertain and even unspecifiable. Decision making, as an instance of
problem solving, is a heuristic discovery dependent on the integration of subsidiary
particulars into a focal whole. Indeed, the "irreversible character of discovery suggests
that no solution of a problem can be accredited as a discovery if it is achieved by a
procedure following definite rules" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 123). Moreover, a discipline

like science, which is ordered spontaneously through the mutual adjustment ofindividual
initiatives, also relies on a community that shares its values and beliefs. Indeed, it never

exists in isolation but "can exist only because its premisses can be embodied in a tradition
which can be held in common by a community" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 56). "This is
true also of all complex creative activities which are carried on beyond the lifetime of

individuals" wrote Polanyi (p. 56); it is as true about decision making in formal
organizations subject to a planned order as it is about any setting. The grounding of

science and all complex creative activities in a tradition "held in common by a
community" is therefore a significant difference between Simon's planned order and
Polanyi's dynamic order.

Simon's preference for formal organization and decision

making based on explicit knowledge follow directly from his tacit assumption of a

determinate reality, while Polanyi's embrace of the traditional foundation of dynamic
order emanates from his recognition of indeterminacy and the tacit root ofall knowledge.
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Spontaneous Order in the Public Administration Literature

The concept of "self-coordination of independent initiatives" (Polanyi, 1962, p.
55) is familiar to public administrators, although often by other names. Timothy R.
Dahlstrom has made one of the more direct applications of spontaneous order by

suggesting that Polanyi's "sociointellectual framework" is useful for understanding

intellectual networks, for it "provides a broad platform from which to develop theory and
practice" (Dahlstrom, 2013, p. 578). Recognizing that Polanyi's use of science is as a

model of dynamic order, Dahlstrom freely interchanged the terms "scientist" and
"intellectual" and "researcher" in his writing, "to broaden the conceptual landscape" while
developing an image ofintellectuals as "members ofan organization that is closely knit

intellectually .

but loosely knit socially" (p. 580). Intellectuals in general, like scientists

in particular, enjoy an "intellectual liberty" that "consists ofthe right to choose one's own

problem to study, to conduct research free from any outside control, and to teach one's
subject in light of one's own opinions" (p. 581). Yet, while "a well-connected and well-

informed network is necessary," it "stands in contrast to transaction-based or powerbased networks" which "may not require any sense or development ofa true community"
(p. 581).

In an intellectual network, then, the mutual adjustment of independent

initiatives "leads to a joint result that is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it

about" (p. 281). Indeed, its "emergent character dissuades planning and control" and
"any attempt to organize this self-coordination under a central authority would eliminate

independent initiatives and thus reduce their joint effectiveness and paralyze their
cooperation" (p. 281).
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Dahlstrom's application of spontaneous order is focused on and true to Polanyi's
own definition. Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, and Robert Warren, on the other
hand, described a variation of spontaneous order without reference to Polanyi at all.

They introduced the term "polycentric" to connote "many centers of decision-making
which are formally independent of each other" and contrasted "the ideal model" of a
political system "with a single dominant center for making decisions" with a situation

where "each unit of local government acts independently without regard for other public
interests" (1961, p. 831). Ostrom and his wife, Elinor Ostrom, developed the idea of
polycentricity extensively over the next several decades, but the latter, together with

Michael D. McGinnis pointed out that polycentricity, as used by Polanyi, differed from
that proposed by Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren. Polanyi's notion of polycentricity, in

their view, connoted "an automatic dynamic process that does not recognize the pivotal
role ofpublic entrepreneurs in making connections between units ofa governance system

or the critical importance of explicit coordination among distinct actors within that
system" (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p. 18). Polanyi used polycentricity to support his

argument for a process of dynamic order while Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren focused
their attention on the centers of decision-making that they saw as fostering creative and

entrepreneurial action. Importantly, their elaboration of polycentricity in metropolitan
areas "presaged, by several decades, the recent explosion of interest in networked
governance, in which public authorities contract with private firms and other public

actors to produce specific public goods" (McGinnis and Ostrom, p. 18).
The Ostrom-based conception of polycentricity was widely used to describe the
general complexity or messiness of metropolitan government in which authority and
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control of governance, evident in decision making, are intentionally or spontaneously

distributed among many independent centers.

Such decentralization is the result of

factors such as "entrepreneurial leadership; contracts for service delivery; deregulation;"
and so on, factors that effectively synthesize many of the "components of New Public

Management and related concepts" (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p. 18). The Ostrom,
Tiebout, and Warren understanding of polycentricity also influenced "the later

development of a more general appreciation of the critical importance of networks in
public administration" (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011, p. 18).

Indeed, Laurence J.

O'Toole, Jr.'s definition ofnetworks as "structures ofinterdependence involving multiple
organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate ofthe

others in some larger hierarchical arrangement" (2015, p. 361; 1997, p. 45) is strikingly

similar to the Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren definition. "The notion of network" wrote
O'Toole, "excludes mere formal hierarchies and perfect markets, but it includes a very
wide range of structures in between" (1997, p. 45). However, it is interesting to note that

networking, as O'Toole described it, is arguably different from true spontaneous order, as
envisaged by Polanyi. O' Toole seemed to recognize this difference when he observed

that "network forms .

are not necessarily voluntary - that is, self-organizing - nor even

necessarily cooperative" (O'Toole, 2015, p. 362). Nevertheless, consistent with Polanyi's

ideas, network theorists question Simon's assumption "that complex tasks can usually be

divided up into small, relatively independent components that can be treated separately

while still contributing to the overall objective" (O'Toole, 1997, p. 46). Like Polanyi's,
their work brings into question Simon's argument that organizational hierarchy somehow

"can 'push back' the decision-making weaknesses experienced by individuals" (p. 45).
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Public Administration as Dynamically Ordered Tradition

In this chapter, I have brought attention to public administration scholars who

have embraced the concept of a self-modifying tradition and others who have consciously

or unconsciously recognized the importance of spontaneous order. I turn now to two
examples that seem to reflect a more developed understanding of a dynamically ordered

system that is also anchored in tradition.

Michael Spicer's most extensive use of Polanyi's conception of spontaneous order

is found in his argument for civil association. He has suggested that the understanding of
the state "which undergirds much of public administration, is one of purposive
association" (Spicer, 1997, p. 90), an understanding "in which individuals see themselves

as bound together for the pursuit of a particular coherent set of common substantive
ends" (p. 91). Within such an association, a formal set of specifically instrumental rules

may develop, rules that "serve to elicit and to facilitate individual actions in pursuit of the

common purposes of the state" (Spicer, 2001, p. 15). A purposive association or state,
therefore, "would seem to resemble closely what Michael Polanyi has termed a

'corporate' or a 'planned' social order" (Spicer, p. 15).

Such an association "is

characteristically one that has been consciously designed, or at least consciously adapted,

by some individual or group of individuals to attain a particular set of substantive

purposes deemed to be desirable" (p. 15).
Simon's planned order, implemented through a hierarchical structure, is a clear

example of purposive association. Indeed, Spicer has argued that the description of

planned order that Simon espoused is characterized by "a distinctly teleocratic tone"

(2001, p. 59).

Such a purposive or teleocratic order depends on "a powerful
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administrative apparatus" (p. 70), and such an apparatus can only be controlled by
political power that is "sufficiently centralized" (p. 70). In addition, a purposive state

requires "sufficient knowledge about the effects of its policies on the actions of its
subjects so that it can identify what those policies should be" (Spicer, p. 71). However,

"a vision ofpurposive association does not really describe the type ofpolitical association
in which we live" (p. 71). On the contrary, argued Spicer, "for most of our history, our
political practice has reflected a vision of the state as something more akin to a 'civil

association'" (p. 71).
In contrast to a purposive association, a civil association "is a form of political

association in which men and women see themselves as essentially free to seek their own
interests and values but recognize certain rules of conduct that serve to limit their
individual spheres of action" (Spicer, 1997, p. 96). By limiting individual spheres of

action, these rules of conduct also "limit conflict between individuals and groups"
(Spicer, 2001, p. 21). In a purposive association, "the activities ofindividuals in the state
must be organized around the pursuit of a coherent set of substantive ends" (Spicer, p.

22), but in a civil association, "individual or group actions are seen as directed toward
achieving their own particular substantive ends" (p. 22). If a purposive association may

be understood as a "purpose-based order," a civil association "is more accurately defined
as a rule-based order" (Spicer, p. 22). More directly, a civil association "can be seen here
as akin to what Michael Polanyi, drawing on analogies from the physical sciences, has

termed a system of'spontaneous order'" (Spicer, p. 72).
In this brief characterization of civil association, a mutual adjustment of

independent initiatives, so central to spontaneous order, is clearly evident. Moreover,
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"much of the information or knowledge that men and women use in deciding on what

actions they will undertake is inevitably dispersed" (Spicer, 2001, p. 84). As a result, a
spontaneous ordering of individual effort also results in (to use Polanyi's terminology) a
mutual or "General" rather than centralized or "Specific" authority. Within our political

system, wrote Spicer, "[i]nstead of there being a single locus of power, power is
fragmented. It is dispersed throughout our constitutional system" (p. 80). Polanyi wrote

similarly about general and specific authority: "the former leaves the decisions for
interpreting traditional rules in the hands of numerous independent individuals while the
latter centralizes such decisions at headquarters" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 59).
Importantly, general or mutual authority lays down "general presuppositions"

while specific or centralized authority imposes "conclusions" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 57).
Spicer emphasized that a civil association is, indeed, dependent on rules, but these are
not, to quote Michael Oakeshott, "instrumental rules whose desirability lies in their

propensityto promote, or at least not to hinder, the pursuit ofthe purpose" (1991, p. 451).
Instead, they are "noninstrumental rules of conduct" (Spicer, 2001, p. 71), the purpose of

which "is not to secure the achievement ofany particular set ofsubstantive purposes" (p.

71). The dynamic freedom of individuals, mutually adjusting their effort to that of their
neighbors, results in a distributed authority, a fragmented power based on traditional rules
and general presuppositions rather than on instrumental rules that impose conclusions.

Within a dynamically ordered civil association, then, the role of government

"becomes largely that of elucidating, protecting, and enforcing rules of conduct" (Spicer,
2001, p. 72). In Polanyian terms, it acts as the community which becomes, or perhaps the
hierarchy of "influentials" who become, "entrusted by the whole of society with the
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cultivation of certain ideals, in which the rest of the people take part at various stages of

interest" (Polanyi, 1941, p. 442). "We have here" wrote Polanyi, "a system of indirect
representation, at each stage of which people less experienced and interested in a

particular field confide in others, more intimately concerned with it" (p. 442). Indeed, the
scientists who make up the dynamic order that was Polanyi's central example, "are
speaking with one voice because they are informed by the same tradition," a tradition that

"represents only a temporary and imperfect embodiment of the traditional standards"
(Polanyi, 1946/1964, pp. 52, 53). Like science, a spontaneously ordered civil association

is anchored in general rules of conduct, customary standards, and daily practices that
together make up the tradition that forms and defines the association.

Furthermore, because the general rules of a tradition are "incapable of precise
formulation," they "can be transmitted only by teaching the practice which embodies

them" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 58).

In other words, traditional standards and

presuppositions can only be known tacitly, through example and skillful application.
Spicer suggested that it was from "historical practices" that "the idea of the state as a civil
association began to take on a much clearer form" (Spicer, 2001, p. 77). Indeed, the

concept of civil association emerges from "an ordinary or practical type of knowledge

often based on experience and practice rather than on scientific analysis" (Spicer, p. 84).
Unlike the strict instrumental rules so important to the enforcing of a centrally defined

and implemented purpose through planned order, the standards and presuppositions of a

tradition are never fixed statically in place, but are revealed only in their particular
expression through the practice of those who submit themselves to that tradition. As a

result, "[t]he social scientist who seeks to make predictions about the effects of public
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policies on the interrelated actions of individuals in particular situations must do so in the
absence of much, if not most, of the knowledge that those individuals themselves use in
deciding their actions in those situations" (p. 85). In Polanyian terms, the conclusions of

social scientists who depend on explicit knowledge and a positivist method that ignores
the tacit knowledge of real people in real situations, will be limited at best.

Aligning himself with Rohr and other constitutionalists, Spicer suggested that the
Constitution stands at the center of the tradition guiding American public administration:

The founders' Constitution, with its various devices for checking power,
can be seen here, therefore, as providing agreed-on rules of association for
individuals and groups as they seek to achieve their own interests or
particularistic visions of the public good within the political process.
(Spicer, 2001, p. 79)
The general "rules of association" set out in the Constitution "place boundaries on the
conduct of individuals and groups within the process of policy formulation and

implementation" (Spicer, p. 79). They limit the power of any particular individual or

group, thereby reinforcing the general or mutual nature of authority. Indeed, because the
Constitution "reflects so strongly a vision of civil association," it becomes difficult for

anyone "to use public administration as an instrument by which they might consistently

carry out a coherent set of substantive state ends" (Spicer, p. 83). The Constitution can
be seen as providing "agreed-on rules of association" that describe a civil association that

is "essentially the same one that has been handed down to us through the centuries as part

of our own Anglo-American tradition of political practice" (Spicer, 2001, p. 77). The
Constitution, itself, emerged from a tradition and is evidence of the dynamic nature of

traditions, dependent as they are on the interpretation of those who subscribe to and

commit themselves to its premises.
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Spicer did not claim that civil association should replace all vestiges ofpurposive

association. On the contrary, the vision ofa purposive association has been "[o]ne ofthe
most powerful visions of the state to shape Western political thought, discourse, and

action since the Middle Ages" (Spicer, 2001, p. 14). To early public administration
writers, "[s]uch a vision was especially appealing" and "it has continued to exert a
powerful influence on the field ofpublic administration" (Spicer, p. 125). However, both

"a particular set ofpolitical and constitutional traditions," that we have inherited, and "the

severe fragmentation ofpolitical culture" (Spicer, p. 89), that we are experiencing, make
"the pursuit ofsuch a teleocratic vision of governance and administration .

impractical"

(p. 126), for they place constraints on our ability to realize an efficient planned order and
an effective purposive state, and are also potentially dangerous for citizens who happen

not to share the ends pursued by government. Both purposive and civil associations,

then, have a place in the thought of public administration. As Polanyi made clear, "[t]he
two alternative and opposite methods of achieving order - by limiting the freedom ofthe

particles, or by giving full scope to their interactions - have their respective proper

occasions" (1951/1998, p. 192). However, public administration in practice is largely

characterized by civil association, by spontaneous order anchored in tradition.
It was the contrast between a theoretical "rational-comprehensive" model or
method of administrative action and its practice that prompted Charles E. Lindblom to
describe an alternative model that also largely reflects Polanyi's conception of
spontaneous or dynamic order. Lindblom's “science of muddling through” (1959) or

process of “disjointed incrementalism” (1979), with its dependence on “successive

limited comparison” and the response of many individuals to marginal change, is an
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example of administrative structure and practice anchored in the spontaneous ordering of

independent initiatives through mutual adjustment.

He argued that a "rational-

comprehensive" model or method of administrative action is a heroic model that, for
complex problems, "is of course impossible" because it "assumes intellectual capacities

and sources of information that men simply do not possess" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 80). In
practice, the public administrator disregards "most other social values as beyond his
present interest," outlines and compares "those few policy alternatives that occurred to
him" while relying heavily on past experience, and weighs values and "instruments for
reaching values" together to achieve the best result given the current situation (Lindblom,
pp. 79-80). Because practitioners of this approach "expect to achieve their goals only

partially, they would expect to repeat endlessly the sequence just described" (p. 80).

In this brief overview, one may see clear evidence of traditional foundations - in
the practitioner's reliance on past experience - and of spontaneous order - in the need to

approach problems incrementally (what Polanyi referred to as successive approximation)
through the action of individual practitioners.

The process of "successive limited

comparison" was anticipated by Simon (1945/1957) as "satisficing" and as "bounded
rationality" (March and Simon, 1958), but he saw them more as an anomaly or a

concession to fallibility. In contrast, by emphasizing that successive limited comparison

is necessary because of the impossibility of achieving useful results through a rationalcomprehensive approach, Lindblom argued that a model of decision making

characterized by "successive limited comparisons" (1959, p. 81) "is not a failure of

method for which administrators ought to apologize" (p. 87) but an alternative worth
clarifying and formalizing.
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Because the "science of muddling through" depends on a process of successive
approximation that is never certain with regard to its outcomes, it emphasizes the

indeterminate nature of reality and the very real possibility of "unanticipated
consequences" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 86).

When coupled with the limited nature of

incremental decisions, what materializes is decision making that is distributed among

many centers, in which "every important interest or value has its watchdog" (Lindblom,
p. 85). As Polanyi made clear, each participant in a dynamic order addresses the needs of

his or her small "neighborhood" and thereby, together with each other participant,
addresses the needs of the whole. Because the fixed, formal methods of a rational

comprehensive or "synoptic" method are unachievable, the administrator is forced to rely
on a tradition of accumulated past experience, rather than on formal organization,

experience that is dynamically changing in response to each use. Because the selection

of "value goals and empirical analysis" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81) are closely intertwined in
a traditional setting revealed in practice, the acceptance of responsibility takes precedence

over response to external stimuli established by a comprehensive plan.

Each actor is

responsible to unique stimuli based on individual characteristics and must employ a

process of tacit knowing to account for relevant factors. Because each administrator is
responsible for his or her own domain, "the only practicable test of a policy's correctness"

(Lindblom, p. 84), the only real measure of organizational purpose, must emerge from
agreement among administrators.

Purpose, therefore, appears from within the

organization rather than being dictated from without. Ultimately, decision by disjointed
incrementalism is a bottom-up process that emerges from the mutual adjustment of

independent initiatives rather than being enforced from the top down by a central plan.
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As suggested in the previous paragraph, Lindblom's description of disjointed
incrementalism and his advocacy of "strategies for skillful incompleteness" (Lindblom,

1979, p. 524) display the importance of tacit knowing. That "means and ends are not
distinct" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 81) acknowledges that the tacit integration of means takes

place whenever we decide how to deal with an issue or problem we face. In Lindblom's
words, "the only practicable way to disclose one's relevant ... values even to oneself is to

describe the policy one chooses to achieve them" (p. 82). In other words, because
"evaluation and empirical analysis are intertwined," values and policies are chosen "at

one and the same time" (p. 82) in a Gestalt-like process of integration.

That

incrementalism relies on tacit knowing is also supported by its dependence on traditional

processes that are self-modifying and known tacitly through practice. The spontaneous
ordering of multiple centers in a polycentric entity results in the mutual adjustment of
individual choice and action through a process oftacit knowing.

In Lindblom's description of a "science of muddling through" one finds a clear
example of dynamic order anchored in tradition, community, and the logic of tacit

knowing. Because there are so many involved in administrative decision making, no
individual knows enough to conceive of, much less implement a truly comprehensive

plan, but within a society where "individuals are free to combine and pursue almost any
possible common interest they might have" (Lindblom, 1959, p. 85), a dynamically

ordered entity "often can assure a more comprehensive regard for the values ofthe whole
society than any attempt at intellectual comprehension" (p. 85). Like other examples of

dynamic order in public administration, Lindblom's description ofincrementalism closely
parallels Polanyi's descriptions of a dynamically ordered Common Law or science with
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their reliance on the precedent evident in the legal or scientific tradition. It is not
surprising, therefore, that reasoning by example, as described by Spicer in 1995 and by
Spicer and Terry in 1996 may also be seen in the decision making process employed by

disjointed incrementalism. As already noted the "science of muddling through" depends

heavily on historical precedent for decision making and its focus on marginal change
gives evidence to the reasoning by example so integral to a traditional domain.

The parallels between incrementalism and civil association are more complex, but

the freedom of individual administrators to make incremental changes is plainly related to
the freedom of individuals to make choices within a civil association. That both are clear
examples of dynamic order makes that relationship evident. In Spicer's writing about

civil association, one finds emphasis on the heuristic power of civil association, on the
rules necessary to check its potential abuse, and on its reliance on tradition.

In

Lindblom's writing, on the other hand, there is greater emphasis on the orderliness of
disjointed incrementalism as evidence of its practical value, on its origin in and support

for personal choice, and on its self-modifying capacity.

There is a difference in

emphasis, but both Spicer and Lindblom recognized that the mutual adjustment of

individual initiatives evident in dynamic order takes place in time (through incremental
mutual adjustment to precedents that make up the tradition upon which it relies) as well

as in space (through mutual adjustment to other individuals or groups). In its reliance on

tradition as supported by community, spontaneous order is dynamic, both temporally and
spatially.
Public Liberty and Public Administration

While Lindblom's clarification and formalization of a model of successive limited
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comparisons showed that the practice of public administration discloses a proclivity for
spontaneous over planned order, Spicer's elucidation of civil association and its
application to the field of public administration also revealed the traditional roots of such

a propensity.

Importantly, while neither addressed tacit knowing explicitly, both

emphasized the ongoing practice of public administration as the primary source of a

normative, as well as a positive, understanding of public administration. However, in
spontaneous order, the dynamic skill of individual initiative is seen in relief against a

background of tradition enforced by a community. Both a civil association and the
successive limited comparison method of decision making reveal a tension between a

traditional structure of values, beliefs, and setting, and the dynamic possibilities that seek

better solutions to administrative problems.

The tradition of public administration

described by John Rohr and Michael Spicer acts as a background which defines the

conditions from which the practice of public administration emerges, thereby
constraining and re-imagining this tradition in the process of engaging specific
administrative problems and issues.

Said differently, the practice of public

administration reveals a tradition of public administration that demonstrates a strong
preference for civil association, incrementalism, and therefore spontaneous order, even

though "American public administration as a field reflects, in significant part, a vision of
a purposive state" (Spicer, 2001, p. 31), and even though "the literatures of decision

making, policy formulation, planning, and public administration formalize the [rationalcomprehensive] approach rather than the [successive limited comparisons approach]"

(Lindblom, 1959, p. 80). In a dynamically ordered public administration, the action of

each individual is as full of meaning as is the practice or structure of society as a whole.
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This tension between the practice of public administration and the tradition that
gives it context is clearly reflected in Polanyi's concept of public liberty. Within an
institution or system exercising public liberty, reliance on or fidelity to a tradition reveals
itselfas a calling to responsibility, a fiduciary commitment which provides the conditions

within which liberty may legitimately emerge through practice. Indeed, it is in the

traditional practice of freedom that liberty resides, not in its promotion or declaration.

As Polanyi emphasized, systems ofdynamic order fostering public liberty find protection
“not in the explicit content of their constitutional rules, but in the tacit practice of

interpreting these rules” (1955/1997, p. 203). Writing of science, he pointed out that it
“can exist and continue to exist only because its premisses can be embodied in a tradition

which can be held in common by a community” (1946/1964, p. 56). Yet, it “is constantly

revolutionized and perfected by its pioneers, while remaining firmly rooted in its
tradition” (Polanyi, p. 56).

Because public liberty exists for the benefit of the

community, it must be anchored in that community's tradition and must accept the
premisses of that tradition as experienced in practice. However, at the same time that
tradition limits and defines potential action, individual liberty strains toward a reality that
may undermine the very tradition that gives it meaning.

Anchored in tradition and called to responsible action, a public liberty is therefore

a moral freedom, for it provides "traditional limits on our freedoms, that is, for our values
and our morals" (Polanyi and Prosch, 1975, p. 183). More specifically, in the exercise of

public liberty, self-centeredness gives way to consideration ofthe community as a whole,

for public liberty is not private freedom, but acts freely and responsibly on behalf of a

community. Indeed, as was demonstrated in Chapter III, it is the neglect of public
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liberties that leads to moral inversion and totalitarianism. Within a totalitarian state,

liberty "can mean only a private freedom to act unsocially, or at least irresponsibly"
(Polanyi, 1941, p. 439); because totalitarianism "must reject the rival claims of

individuals to act independently for the benefit of society" (p. 438), it can conceive of

liberty only as an absolute and a-moral freedom that is unconstrained by responsibility.

Even in a liberal society, if unschooled in the unspecifiable art of public liberty, a
commitment to political freedom will fail. Thus, the results were disastrous when "the

doctrines of political freedom spread from England in the eighteenth century to France

and thence throughout the world, while the unspecifiable art of exercising public liberty,
being communicable only by tradition, was not transmitted with it" (Polanyi, 1958/1962,
p. 54). An a-moral liberty is a dangerous freedom, for, as we have seen, it leads to moral

inversion.
Within a moral context, however, meaning emerges from freedom that is

constrained, from dynamic order and from public liberty, from possibilities straining
against and restricted by boundaries, from heuristic power restrained by orderliness.

Objectivism, in rejecting contingency and freedom, controls and restricts itself into

meaninglessness while subjectivism imagines possibility without restraint and finds that a
world of absolute freedom is without substance or purpose. Public liberty, on the other

hand, embraces freedom, but grants it only in the context of a tradition and a commitment
to the community that embraces and enforces it. It is not a formal organization, defined
by external rules and specific purpose, but is a tradition that has been embraced and

internalized, an internally defined order that is enforced through practice by its elements,
a moral order that calls its members to responsible action.
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Within public administration, the concept which most closely parallels public

liberty is the idea of "administrative conservatorship" as described by Larry D. Terry.
Noting that at the end of the 20th Century, "the topic of bureaucratic leadership is
conspicuously absent" from conversations about "more effective leadership" in the

United States (1995, p. 2), Terry suggested that a combination of factors was at play. In
particular, he pointed to "Americans' deeply rooted fear of bureaucracy, the myopia

created by Progressive Era reforms and scientific management, and the unintended
consequences of scholarly attempts to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy" (p. 3).
Fear of governmental power led antibureaucratic forces to devise strategies such as
"politicization of bureaucracy; constant reorganization; extensive use of deregulation and

budget, program and personnel cuts ... the exclusion of career executives from policy
discussions and formal processes; and expansion of the size of both executive and

legislative staffs" (Terry, p. 5). The activities of Progressive reformers and scientific
management led to advocacy of a "business enterprise model" of governance, placing a

heavy emphasis on "the application of scientific methods as a means of achieving
commercial efficiency;" promoting "the use of experts who possessed skills, knowledge,
and technical training in the application of scientific methods;" and relying "on the

concept of a strong executive who exerted control over the enterprise by centralizing the
decision-making process" (Terry, pp. 8-9). All of these trends led to a disregard for and
an undermining ofleadership in bureaucracy.

At the same time, scholarly attempts "to reconcile bureaucracy with democracy"

also "deflected attention from the importance of bureaucratic leadership" (Terry, 1995, p.

11). In attempts to resolve the tension between a focus on efficiency that is prevalent in
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bureaucracy and the need for "responsiveness to the public will" that is central to

democracy, one response was to separate the two in a "hierarchy" that clearly defines the
"responsibilities of bureaucracy ... within the boundaries of the democratic system" (p.

11), thereby turning to a focus on "controlling bureaucracy" to the detriment of
bureaucratic leadership. A second response was to cast administrative officials "in a
passive role of referees in an arena in which interest group competition and bargaining

occurs" and the administrator becomes "a blank slate" on which various interests are

written (Terry, p. 15). In either case, responsible, independent initiative, evident in true
leadership, is missing.
In contrast to the weak role of bureaucratic leadership encouraged by fear,

myopia, and a misunderstanding of the relationship of bureaucracy to democracy, Terry
suggested several conceptual pieces that support a "theory of bureaucratic leadership that
provides career executives with a legitimate role in the system of democratic governance"

(Terry, 1995, p. 16). Based on the constitutional work of Rohr, together with his own
work in partnership with Spicer, as well as the work of Brian J. Cook (1992), Terry

concluded that public bureaucracy is legitimate "in the American political system" (p.

23). More specifically, he argued that (1) public bureaucracies are compatible with
constitutional principles; (2) public administrators have "a moral obligation" to preserve
and sustain constitutional principles; (3) public administrators occupy "a subordinate yet
autonomous role" that includes the checking of political power; (4) public bureaucracies

"serve as a representative institution that participates in and ensures reasoned

deliberations on public policy issues"; (5) the exercise ofcombined executive, legislative,
and judicial powers by public administrators "in a subordinate capacity is consistent with
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the framers' relaxed interpretation of the separation-of-powers doctrine"; and (6) public
bureaucracies help in forming "the character of citizens by contributing to the ongoing

process of making the American regime what it is" (Terry, pp. 23, 24). Consequently,
Terry concluded, "the primary function of bureaucratic leaders is to protect and maintain

administrative institutions in a manner that promotes or is consistent with constitutional

processes, values, and beliefs" (p. 24).
Terry characterized this leadership role as "administrative conservatorship" (1995,

p. 25; 1990, p. 396).

Such leadership consists in "the willingness of administrative

elites, out of traditional loyalty and moral principles, to preserve authority and

distribution of power with regard to the propriety of an institution's existence, its

functional niche, and its collective institutional goals" (Terry, 1995, p. 26). Drawing
largely on the work of Philip Selznick, Terry distinguished formal organization from an

institution which is "a creation of social needs and aspirations," that is "an adaptive,
responsive, cooperative system that embodies cultural values," and that has the "cultural
values and moral commitments of a society" implanted within it (Terry, p. 26). In

Polanyian terminology, institutions may be recognized as forms of dynamic order that
make possible the exercise of public liberty. An institution is granted a certain freedom
by society to govern itself independently; in return, it agrees to act responsibly, “to act
independently for the benefit of society” (Polanyi, 1941, p. 438). An institution, then, as

opposed to a formal organization, may be seen as "a responsive, adaptive organism"
(Selznick, 1957, p. 5), an entity or a process that is infused with value "beyond the

technical requirements of the task at hand" (p. 17). Formal organizations "are technical
instruments, designed as means to definite goals" (p. 21) wherein management becomes a
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primary function.

Institutions, on the other hand, are "products of interaction and

adaptation" (p. 22) and demand a more active, dynamic leadership.
According to Terry, public administrators, as administrative conservators, are

responsible for "preservation of institutional integrity" (1995, p. 26), for identifying and
maintaining an institution's "distinctive competence" (p. 27). Moreover, Terry found that
"elites are essential to the perpetuation and preservation of society because they are the

bearers and conservators of cultural values" (p. 28), much as Polanyi recognized the
critical nature of "influentials" in a dynamic order like science. Polanyi, of course,

insisted on the responsibility of all members of a traditional community while Terry
focused on the importance of leaders, but one may readily recognize multiple parallels
between Terry's description of administrative conservatorship and Polanyi's description

of the role of individuals within a dynamic order that exercises public liberty and relies

on tradition as enforced by a community. Administrative conservatorship is a moral
responsibility that is grounded in and "consistent with our constitutional tradition" (Terry,

1990, p. 396). It is reliant on the independent initiative ofa cadre ofresponsible leaders
who can only be formed as leaders through a process of apprenticeship, thereby

submitting to a tradition while humbly accepting the responsibility for its reformation

through practice.

As noted in Chapter III, Polanyi identified an art of free discussion that is fair and
tolerant, a tradition ofcivic liberties that are evident in public opinion, and the institutions

of democracy that include legislatures, courts, churches, the press and other forms of
communication, local government, and a variety of independent organizations, as key

features of a free society that is anchored in moral responsibility, dynamically ordered,
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and dependent on a self-modifying tradition. What Chapter V has shown is that, in the
United States, public administration is an integral element of such a society, dependent
on a constitutional tradition, facilitated by spontaneous order, and responsible to protect

and maintain that tradition, including the full range of institutions that make it possible.
Both in practice and in scholarship, the traditional framework upon which public

administration rests is a moral association, constrained and directed by tradition to
freedom for responsible relationship with an indeterminate reality.
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CHAPTER VI
A SOCIETY OF PERSONS
CALLED TO RESPONSIBILITY

[E]ven the most distinguished minds can produce nothing truly relevant to human
affairs if they restrict themselves by the kind of detachment which is currently
supposed to be the mark of scientific integrity. ... I would suggest that we might begin
to remedy this weakness by prohibiting the use of the term scientific in praise of a
study of human society, for a trial period of, say, 10 years. And in the meantime we
should try training ourselves to study human affairs by intense participation in human
problems instead of by detachment from them. (Polanyi, 1957, p. 482)

It is the image of humanity immersed in potential thought that I find revealing for the
problems of our day. It rids us of the absurdity of absolute self-determination, yet offers
each of us the chance of creative originality, within the fragmentary area which
circumscribes our calling. It provides us with the metaphysical grounds and the
organizing principle of a Society of Explorers. (Polanyi, 1966/2009, p. 91)

In the previous two chapters, I have attempted to demonstrate how Michael
Polanyi's philosophy, his epistemology and ontology, his understanding of how we know

and what we know, is revealed in, and may be applied to, the study and practice of public
administration. In Chapter IV, I focused my attention first on his assertion that all

knowledge is tacit or rooted in tacit knowing (rather than being explicitly objective) and
163

therefore dependent on the person (rather than on a detached realm of impersonal facts).

Then I examined his associated claim that reality is revealed in indeterminate possibilities
rather than in determinate certainty.

Like the first, this second assertion has wide

ramifications, not the least of which is to give an ontological expression to the logic of
tacit knowing and personal knowledge. A deterministic world leaves human beings

chained to immutable rules and isolated from an unalterable reality in a world that has no

meaning. Recognition of the unspecifiable future manifestations that characterize reality
forces public administration scholars and practitioners to approach their disciplines with

an open attitude that is sensitive to the contingent nature of administrative
responsibilities, ever mindful that the normative can never be absolute. This suggests

that an alternative definition of science may be appropriate.

To facilitate such a definition, I suggested three widely accepted principles of
public administration that are undermined by acceptance of the centrality of the tacit and
the personal. If we know by integrating subsidiary particulars to a focal whole, it

becomes detrimental and even impossible to separate facts from values; any attempt to

theoretically model public administration must take into account the tacit nature of our
knowing process and the personal nature of our knowledge; and that we can know more

than we can tell suggests that alternative forms of knowledge, models, and methods must
be embraced by public administrators in their scholarship and in their practice.
Importantly, while an understanding of tacit knowing undermines certain widely accepted
assumptions and practices, it also suggests opportunities for a more personal approach to

administration that recognizes that our understanding of administration emerges from a
host of subsidiary particulars that reveal themselves in ways that are often unforeseeable
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and even unspecifiable.
In Chapter V, I turned to the application of Polanyi's sociological arguments to
public administration. I showed that the traditional foundation of public administration

advocated by Rohr, Spicer, and other constitutionalists, is congruent with and supported
by Polanyi's conception of the self-modifying tradition so necessary to a free society's

long term survival. Such a tradition is not simply a set of fixed prescriptions handed

down from the past, but is a dynamic process of self-definition by which its members

submit to its authority and, through practice under that authority, subvert and transform it.

A free society is also a dynamic one, ordered spontaneously by the mutual adjustment of
independent initiatives. Hints of such an order are evident in networking literature and a
more direct application may be seen in Dahlstrom's promotion of intellectual networks

dependent on the mutual adjustment of independent initiatives. More explicitly, Spicer's
defense of civil association as a central element of the American constitutional tradition

and therefore of public administration in the United States calls both scholars and
practitioners to protect the traditional framework that enables dynamic order in

administration and in society.

Likewise, Lindblom's description of a "science of

muddling through" describes a spontaneously ordered tradition that highlights the

dynamic nature of administrative practice and both its dependence on and support for
tacit knowing.

At the end of Chapter V, I emphasized the moral roots of a dynamically ordered

free society, which relies on a self-modifying tradition, by examining evidence of public
liberty in the public administration literature. The link that I found was in the work of
Larry Terry, and in his definition of administrative conservatorship.
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Public

administrators are called to conserve a constitutional tradition of public administration dynamically but also hierarchically - much as Polanyi described the practice of science.

While subject to that moral responsibility, they are free to act independently on behalfof
society as a whole, and the tension between freedom, spontaneously striving for meaning,
and tradition, that constrains it, opens the door to creativity. What becomes evident is

that the possibilities for applying Polanyi's sociological and philosophical insights to
public administration are far greater than could be examined in this dissertation. Indeed,

C. P. Goodman has argued that "Polanyi anticipated or directly influenced many of the

innovations that have most excited philosophers in the second half of the Twentieth
Century" (Goodman, 2008, p. 73), for "the theory oftacit knowing effects a shift in the
way in which we understand the world, one that undermines some ofthe assumptions that

have generated the modern world" (Goodman, p. 75). Admission that all knowledge is
tacit or dependent on tacit knowing forces us to responsibly accept our personal

involvement in the knowing process, even while conceding the indeterminacy of our

knowledge and of reality itself. Ifour knowledge is both indefinite and personal, we may

never claim an "absolute understanding" (p. 77) but are forced to humbly accept our

humanity and, therefore, our dependence on a community of persons who join us in a
convivial journey ofexploration and discovery.
A Dynamic Person and Harmonious Particularity

"Personal knowledge is an intellectual commitment," wrote Polanyi, "and as such
inherently hazardous" (1958/1962, p. viii). Therefore, "into every act of knowing there
enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what is being known" (p. viii).
Importantly, "this [personal] coefficient is no mere imperfection but a vital component"
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(p. viii) of this knowledge.

Fully aware that her knowledge commitment may be

mistaken, the person acts responsibly in reaction to a calling "to fulfil the universal
obligations" (p. 323) which s/he has embraced. "Many writers have observed," wrote

Polanyi and Prosch, "that, to some degree, we shape all knowledge by the way we know
it" (1975, p. 194). "Stated in this bald way," they continued, "knowledge would appear to

be subject to the whims of the observer" (p. 194). However, the knower is always
controlled by his calling: "His acts are personal judgments exercised responsibly with a

view to a reality with which he is seeking to establish contact" (p. 194).

Any conclusion, whether given as a surmise or claimed as a certainty,
represents a commitment of the person who arrives at it. Whether or not it
is the truth can be hazarded only by another, equally responsible
commitment. There is no explicit or automatic way to avoid this
necessity. (Polanyi and Prosch, p. 194)

A person claiming to know truth is not free in an absolute sense. She can discover or
create or even act only within the context of "impersonal requirements" and in response

to a calling to responsibility. In this sense, she is not simply an individual; a person
exists in relationship, in community subject to tradition.

Thomas Pfau (2017) has attempted to describe this distinction between a person

as individual and as relational entity by drawing attention to "the Trinitarian framework"
embraced by the Christian church. The Trinity acts as "the archetype of the ideal, organic
community wherein the identity of the persons comprising that unity is inseparable from

their relations, even as it is neither transferentially projected upon nor mimetically
derived from the other persons in that community" (Pfau, 2017, p. 14). In other words,

Pfau was arguing that "the human person is the expression or manifestation of an allencompassing order, rather than a subject capable of unilaterally fashioning an account of
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its inner constitution and its relatedness to other human beings" (p. 14). In comparison,
for the individual (or "self"), "no apparent normative dimension intrudes on the various

rights claims and subjective preferences" which modern political philosophy "takes to be
the very essence of human flourishing" (Pfau, pp. 14-15). The result is that "otherwise

isolated and hermetic individuals" are furnished with "a strictly elective and opportunistic
template of socialization" (p. 15). Compare this picture of a "society of individuals" to

the "communion of human persons" (Pfau, p. 15) evident in Polanyi's writings. For

Polanyi, a person can never exist in isolation from the community that gives him or her
meaning. Nor can s/he be isolated from the tradition which calls him or her to act, to be,

or to know. A tradition supported by a community, as Polanyi described, may be

recognized in the "all-encompassing order" of which, wrote Pfau, "the human person is
the expression or manifestation" (p. 14).

Consequently, the "mystery of human

personhood" expresses "an unfathomable reality in which all human beings or individuals

already find themselves, from which their discursive and social practices necessarily
proceed and to which, ideally, their reasoning ought to return them" (Pfau, p. 15).
Murray Jardine, working from the perspective of political philosophy, has also
found a Trinitarian framework helpful to understand the deep implications of Polanyi's

philosophy, anchored as it is in the concept ofpersonal knowledge. Drawing on the work
of Colin Gunton, Jardine recently (2013) argued that a Christian failure to truly embrace
the plurality ofthe Trinity resulted in an emphasis on the "unity" ofGod and nature and

set the stage for modernism's emphasis on instrumental human agency. To clarify this
point, Gunton compared the vision of "the world in terms of unity" evident in the
philosophy of Parmenides to the understanding of "the world in terms of plurality"
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evident in the philosophy of Heraclitus (Jardine, 2013, p. 183). In the former, "the many
are simply functions of the one" while in the latter, "the many are prior to the one" (p.

183) . Importantly, Gunton was not arguing that the Heraclitian view is of "reality as
pluralistic and therefore conflictual," but that "plurality can be harmonious" (p. 183), with
the Trinitarian framework serving as a model. In such a framework, particularity is not

subsumed by unity but is celebrated through relationship.

"Politically, then," wrote

Jardine, "a truly trinitarian (sic) theology would imply that humans attempt to work out
and put in practice a truly relational approach to each other and the natural world" (p.

184) . Such an approach would imply that, as Polanyi argued, "true freedom is possible
only within the context ofcommunity" and "would result in a new understanding ofthe

human relation to nature, one that could mean a new, noninstrumental type of
technology" (Jardine, p. 184).

In addition to drawing on the Trinitarian framework of particularity within and
enhanced by community, Jardine turned to the work of William Poteat. What he found
helpful was Poteat's suggestion that "Western thought since the Middle Ages has been

characterized by a kind of 'parallax' created by the incoherent mixture" of Hebrew and
Greek models of reality (Jardine, 2013, p. 182). The Hebrew model of reality, "drawn
primarily from oral/aural experience" (p. 181), was "the speech act, as conceived by an
oral culture" (p. 182). In contrast, the Greek model of reality, "drawn primarily from
visual experience" (p. 181), was "the rhythms ofthe natural world . as conceived by a

literate culture" (p. 182). When the two models were brought together in the Middle
Ages, "the full development ofthe implications ofthe Hebraic worldview was thwarted

by the use of Greek philosophical concepts" (Jardine, p. 182). More specifically, while
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the oral/aural logic of the Hebraic picture of reality can "allow for the coexistence of
necessity and contingency" because of "its basis in the dynamism of the speech act," (p.

182), the "visual logic developed by the Greek philosophers" concluded that "a necessary

relation cannot coexist with contingency" because its concern is for "eternal relations

between static entities" (p. 182). In other words, "the static, impersonal concepts of

Greek metaphysics could not allow Western philosophy and theology to make sense of
the dynamic, personal picture of reality actually at the core of Christianity" (p. 182). The
explosion of new discovery at the end of the Middle Ages made Western culture more

aware of the contingency of reality, but a visual understanding of static necessity left
modernity "unable to conceptualize any necessary limits on that contingency" (p. 182),
limits that, Polanyi recognized, are necessary to give such contingency meaning.

The "absolute contingency of a world created by arbitrary will" (Jardine, 2013, p.

182) is an apt description of the conditions leading to moral inversion as Polanyi
described it - the result of a world of instrumentally oriented individuals that leads to

nihilism. In contrast, an oral/aural world of persons, formed over time by traditional
relationships over which they may or may not have sway, in which knowing and doing
rely on indeterminate subsidiary particulars pointing to comprehensive entities that
manifest their reality in unexpected ways, is necessarily contingent. For Polanyi, then, it

is contingency rather than arbitrary certainty that is necessary, much as it is for a "speech
act, as conceived by an oral culture" (Jardine, p. 182). Note that Jardine was not arguing

for the elimination of a visual, literate culture. Yet, he did recommend the examination

of "a literate culture more thoroughly informed by the Hebraic model" (p. 182). Indeed,
he pointed to Poteat's argument that this is the project that Polanyi had begun, albeit
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unconsciously: "to convey a sense of the world being ordered temporally, as it would be
understood from an oral/aural paradigm, rather than being ordered atemporally, as it

would be seen from a visual standpoint" (Jardine, p. 183).
Both a Trinitarian framework and an oral/aural model of reality draw attention to
the dynamics of personhood and, Jardine emphasized, "particularity - or again,

particularity that is harmonious - is a central theme in Polanyi's thought" (2013, p. 185).

A dynamic personhood is evident in the logic of tacit knowing where "the triad of
knower, context, and known could be seen as a harmonious particularity" (p. 185). By

recognizing the relational nature of the person, apparent in harmonious particularity, the
"inevitable reduction of object to subject or vice versa" (p. 185) may be avoided.

Polanyi's understanding of reality as layered also demonstrates a particularity that is
harmonious, for higher level entities are constrained but not defined by lower level

entities; higher levels "are limited by but not reducible to lower levels" (p. 185). Finally,
"a (tacit) Trinitarian approach" that shows harmony through particularity is clearly
evident in Polanyi's descriptions of spontaneous order, public liberty, and a free society,

where individual persons and institutions work harmoniously through "the system of
overlapping competences," through "the creative tension between tradition and

innovation," and through "the free actions ofparticular individuals" (Jardine, p. 185).
The Person in Public Administration

Polanyi's emphasis on the person and on personal knowledge, so evident in the
logic oftacit knowing, prompts us to see the world in a new light. Apersonwho ismore
than simply a "self" or individual, who is a whole expressing harmonious particularity, is

a temporal being, forever submitting to tradition while simultaneously seeking to subvert
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and modify it and to thereby discover new aspects of, and bring change to, reality.
"Reliance on" and "commitment to" are two sides of a fiduciary program, a system of

action that reveals its subsidiary particulars - its procedures, its standards, its assumptions
- in their bearing on the action or perception or idea to which they point. Yet, such a

program is a whole that is not simply directional, for it includes those subsidiaries as a
"from" which bear on a "to" through the action of a person. Such a program turns an

individual into a person, a single-dimensioned image into an ineffable three-dimensional
reality expressing unspecifiable future possibilities.
Camilla Stivers' examination of the possibility of hope "in Dark Times" (2008b),

throws light on the importance of a personal understanding in studying public
administration. Writing in a personal style that she identified as "meditation" (p. 238),
Stivers demonstrated particularity in public administration by focusing attention on a

single culture (the Crow) and within that people, the speech and dream and actions of a
single person (Plenty Coups). The particularity that she used in her writing, however,
was not isolated particularity, but the harmonious particularity of the individual within

the people and of the culture within a broader philosophical framework. In other words,

both people and individual may be considered "person" as Pfau, Jardine, and indeed,
Polanyi, make plain: person in community, subject to, advocate for, and in defiance of
tradition. In stating that
When the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground,
and they could not lift them up again. After this nothing happened. (Lear,
2006, p. 2, as quoted in Stivers, p. 230)

Plenty Coups, as a person himself, was recognizing the interrelatedness of his people,

physical elements such as the buffalo, cultural elements like the hunt and warfare, and the
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importance of meaning. A people who are isolated from their cultural, physical, and

corporate relationships, become less than person, and thereby meaningless; for the Crow,

"the way of life that gave meaning to the idea of counting coup is gone" (Stivers, p. 231).
Hope, albeit a dark hope, came to the Crow in the midst of the collapse of the
"pillars of their world" (Stivers, 2008b, p. 232) when they corporately acknowledged the

enigmatic and indeterminate nature of the future, while holding on to their traditions in

the midst of change. As Stivers put it,
Plenty Coups and the Crow people do not have faith in a better future.
What they have is belief in the importance of paying attention to dreams.
Therefore they are willing to risk everything to heed the advice they
received from outside the limits of ordinary existence. (Stivers, p. 235)

While, in the dream of Plenty Coups, the Crow were given "a direction, but not a
destination" (p. 234), such an uncertain and incomplete future could be accepted because
they recognized that a person is more than an individual.

In writing of Havel's

description of a greengrocer's rebellion against the system, Stivers pointed out that "[t]he

truth in him is a living truth, one that he creates and sustains in the process of acting" (p.
234). The same may be said of Plenty Coups and the Crow as a people: the living truth

of the dream, and their future, would be created and sustained through action.
Hope is a temporal concept and is realized in the recognition that the identity of
persons is linked to and dependent on - yet not derived from - their situation and

tradition; it is "inseparable from their relations" (Pfau, 2017, p. 14). Or as Polanyi and
Prosch put it, "we shape all knowledge by the way we know it" but "even in the shaping

of his own anticipations, the knower is controlled by impersonal requirements" (1975, p.
194). The freedom of originality "lies in this perfect service" (p. 194) of responsibility to
a background of tradition and situation that call us to judge and to act. Indeed, it is only
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"by submitting to one's own sense of responsibility" (Polanyi, 1959a, p. 62) to a "hidden
reality" that is "already there, ready to be discovered" (p. 35); it is only by making a

responsible claim with universal intent in the context of "a pre-existent task" (p. 36) with
"straining" clues "pointing towards the true solution" (p. 62); it is only as a person

dependent on a self-modifying tradition, sensitive to the present situation, and cognizant

of the possibilities of an indeterminate future; that "the correct solution" (p. 36) can be
discovered, or "a valid choice can be made" (p. 62). The Crow recognized the dream of
Plenty Coups, to use Polanyi's words, as an opportunity and a calling, a calling which
determined their responsibilities.

Acceptance of the person as more than an isolated and independent individual
leads naturally to a reliance on tradition, to trust in the mutual authority of a community

of responsible individuals, to the acceptance of an indeterminate and hidden reality, and
to the recognition of personal knowledge adhering to the logic of tacit knowing. That we

attend subsidiarily from particulars to focus on a whole, suggests how particularity in a
person may exist harmoniously even when its elements are in tension with each other.

Indeed, it is the tension between the possibilities intimated in subsidiary particulars and
the comprehensive whole on which they bear that gives them meaning. It is true that the
particularities that make up a person, whether psychological, sociological, or theological,

may indeed clash with each other. Yet, they remain a part of the whole so long as they
continue to bear on it and remain meaningful as subsidiaries to the whole.
Formed by tension between possibility and constraint, a person becomes known in

action, for reality revealed in indeterminate future manifestations is always forward
facing, always moving from what is to what may yet be. The calling "to live and die in
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this body," that Polanyi described, involves "struggling to satisfy its desires, recording
my impressions by aid of such sense organs as it is equipped with, and acting through the

puny machinery of my brain, my nerves and my muscles" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 323).
It is a calling to action, and actions so described are integral to the formation and

expression of a person.

Furthermore, "[w]hile the first rise of living individuals

overcame the meaninglessness of the universe by establishing in it centres of subjective
interests, the rise of human thought in its turn overcame these subjective interests by its
universal intent" (p. 389). Self-originating action moves a person forward; yet it remains

incomplete, "for a self-centred life ending in death has little meaning" (p. 389). Human

thought reaches beyond individual action by claiming universality; yet, "owing to the
finitude of man's condition it too remains blatantly incomplete" (p. 389). Once again, we
see the tension between possibilities - of a self-centered life or human thought with
universal intent - straining against constraints - against finitude and death. In that

tension, person becomes more than self or individual, for a person who is called to
responsibility discovers meaning in responsible action.

The meaningful action of a responsible person may also be seen in the work of

Nicholas Zingale. In his 2007 survey of environmental managers he arrived at general

conclusions by surveying persons rather than isolated individuals. This distinction can be

seen in both the types of questions asked and in the effort made "to stimulate the subjects

to not only discuss what they know about their job, but to get a sense of how they know
it" (Zingale, p. 60). A similar sensitivity to the person may be seen in Zingale's 2016

study with Piccorelli. In this latter study, the centrality of persons, in Pfau's or Jardine's

sense, was particularly evident in the interconnectedness of the conductors, the grip
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operators, the repair technicians, and the powerhouse workers. Zingale and Piccorelli
specifically noted the manner in which "[t]he cable connects each employee to the others"

(2016, p. 360) and thereby "sheds light on a link that has really always been there

between individuals within any organization and their connectedness to society" (p. 361).
Indeed, "[l]ike the cable car operators, public administrators are nested in a much larger

environment, some of which they can control, most of which they cannot." (Zingale and
Piccorelli, p. 362).

A person is not a passive puzzle piece to be manipulated at will, nor an
instrumental cog in an organizational machine, but neither is s/he wholly independent, for

"being ... is a way of understanding who we are by carefully observing our engagements
with the world and letting these tell us about us" (Zingale, 2007, p. 48). The harmonious

particularity so evident in a person acts as background that may be relied on or integrated
to bear on a comprehensive entity that is our focus. However, such integration is never

straightforward and simple. In public administration, Zingale and Piccorelli suggest,
"public administrators play a significant role . ofnot only creating the conditions for the

intentionality arc of know-how, but also experiencing an understanding for know-how
themselves" (2016, p. 364). Indeed, "developing know-how is highly individualistic yet
shaped by the demands of a situation as influenced by society at large" (p. 364). Such

knowledge is truly personal, yet it is not subjective, for it is anchored in the active
formation ofindividual persons who are shaped by situation and tradition.

A second look at Mary Schmidt's examination of the failure of the Teton River
Dam in light of this enhanced understanding of person and its relationship to situation
and tradition, suggests that science, engineering, and bureaucracy, as Schmidt described
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them, had become isolated in a positivist world, divorced from a self-modifying tradition
and from person as harmonious particularity. In contrast, her call for acceptance of
"alternative kinds of knowledge" of "specific phenomena" attained through "direct,

bodily involvement" and "synthesis of data" from "several senses," "a feel for the hole,"
"several individuals," or "over time" (Schmidt, 1993, p. 530), was a call for an
understanding of person, in Polanyi's full sense, and of institutions more dependent on a
dynamic tradition as supported and enforced by community. Embrace of Schmidt's

suggestions would result in more responsible action - in administrative conservatorship,

to use Terry's terminology, which is rooted in the logic of tacit knowing.
A Redefined Science of Administration

As suggested in Chapter IV, the paradox of positivism is that those who defend

determinism and detached, impersonal knowledge abandon such a philosophy in practice.
Yet words and ideas have power, and as Polanyi made clear, the isolation of moral
passions from their tacit, traditional meanings by masking them in neutral, scientific

terminology is a temporary solution that leaves society unstable and predisposed to moral
inversion.

Consequently, Polanyi set out to define a post-critical philosophy of

knowledge and reality that explains and justifies the manner in which we practice science

or law or economics or art. In a post-critical world, a new definition of science is
necessary, a science that is dependent on tradition and anchored in personal knowledge.

As I have argued in this dissertation, the philosophical shift that Polanyi attempted was to
move away from a critical philosophy that is anchored in the rejection or uprooting of
"unproven" and "voluntary ... belief" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 269) and that leaves only
an absolute, empirical world of "real knowledge" discovered through a rigorous method
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of absolute doubt. Such a philosophy of radical doubt leads to objectivism if reality is
considered independent of the subject and therefore fixed and permanent. Alternatively,

it may lead to subjectivism, if reality is understood to be radically contingent on the

subject. Both extremes leave the subject without meaning for, as Polanyi recognized,
meaning emerges from freedom that is constrained, from dynamic order and from public
liberty, from heuristic power restrained by orderliness. Objectivism controls and restricts

itself into meaninglessness while rejecting contingency and liberty.

Subjectivism

imagines possibility without restraint and finds that a world of absolute freedom is

without substance or purpose.
Polanyi rejected both alternatives. To suggest that "science deals only with the
factual aspect of things, while their value can be appreciated only by other modes of

thought" is both "false in principle" and "impracticable" (1954/1974, p. 85). Indeed, such
a belief "sets for science an ideal of objectivity which would discredit large and perfectly
sound parts of science and ... if strictly applied, would invalidate all empirical science"

(p. 85). At the same time, it also "deprives our valuations ofthe support which they may

justifiably derive from their continuity with similar acts within science" (p. 85). Such an
objectivism "seeks to relieve us from all responsibility for the holding ofour beliefs. That

is why it can be logically expanded to systems of thought in which the responsibility of
the human person is eliminated from the life and society ofman" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p.

323). However, to reject objectivism without safe-guarding the limits it places on us,

would acquire for us "a nihilistic freedom ofaction" (p. 324), an empty promise of liberty
without meaning.
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A shift from a critical philosophy, therefore, is not enough, a shift from requires a

shift to. The other half of change is a destination, and it is this constructive side of
Polanyi's philosophy that has attracted much of my attention9.

Central to Polanyi's

argument for a post-critical philosophy is an understanding of person as I have described
in this concluding chapter, an understanding of person as harmonious particularity, as a
story being written in time and space, or as a comprehensive entity dependent on but not

defined by subsidiary particulars. It is "further expansion of our personal participation in

the act of knowing" that may "bridge the gap between scientific method and the study

and conduct of human affairs" (Polanyi, 1954/1974, p. 92). According to Polanyi, there

can be a science of administration, for "[s]cience does not require that we study man and
society in a detached manner" (p. 96). Therefore, "[w]e cast off the limitations of
objectivism in order to fulfil our calling, which bids us to make up our minds about the

whole range of matters with which man is properly concerned" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p.

324).
Rather than relying on an impersonal, detached approach to science and
administration, Polanyi argued that "the part played by personal knowledge in science
suggests that the science of man should rely on greatly extended uses of personal

knowledge" (1954/1974, p. 96). As he made clear, "even an exact science is seen to

include an art, the art of establishing correspondence with the raw experience given to
our senses" (p. 88). Answers to the questions that interest us, therefore, "must be given in
terms of personal knowledge" for "Laplacean predictions would convey none of this

9 The importance of Polanyi's constructive philosophy was brought to my attention by questions posed by
Phil Mullins at the 2014 annual meeting of the Polanyi Society and presented more formally in his
introduction to a 2013 forum on Polanyi's political thought published in Perspectives on Political Science.

179

personal knowledge and would therefore ignore almost the entire range of existing
knowledge" (Polanyi, p. 89).

Indeed, a broader understanding of person and a

recognition of the personal nature of our knowledge suggests that our comprehension of

humanity "may consist in putting ourselves in the place of the persons we are studying
and in trying to solve their problems as they see them or as we see them" (Polanyi, p. 96).
"[W]e might begin" wrote Polanyi, "by prohibiting the use of the term scientific in praise

of a study of human society, for a trial period of, say, 10 years. And in the meantime we
should try training ourselves to study human affairs by intense participation in human
problems instead of by detachment from them" (1957, p. 482).

Such an approach to the study of humanity "opens the door for our entry into

human personality in its whole moral, religious, and artistic outlook, as the bearer of a
historical consciousness, a political and legal responsibility" (Polanyi, 1954/1974, p. 96).
As was explained in Chapter II, tacit knowing "operates by an expansion of our person
into a subsidiary awareness of particulars that are merged into our focal awareness of a
whole" (p. 94). In this sense, our capacity "for understanding another person's actions by

entering into his situation and for judging his actions from his own point of view" is

shown to involve "an act of uncritical assimilation of certain things which enables us
critically to appreciate others" (p. 94). When we are called by our "historical situation
and our acceptance of a certain role" to personally participate in a search for truth or in
the acquisition of a skill or the completion of a task, we accept our situation and our role

as "legitimate guides to our responsible participation in the problems presented by these
situations" (p. 94). Because we are called to enter into and fulfill our calling, we respond

personally, guided by purpose or passion. A science based on tacit knowing, then,
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"restores us to an acceptance of our position as members of a human society" (pp. 94-95).

Indeed,

A system of ethics or a code of laws can no longer be regarded as
unscientific in a derogatory sense because it predicts nothing that could be
true or false, for science is seen to accredit us with the capacity for
authentic appreciation of other values than the truth or falsity of a
statement. As we know order from disorder, health from sickness, the
ingenious from the trivial, we may distinguish with equal authority good
from evil, charity from cruelty, justice from injustice. (Polanyi, p. 97)
Full acceptance of the person recognizes and embraces a calling to responsible
action that is anchored in the capacity to recognize and appreciate more than simply truth

or falsehood. Assumption of that responsibility is both a commitment to the future and
an act of faith that trusts and relies on a comprehensive tradition that brings together
heredity, culture, education, and individual goals in the harmonious particularity of

personhood. In this confluence, of self-centered "inarticulate interpretations by a person"
and "universalized processes" or "universal technical principles," we meet humanity's

"momentous acts of responsible commitment, made by accepting his own starting-point
in space and time, as the condition ofhis own calling" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 323). "We
cast off the limitations of objectivism in order to fulfil our calling," wrote Polanyi,

"which bids us to make up our minds about the whole range of matters with which man is
properly concerned" (p. 324).

Having accepted our calling, "we claim that our

participation is personal, not subjective" (p. 324). The background in which our story is

set "lies beyond our responsibility, " for it is beyond our control, yet it is "transformed by
our sense of responsibility into part of our calling" (p. 324). Our faith in, our reliance on

"the historically given," anchors us and sets the conditions for our subjective acts of
personal choice. Our redemption from both objectivity and subjectivity, then, "is to lose
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ourselves in the performance of an obligation which we accept, in spite of its appearing
on reflection impossible of achievement" (p. 324). "We undertake the task of attaining

the universal in spite of our admitted infirmity," insisted Polanyi, "because we hope to be

visited by powers for which we cannot account in terms of our specifiable capabilities"
(p. 324). We can know more than we can tell.

Thus, at the confluence of biology and philosophical self-accrediting, man
stands rooted in his calling under a firmament of truth and greatness. Its
teachings are the idiom of his thought: the voice by which he commands
himself to satisfy his intellectual standards. Its commands harness his
powers to the exercise of his responsibilities. It binds him to abiding
purposes, and grants him power and freedom to defend them. And we can
establish it now as a matter of logic that man has no other power than
this. He is strong, noble and wonderful so long as he fears the voices of
this firmament; but he dissolves their power over himself and his own
powers gained through obeying them, if he turns back and examines what
he respects in a detached manner. Then law is no more than what the
courts will decide, art but an emollient of nerves, morality but a
convention, tradition but an inertia, God but a psychological necessity.
Then man dominates a world in which he himself does not exist. For with
his obligations he has lost his voice and his hope, and been left behind
meaningless to himself. (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 380)
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POSTSCRIPT
A POST-CRITICAL SCIENCE OF ADMINISTRATION:
TOWARD A SOCIETY OF EXPLORERS

The purpose of this dissertation is simple: it seeks to answer a problem long at the
heart of the American study of public administration. Specifically, it seeks to discover

how we can develop a science of administration. The first widely recognized expression

of this concern can be seen in Woodrow Wilson's 1887 "The Study of Administration" in

which he wrote,
Seeing every day new things which the state ought to do, the next thing is
to see clearly how it ought to do them. This is why there should be a
science of administration which shall seek to straighten the paths of
government, to make its business less unbusinesslike, to strengthen and
purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness. (Wilson,
1887, p. 201, italics added)

Fifty years later, public administration in the United States came into its own in
response to the Great Depression and World War II, but its orthodox approach was

already beginning to be questioned. What had developed was a critique of orthodoxy that
recognized a certain naiveté about a discipline that separated politics and decision from

administration and execution; about a discipline that assumed that public administration
could be studied in the same impersonal, objective manner as the physical sciences; about

183

a discipline that believed that a set of law-like "principles" of administration could be
discovered and applied in a detached manner; and about a discipline that treated economy

and efficiency as the central or even the sole goals of administration. However, the
critique of public administration orthodoxy came from two different sets of philosophical

assumptions, and the result has been a bifurcation of the field of public administration

around the possibility of developing a science of administration.
One set of critics are those who continue to embrace a science of administration
as an ideal worth pursuing. While recognizing the fallibility of human beings and the

complexity of human relations, these scholars believe that objective, empirical
knowledge is possible. Shortly after World War II, Herbert Simon captured this belief
when he wrote that,

A valid approach to the study of administration requires that all the
relevant diagnostic criteria be identified; that each administrative situation
be analyzed in terms of the entire set of criteria; and that research be
instituted to determine how weights can be assigned to the several criteria
when they are, as they usually will be, mutually incompatible.
(1945/1957, p. 36)
Importantly, this approach to administrative study assumes an "objective" reality that is
fixed and certain and therefore discoverable. As did public administration orthodoxy,

this system holds the physical sciences up as exemplars of how a science of

administration may be defined, but it emphasizes the need for additional logical
discipline through the use of formal methods and theoretical constructs to focus on facts.

A second set of critics have been those who see science, itself, as culpable. These
critics emphasize the importance of understanding the values, like democracy and liberty,

that underlie the work of public administrators, and promote an openness to alternative
ways of thinking about the world. Dwight Waldo represented this second approach when
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he wrote that,
Students of administration ... have simply been willing to accept the
verdict of science - or more accurately, popular conceptions of the verdict
of science - as to the nature ofreality. It is appropriate to inquire whether
these concepts of reality are consistent among themselves, whether they
are valid within their proper realm, and whether, if valid, they have been
extended beyond the bounds oftheir validity. (1948, p. 21)

This second set of critics have explored a broad range of methods and philosophies, but
what ties them together is their suspicion ofa science defined in positivist terms.

The purpose ofthis dissertation is to add another voice to the debate about science
in administration. This voice will not seek to remove science from public administration
nor even to undermine its influence. Instead, it will seek to redefine science in a way that

embraces values and opens it to the influence of alternative philosophies and to the use of
alternative methods and models. This voice is the voice of Michael Polanyi, a worldrenowned physical chemist who became acutely aware of the fallacy of a positivist

approach to science when he was confronted by its logical conclusion in the Soviet Union
ofStalin. "What philosophy of science had we in the Westto pit against this?" he asked

(1946/1964, p. 9), for it was the very arguments used in the West to justify science that
were being used under totalitarianism to destroy it. Beginning in the mid-1930s, Polanyi

began criticizing central planning, totalitarianism, and a positivist approach to science

through economic, social, and philosophical writings. With science always at the center
of his thinking, he also began constructing an alternative philosophy of knowledge and
reality.

Science, Polanyi claimed, is but one example of personal commitment to “the
logic of self-compulsion with universal intent” (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 396). Like art,

law, a market economy, and many other arenas, science can not be centrally managed
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through a hierarchy, but depends on “coordination by mutual adjustment of independent

initiatives” (Polanyi, 1962, p. 54). Scientific principles are enforced by a community
through tradition, and science is learned as a skill by apprenticeship to a master. Through
a process of tacit knowing, it discovers an independent reality pregnant with possibility

and rejects objective knowledge that is detached and impersonal. In practice, science
itself relies on the type of alternative philosophy that Polanyi sought to reveal, and to

understand his critique of central planning, totalitarianism, and positivism, it is necessary

to understand his philosophical argument.
Polanyi's central contribution to philosophy is the logic of tacit knowing. We

know, wrote Polanyi, by integrating subsidiary particulars to a focal whole. This triad of
context, person, and object of our awareness comprises the structure of tacit knowing

(note that Walter Gulick (2012-2013) argues that there is sometimes a "via" that enters
into tacit integration). It is widely accepted that we may identify two types of knowledge.
The formal knowledge that is found in books, databases, and so on, is explicit knowledge.
The informal knowledge that we have of something we are in the act of doing or

discovering is tacit knowledge. To use explicit knowledge, we must know it tacitly. In
fact, wrote Polanyi, all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.

Take, for example, piano playing.

Anyone who has listened closely to an

accomplished piano player knows that the personality of the pianist is evident in her

playing. A piano is designed so that only one sound may emerge from hitting each key,
yet a pianist passionately reaches into the depths of a piano to pull out an infinite wealth

of music. This is tacit knowing at work. Knowing the keys of a scale and how to place
one's fingers are bits of explicit knowledge memorized by a novice, but expert playing
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requires the pianist to learn how those bits fit together into a comprehensive whole. The
context, including explicit knowledge, must be integrated by a person into the object of
our attention.

Not only are there two kinds of knowledge, but tacit knowing is also characterized

by two types of awareness. The piano player is focally aware of the music he is playing
but he is also subsidiarily aware of the keys and of his arms and fingers and even his

breathing.

Skills like bicycle riding or using a hammer are clear examples of tacit

knowing and the two types of awareness integral to its logic. In fact, if the pianist turns

his focus to his fingers or the keys, his playing may well hesitate and unravel, just as
someone riding a bicycle may crash if she turns her focus from her destination to her feet

on the pedals.
Perception also demonstrates tacit knowing - when we hear someone speak we are

subsidiarily aware of a plethora of sounds around us, but our focus is on the speaker. Our

minds integrate the sounds together into a comprehensive whole. In contrast, someone
trying new hearing aids may find that all sounds have become focal and the cacophony
may make true hearing difficult, if not impossible.

Tool usage helps to demonstrate another key aspect of tacit knowing - when we

use a tool, it becomes an extension of our body. WhenIpickupapen, itismyfocus, but
when I use it to write a sentence or to draw a picture or to adjust the time on the back of
my clock, I turn my focus to the sentence or the picture or the time and I become aware

of the pen subsidiarily, rather than focally. The sentence or picture or time, then, become
the meaning of my use of the pen, and the pen, while essential to my knowing process,
recedes into the background as part of the context. Polanyi argued that I indwell or
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interiorize the pen when I use it skillfully - I make it an extension ofmy body. The same

is true of perception: when we see something we focus on the sight, but we are

subsidiarily aware ofa host ofother factors - ofobjects at the edge ofour visual field,but
also of the muscles controlling our eyes, the tilt of our head, and so on. In fact, Polanyi
argued, all conscious transactions that we have with the world involve the subsidiary use

of our body. Indeed, our body is primarily known subsidiarily, as it bears on the objects
ofourfocus.
Before the logic of tacit knowing recedes into the background, it may be helpful

to introduce some additional ways ofunderstanding it. We may say that we submit to the

subsidiaryparticularsofanintegrationwhenwerelyonthembyindwellingthem,butwe
do so responsibly, for a purpose, for we trust that they bear on a reality that can be

known, albeit indeterminately. This reliance on a context to bear on reality creates a

logical gap that must be leapt, but once it is leapt, it is impossible to return - once we

know something, we cannot un-know it. Furthermore, the possibilities ofthe background
to point to reality infuse us with a passion that drives us onward. This is the heuristic

power of tacit knowing - once we tacitly know something we cannot un-know it, and
leaping a logical gap does not complete our task, but opens us to new possibilities and

new discoveries.

The dynamics of tacit knowing involve intuition together with passionate use of
imagination, but both intuition and imagination may be seen as integration of subsidiary

particulars to a focal whole. In the former, that process occurs almost unconsciously; in
the latter, it is more intentional. Yet central to both is the leaping ofa logical gap through

integration ofa context to the object ofour attention. When Polanyi wrote that "we can
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know more than we can tell" (1966/2009, p. 4), his use of the phrase "We can know"
rather than "We do know" emphasized that tacit knowing is a process. Had he written
"We do know" he would have left open the possibility of making tacit knowledge

explicit, but he recognized that knowing is not only a dynamic process but results in

knowledge that is indefinite and sometimes unsuspected or even unspecifiable. "We
meet here with a new definition of reality" wrote Polanyi.

Real is that which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future.
Hence an explicit statement can bear on reality only by virtue of the tacit
coefficient associated with it. (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 10)

Like our knowledge of it, reality, itself, is indeterminate.

Looking backward, the

orderliness of a comprehensive entity reveals the involvement of a person, but looking

forward, its indeterminate possibilities excite us with a heuristic passion for discovery.
Having recognized a relationship between an indeterminate reality and the logic

of tacit knowing, it is a small step to recognize that the logic of tacit knowing becomes
evident in the objects that we know, not just in our knowledge of them.

Polanyi

described an ontological theory of a stratified reality in which a lower level is

characterized by principles which leave possibilities open at the margins. A menagerie of

processors, memory, screens, buttons, and cases are each characterized by a set of
principles, but each leaves open possibilities by which they may be used. It takes a
higher level set of principles, not evident in the lower levels, to assemble the components
into a phone or computer that gives them meaning as a comprehensive entity. The

success of such an entity is determined by the success of higher level principles, but once
formed, its failure is determined by the lower-level components and the principles which

characterize them. In examining such a comprehensive entity, it becomes clear that a
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stratified reality reflects the structure and logic of tacit knowing, and just as tacit

knowledge may emerge from the integration of subsidiary particulars to a focal whole, so

a comprehensive entity may emerge from the restraint of lower-level possibilities by
higher-level principles.

Finally, it should be clear by now that reduction by turning our focus to the

subsidiaryparticulars of a comprehensive entity does not simply shift ourfocus. Rather,
it dissolves the integration that brings it into being. No longer do we know the context
subsidiarily as it points to our original focus, for it has become our new focus and we are

now depending on our subsidiary awareness of its context to give it meaning.

Furthermore, to attempt to regain the comprehensive entity, we must reintegrate it, and
the new integration must take into account new elements that make it into a new entity. I

will always remember helping a friend reassemble his motorcycle transmission, only to
find extra parts that belonged deep within. It still functioned but it was no longer the
factory built transmission it had been.
Witha freshunderstanding ofthe logic oftacit knowing in hand, we may return to

an examination of the bifurcation in American public administration scholarship that I

identified in my introduction, around the possibility and legitimacy of developing a

science ofadministration. Those who argue for a more robust administrative science tend
to adopt what may be called the positivist model, a model which sees science primarily as

a means for obtaining knowledge of the world through empirical research using formal
methods that attempt to isolate objective, impersonal facts from subjective, personal

values. Any data obtained through such methods is interpreted by theoretical models that

may be used to establish universal generalizations. Tacitly assumed (but not necessarily
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acknowledged) are a fixed reality and a deterministic relationship of its components.
Certainty is necessary to give meaning to reality and to justify its independence from the

person.

To account for freedom of choice, absolute determinism is eschewed, but

recurring attempts to define reality precisely, to measure it exactly, to describe it

explicitly, and to predict and control it, suggest a deterministic mindset. To be true,
indeterminacy is recognized, but it is dismissed as anomaly and is mitigated if at all

possible. Given such an understanding of science, public administration scholars have
focused their attention on impersonal facts that are separated from values; they have
relied on formal theories, methods, and models, and they have privileged the positivist

model and methods above all others.
Critics of a positivist model of administrative science have argued that fact and

value cannot be separated for they are joined organically, that administrative means are
always informed by values, that the study of valueless facts leads to meaningless action,
and that separating fact from value forces administrative scientists to smuggle their own

values into their work disguised as "scientific" terms. Critics have also argued that
rigorous, formal method is problematic because it creates two worlds. On the one hand is

a formula world that assumes a certain reality that can be disassembled, measured, and
described in an abstract, impersonal manner, and that classifies reality either as examples

ofthe formula or as accidents or anomalies. On the other hand is the real world in which
we live and which is forced to respond to the formula world. Because of the difference
between the two worlds, translation back and forth is necessary, and it is unclear that

translation efforts are successful. Critics have suggested a number of alternatives to a

positivist science, including "hands-on" approaches, story-telling, intuition, and judgment
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that involves "intimate knowledge" and "social rationality." Such alternatives synthesize
data from multiple sources and demonstrate that "we know more than we can say"

(Schmidt, 1993, p. 530).

As Polanyi recognized also about physicists and chemists, those who claim to
follow a positivist model of science, do not actually do so in practice. We pretend to
follow strict rules, to be "pulled by strings" as if we are puppets. Yet, in practice, we

know that we are making judgments and decisions, that we have freedom to choose, and
that a potential discovery inflames us "with creative desire" and imparts "intimations that

guide [us] from clue to clue and from surmise to surmise" (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 14).
The problem, Polanyi recognized, is that we have no philosophy to justify and support

our personal action. So long as we accept the positivist model of science as valid, our

only alternative is to reject science completely by embracing non-scientific models and
methods and forms of knowledge.

One of Polanyi's greatest contributions to the study of public administration,
therefore, is to give us an alternative definition of science that is based on the logic of
tacit knowing. If we know by indwelling, rather than by dominating, reality, then our

central concern becomes discovery, rather than method. A science focused on discovery

of what is hidden but knowable eschews both a subjective reality that is created at will,
and an objective reality that is fixed and determinate. Instead, it embraces a reality which

is expected to reveal itself unexpectedly in the future and which is anchored in personal
encounter with the world. Such a post-critical science readily submits to and relies on

the tacit coefficients associated with all knowledge, while responsibly committing itself to
a reality that is affirmed with universal intent. The discovery of reality through personal
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intuition and imagination recognizes that it can only be described, measured, modeled,

predicted, and controlled tentatively, by means of personal judgment.
Therefore, a post-critical science of administration is interested in personal clues

rather than impersonal facts, for indeterminate facts are only meaningful if they point to

and are integrated by a person into a comprehensive whole. As Waldo noted, facts

without values are meaningless but, set within the logic of tacit knowing, there is no need
to separate facts from values.

Transformed into clues, they become meaningful as

subsidiary elements of a comprehensive whole. Likewise, a post-critical science of

administration does not rely on formal methods and theory, for formal processes overlook
the personal appraisal necessary to turn facts into clues.

Indeed, any attempt to

exhaustively list all alternatives cannot succeed in the face of an indeterminate world.

Nor can it evaluate alternatives without judgment nor define descriptive terms without
tacit knowing, for formal processes are, themselves, personal understandings of the

world.

Furthermore, because discovery is central to a post-critical science of

administration, it readily embraces alternative methods and models and forms of

knowledge. Indeed, even a positivist model of science becomes useful in the "detailing"

of the context or background of a tacit integration.
A post-critical science of administration calls us to discover the world of

administration through the logic of tacit knowing. Because of its radically contingent
nature and its reliance on belief, tacit knowing is never general and universal and always
runs the risk of being mistaken. It is possible only through humble commitment, held

with universal intent.

It is "the deliberate holding of unproven beliefs" (Polanyi,

1958/1962, p. 268).
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In addition to re-defining science and how we know, the implications and

influence of Polanyi's philosophy may be readily seen in several other arenas.
Community is central to much of Polanyi's writing, and he defines conviviality as the

"interpersonal coincidence of tacit judgments" (1958/1962, p. 151).

That such

conviviality makes communication possible is itself important, but it is community's role

in supporting and enforcing tradition that I have highlighted.

The premisses of a

tradition "cannot be explicitly formulated," but may be "authentically manifested" only in

practice (Polanyi, 1946/1964, p. 85). They are tacit, known only subsidiarily as they
point to an object of attention. Therefore, "A society which wants to preserve a fund of
personal knowledge must submit to tradition" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 53).

Such

submission, however, is not blind, for the premisses ofa tradition as "transmitted to us .
are our own interpretations of the past" (p. 160) and our reliance on them also modifies

them. Tradition, as Polanyi characterized it, is self-modifying.

In public administration literature, such an understanding oftradition may be seen
in the writing ofJohn Rohr who argued that the Constitution did not emerge ex nihilo, but
is part of a continuing, active process. It may be seen as "the conclusion of the great

public argument ofone hundred and fifty years ofcolonial experience and the premise of
the great public argument of the next two centuries" (Rohr, 1986, p. 173). Michael

Spicer also recognized the importance of a self-modifying tradition by emphasizing the
importance of the common-law reasoning by which judges turn to past decisions as
guides for their own judgments, with those fresh judgments then becoming part of the

background on which they, and others, will rely for future decisions. Both Rohr and

Spicer were effectively describing self-modifying tradition anchored in the logic of tacit
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knowing.
In response to the abuse of science in the Soviet Union, Polanyi argued strongly
in favor of the freedom of scientists to choose their own problems. He appropriated the

term "dynamic order" from Gestalt Psychology to describe the giving of free rein to the
elements of a system. In society, such dynamic or spontaneous order demonstrates "self
co-ordination by mutual adjustment" (Polanyi, 1967/1969, p. 84), by the freedom of

individuals constrained by their interaction with each other, much as the possibilities of a
lower level are constrained by the principles of a higher one. Indeed, Polanyi argued that
"[a] polycentric task can be socially managed only by a system of mutual adjustments"

(1951/1998, p. 226). Such a dynamic order not only reflects the logic of tacit knowing,
but it also provides an environment that supports such a process of knowing and being by
allowing for indeterminacy. In contrast, a formal, centralized organization must rely on

fixed, explicit knowledge and assumes a certain and determinate reality.

Polanyi pointed specifically to science, a market economy, and Common Law as
examples of dynamic order, but he also noted that other domains, like art, are
spontaneously ordered. Within public administration literature, Timothy Dahlstrom has

found dynamic order particularly relevant to "socio-intellectual" networks, and

networking and polycentricity literatures resonate some of Polanyi's ideas. However, the

two most extensive applications of Polanyi's concept of dynamic order have been Spicer's
characterization of civil association and Charles Lindblom's "Science of Muddling

Through".
According to Spicer, the understanding of the state "which undergirds much of
public administration, is one of purposive association" (Spicer, 1997, p. 90), "in which
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individuals see themselves ... bound together for the pursuit of a particular coherent set
of common substantive ends" (p. 91). However, public administration in practice is
largely characterized by civil association in which a set of rules of conduct limit

"individual spheres of action" (p. 96) while individuals are otherwise given freedom to

pursue their own ends. Lindblom's "science of muddling through" (1959), or "disjointed
incrementalism" (1979), also picks up on the practical nature of dynamic order. He
argued that a "rational-comprehensive" model of decision-making is effectively
impossible and that, in practice, public administrators employ an incremental method that

is clearly parallel to Polanyi's dynamic order. Importantly, both writers have not only
described dynamically ordered systems, but have also acknowledged the importance of

relying on a self-modifying tradition. Consequently, both have reflected the logic oftacit
knowing in their writing.

Closely associated with dynamic order is Polanyi's concept of public liberty.
Public liberty is not private freedom but is the freedom of individuals to act responsibly

on behalf ofa community. Many ofthe systems that he described as dynamic orders also
foster public liberty. In science, for example, individual scientists are given freedom to

choose their own problems, but their freedom is constrained by their submission to the

scientific tradition. Through apprenticeship, they learn both explicit and tacit knowledge
contained in that tradition, but it is only when they begin to practice science by
voluntarily submitting to its premisses and standards, that they are granted freedom to act

on their own. Their newfound freedom is not an individual freedom but a public one for
which they have accepted responsibility, a freedom that leaves them also subject to the
mutual authority ofall other scientists.
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Importantly, public liberty can be granted to a system as a whole. Science has

been granted such freedom, just as it then grants freedom to individual scientists. The
domain of Common Law and the "socio-intellectual networks" described by Dahlstrom

have also been granted public liberty, and it is this granting of freedom - to act

responsibly on behalf of society - that characterizes a free society.

Larry Terry's

characterization of administrative conservatorship may be seen in this light. The primary

function of bureaucratic leaders, he wrote, "is to protect and maintain administrative
institutions in a manner that promotes or is consistent with constitutional processes,

values, and beliefs" (Terry, 1995, p. 24). Terry described bureaucratic institutions as
dynamically ordered systems granted freedom by society to act independently, but

responsibly, for the benefit of society. Like science, such institutions foster public liberty
by then granting freedom to individual administrators to act responsibly on behalf of said

institutions and therefore on behalf of society as a whole.

In light of his understanding of a post-critical science, Polanyi suggested that our

approach should be to "try training ourselves to study human affairs by intense

participation in human problems instead of by detachment from them" (Polanyi, 1957, p.
482). Such a focus on personal encounter with the world around us has always been

evident in American public administration - as the early work of settlement houses and
more recent work by community and neighborhood development organizations bear

witness. In current public administration literature, I find the work of Nicholas Zingale
particularly interesting for it demonstrates an understanding of the personal nature of

knowledge and the responsible participation of the scholar. In Zingale's work, a person is
not a passive puzzle piece to be manipulated at will, nor an instrumental cog in an
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organizational machine, for "being ... is a way of understanding who we are by carefully

observing our engagements with the world and letting these tell us about us" (Zingale,

2007, p. 48).
In a post-critical science of administration, then, the person becomes central. Yet
such a person is not an isolated individual in the tradition of Hobbes, but a being set in

community and demonstrating harmonious particularity. We are called to submit to the

context in which we find ourselves; called "to lose ourselves in the performance of an
obligation which we accept" (Polanyi, 1958/1962, p. 324).

Such a responsible

commitment is possible because our knowledge is personal rather than subjective or
objective, and the knowing process, itself, is tacit. We can know more than we can tell.
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